Alleged CRU Emails - 25 results below

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From: Fred Pearce <100713.1311@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>
To: keith briffa <k.briffa@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>
Subject: new sciwentist feature
Date: 13 Oct 96 10:32:49 EDT

Keith,

This is my first draft of the dendrochronology feature. I wonder if you have time to go through look. I hope you recognise the quotes, but please makes changes if they think they misrepresent you. And if you can answer any of the questions in square brackets that would be most useful.

Ideally, can you not change the full text but make notes, remarks, answers referring to it.

As ever, haste is of the essence.

Regards

--Fred Pearce

It was one of the largest volcanic eruptions of the past xxx xxxx xxxxyears. Mount Changbai [correct?] in China blasted 50 cubic kilometres of rock into the air and deluged much of the far east with hot pumice. Radiocarbon dated the explosion at early in the 11th century. But it took Keith Briffa, sitting in his office in Norwich and juggling data from tree rings round the world, to pinpoint the precise year: 1032.

Volcanoes scatter the atmosphere with dust that deflects sunlight and cools the world beneath for a year or more. And when the world cools, trees grow less. That year's growth rings are smaller and less dense.

By analysing those rings, Briffa and his colleagues at the Climatic Research Unit in the University of East Anglia have charted these sudden and dramatic shocks to the climate system, from Changbai to Pinatubo in 1991. Larches in the forests of the northern Urals, for instance, have revealed that 1032 was the coldest summer there in a thousand years, more than 6 degrees cooler than the long-term average. Four of the five coldest summers in Europe and North America during the past four centuries (1601, 1641, 1669, and 1912) coincided with known major volcanic events. "We are pretty certain the fifth one, in 1699, did too," says Briffa. "But the geologists haven't found the volcano yet."

It is clever work. But the science of tree-ring analysis, dendrochronology, is more than just a party piece for botanists. Every ring in every tree round the world contains a memory of the climate the year it was formed. Reading these rings holds the potential, Briffa believes, to answer one of the most vital questions of our time: has human activity started to warm the planet?

With colleagues in laboratories and field stations from Dublin to eastern Siberia, he has within the past year [correct?] begun an attempt to construct a history, year by year, of temperatures across northern Europe and Asia over the past xxx xxxx xxxxyears, right back to the waning of the last ice age. The tam, funded by the European Union, hope to help show whether the warming seen across the planet in the past century, and especially since around 1980, is within the limits of normal natural variability, or the start of man-made global warming.

For climatologists, the search for an irrefutable "sign" of anthropogenic warming has assumed an almost Biblical intensity. The leading figures of the UN's Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), claim that, in all probability, they have seen it. Last summer [ed: 1996], the IPCC's scientific working group, chaired by former UK Meteorological Office boss Sir John Houghton, concluded that "the balance of evidence suggests a discernible human influence on global climate". But it is like the "balance of evidence" suggesting BSE causes CJD. The judgment is far from "beyond reasonable doubt". The case remains "not proven".

Many researchers most intimately involved in the search are still far from sure how the probabilities balance. And some of the sharpest concerns are coming from the places where the original early warnings of global warming emerged in the mid-1980s. Places such as Briffa's base at the Climatic Research Unit in Norwich, and the Scripps Institution of Oceanography in California.

Few investigators doubt that the world has warmed recently. Nor that the enhanced "greenhouse effect" of pollution from gases such as carbon dioxide, will warm the planet. But in the past five years, climate researchers have growing increasingly aware of how little they really know about the natural variability from which they must pick out the "signal" of human influence.

One prominent IPCC researcher concerned about this gap in knowledge is Simon Tett from the Hadley Centre for climate modelling at the Meteorological Office, home to one of the world's five leading global circulation models, capable of recreating a mathematical version of how the atmosphere works and of running simulations of climatic changes over decades or even centuries. He says that "in the past, our estimates of natural variability have been based on climate models." But this autumn [date?], he says, those estimates have been thrown into turmoil by a paper published in the journal The Holocene. In it, Tim Barnett of the Scripps Institution of Oceanography, part of the University of California at San Diego, compared model estimates of natural temperature fluctuations over the past 400 years with the best evidence from the real world -- from instruments in the past century and "proxy data", such as Briffa's tree rings, from before that.

The result was bad news for the modellers. The two models examined -- one German, the other American -- generated a natural variability of around 0.1 degree C per century. This was less than half that revealed in the proxy data. "Of course we don't have to believe the proxy data. They certainly have problems attached to them. But my belief is that they both models, and proxy data too, underestimate real variability," says Barnett

The models' error was not, perhaps, too surprising. As Barnett points out, they do not include vital "forcing" mechanisms that alter temperature, such as solar cycles and volcanic eruptions. Nor can they yet mimic the strength of the largest year-on-year variability in the natural system, the El Nino oscillation in the Pacific Ocean, which has a global impact on climate.

Nonetheless, the findings should serve as a warning, Barnett says, that "the current models cannot be used in rigorous tests for anthropogenic signals in the real world". If they are they "might lead us to believe that an anthropogenic signal had been found when, in fact, that may not be the case."

Barnett knows how easily this can happen. He was a lead author for a critical chapter in the last IPCC scientific assessment, which investigated "the detection of climate change and attribution of causes". It formulated the IPCC case that the evidence points towards a human influence on climate, but it warned repeatedly that great uncertainties remained. "We wrote a long list of caveats in that chapter," says Barnett. "We got a lot of static from within IPCC, from people who wanted to water down and delete some of those caveats. We had to work very hard to keep them all in." Even so, when the findings were first leaked to the New York Times, it was under the headline "Scientists finally confirm human role in global warming".

Suggestive though the evidence may be, Barnett and his co-authors insist that the uncertainties, especially concerning natural variability, have to be answered. And so, suddenly, the modellers are queuing at Briffa's door to find out what his tree-ring data shows about the real world beyond the computer simulations. "Five years ago, climate modellers wanted nothing to do with the palaeo community," says Briffa with a grin. "But now they realise that they need our data. We can help them to define natural variability." He has already collaborated with Barnett. Tett paid his first visit to the dendrochronology lab in November [1996].

And so to the forests of Europe and Asia where, over the next [how many?] years Briffa will coordinate the work of colleagues in a dozen countries who hope to dramatically increase the available proxy data on past climate change. Much of the best data so far has come from the forests round Lake Tornetrask, on the northern border of Sweden, deep inside the Arctic Circle. This is near the northern limit for Scots pine, a place where their growth rate of the trees can be massively altered by small perturbations in summer temperatures. The result is dramatic differences in the thickness and density of tree rings.

The head of this work is Professor W [full first name?] Karlen [ed: acute on e], a geographer at the University of Stockholm, who over many years has taken cores from living trees and from logs and stumps hauled from old peat bogs. Despite the harsh climate, there are living trees here up to 600 years old. And the chronology can be extended ever further by analysing the dead trees. So far the climate reconstruction is complete for more than 1400 years before the present; the aim now is to extent it up to 8000 years.

The best data, says Briffa, comes from analysing both ring width and the maximum density of wood in each ring. By firing X-rays through the wood, researchers can now analyse the density of rings as little as 30 microns across -- the equivalent of a tree's girth growing by a centimetre every century. The growth of cell walls late in the growing season creates the densest wood and, says Briffa, "appears to depend directly on the average mean temperature".

Even so, ring growth is a product of many factors, including the genetics of the tree, past climate, the age of the tree and soil moisture. The relationships between ring growth and summer temperature are not a precise. But comparisons between the recent rings and known climatic data show that the rings can capture at least half of the summer temperature variability.

The temperature graphs produced at Tornetrask show "pronounced variability on all timescales, from year-on-year variations right up to century-on-century," says Briffa. On the longer timescales, for instance, they show 20 major cooling periods during the past two millenia, including long spells between 500 and 850, between 1100 and 1350 and between 1580 and 1750, the little ice age. There were also long warm spells between 900 and 1100, known as the medieval warm period, and 1360 to 1560. [ed: show graph from NERC paper].

Further back, early results suggest a strong warm era from 4000 to 3300 BC, and a cool period ending around 5070 BC. But there are intriguing gaps, for which no tree rings can be found. These, says Briffa, "suggest some major calamity that destroyed trees. Volcanoes, perhaps, or a rapid rise in the water tables." A 19-year gap between 1130 and 1111 BC, for instance, coincides with volcanic ash showing up in Greenland ice.

"What all this means," says Briffa, "is that the old image of the xxx xxxx xxxxyears since the end of the last ice age -- the Holocene era -- as climatically tranquil looks increasingly inaccurate." Hence the intense interest in the EU project, which will attempt to reconstruct those xxx xxxx xxxxyears of climate right across northern Europe and Asia, from Ireland to the Sea of Okhotsk, from the borders of Mongolia to shores of the Arctic Ocean.

During the past summer, helicopters flying low over the tundra have spotted logs in hundreds of small lakes in the Tornetrask region of northern Sweden. Karlen has donned his diving suit to help remove samples of timber from the freezing waters [did he?]. In northern Finland, local diving clubs picked some 3000 samples from lakes.

In the Arctic wastes of northern Siberia, a major survey is being conducted on the Taimyr peninsula, the largest stretch of frozen tundra in Eurasia and far north of today's tree line. There are well-preserved logs buried in river sediments here that grew between 5000 and 8000 years ago. On the Yamal Peninsula, just east of the Ural mountains on the shores of the Arctic Ocean, wood dug from the permafrost grew in conditions so cold that some summers temperatures never exceeded the threshold for growth of about 5 degrees C, so no growth rings formed. Nonetheless Yamal is the only site so far found that yields tree rings right through a gap at 300 BC. "Interestingly, the Yamal rings show this to have been the coldest period in the entire run," says Briffa.

Other, less detailed, surveys are being carried out across the whole of the north of the two continents. And this winter the timber is being analysed at laboratories in Copenhagen and Birmensdorf -- the Swiss home of Fritz Schweingruber, one of the world's top tree-ring analysts. The project will also carry out new analysis on the large numbers of samples of ancient oak already stored in laboratories in Ireland, Britain, Germany, Poland, the Netherlands and Sweden. The oak has been dragged from bogs and river beds, or liberated from archaeological sites and even the beams of old houses over the past 30 years.

"There is a massive amount of data on existing European oak rings. But much of it was done in the 1970s, and then not updated," says Briffa. One of Britain's biggest collections, at Sotterley Park near Lowestoft in Suffolk [Keith: who runs this?], has ring data going back to 1580. "But it stops in the 1980s, missing the recent major droughts. We have got to update that information."

Already, the first long data sets are starting to emerge from Siberia. Last summer [ed: 13 July 1995], Briffa, Schweingruber and Stepan Shiyatov of the Institute of Plant and Animal Ecology at Ekaterunburg in the Russian Urals published a paper on "unusual 20th-century summer warmth in a 1000-year temperature record from Siberia". A complete tree-ring chronology from AD 914, pieced together from larches on the Yamal peninsula, suggested that average summer temperatures since 1901 have been higher than for any similar length of time during the chronology. It estimated that from 1600, the depth of the little ice age, to the present day there has been a 1.14 degrees C warming. The first eight decades of the 20th century were 0.13 degrees C warmer than the next warmest period, nine centuries before in1202-91.

The chronology also showed that Europe's "little ice age" extended east of the Urals, but that the medieval warm period did not. But these long trends disguise sharp short-term anomalies. The 11th century seems to have been a particularly turbulent time in the Urals. 1032, the year of the Changbai eruption, yielded the coldest summer in a thousand years. But the following year was the second warmest of the millenium, at 2.11 degrees above the mean.

Tree rings are not the only source of proxy temperature data. Layers of ice laid down annually in permanent ice sheets, such as those in Greenland and Antarctica, carry a temperature record in the isotopic composition of the ice. Corals also have a temperature imprint, and even sediments on continental shelves can be mined for climate information. The most work, so far, has been done on ice sheets. American and European researchers in the Greenland Ice Sheet Project (GISP), for instance, have drilled for 3 kilometres into the ice pack, going back more than xxx xxxx xxxxyears. Besides plotting the course of the last ice age, they have found evidence of constant climate shifts during the past xxx xxxx xxxxyears.

Briffa says tree rings and ice cores "complement each other, focusing best at different timescales." Tree rings show annual and decade-to-decade variations very clearly. But they do not go back so far, and are not so good at spotting change from millenium to millenium. Ring analysis seems to smooth out long-term trends, probably because trees slowly adapt to these changes, disguising them." On the other hand, ice-core data shows up long-term trends very clearly, but is poor at showing single-year changes. The melting and refreezing of ice in the surface of ice packs means that the ice from individual years tends to mingle together.

The patterns of temperature change revealed by these different methods will probably always remain too fragmented to reveal unambiguous trends in global average temperatures. But this may not matter. "Frankly, global averages are not central to the issue of attributing climate change," says Barnett. "What will ultimately prove whether or not we are altering the climate will be the patterns of temperature change -- geographical patterns, seasonal patterns and vertical patterns." It is not how much it warms, but where, that will be vital.

Under the IPCC umbrella, Barnett and Phil Jones of the CRU have formed a small "detections group", to look for these tell-tale patterns. "We are systematically looking at the patterns, past and present, of all the main forcings on climate," Barnett says. They will investigate how the world's climate systems respond to volcanoes, to changes in the ocean circulation, to solar cycles and so on. "Then we will compare those patterns with what we are seeing today. What we hope is that the current patterns of temperature change prove distinctive, quite different from the patterns of natural variability in the past." And if that turns out to be the case, he says, "we will be able to close down this issue of attribution, perhaps within three to five years."

Here, the climate models will again come into play. If current climate change also accords with what the models predict from global warming, then the "hand of man" will indeed look to be on the planet's thermostat.

The models all suggest that anthropogenic global warming will show a very distinctive pattern. For instance, they predict that anthropogenic warming will be greatest in the northern latitudes of the great continental land masses, such as Eurasia. And that makes the finding of Briffa's team that summer temperatures in northern Siberia are higher than for a millenium potentially extremely important. And the prospect of further data from this region to confirm that finding so intriguing.

Briffa grins at the prospect. "The trend seems to be accelerating. We are getting reports back from Stepan, our man in the Urals, that it was warmer this spring on the Yamal peninsula there than ever before, and tree growth has been absolutely fantastic. It is a major warming, like nothing seen there for a thousand years -- and it is what the climate models predict." Caution prevails, but the elusive pattern of man-made global warming may just be emerging amid the larch groves on the sunny hills of northern Siberia.

ends

Original Filename: 857600338.txt | Return to the index page | Permalink | Later Emails

From: Arnulf GRUBLER <gruebler@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>
To: naki@xxxxxxxxx.xxx, becon@xxxxxxxxx.xxx, ja_edmonds@xxxxxxxxx.xxx, hm_pitcher@xxxxxxxxx.xxx, Fewewar@xxxxxxxxx.xxx, t-morita@xxxxxxxxx.xxx, rob.swart@xxxxxxxxx.xxx, alcamo@xxxxxxxxx.xxx, knut.alfsen@xxxxxxxxx.xxx, kennethgregory@xxxxxxxxx.xxx, akimoto@xxxxxxxxx.xxx, amann@xxxxxxxxx.xxx, Jean-Paul.Hettelingh@xxxxxxxxx.xxx, m.hulme@xxxxxxxxx.xxx, schlesin@xxxxxxxxx.xxx, streetsd@xxxxxxxxx.xxx, wagner@xxxxxxxxx.xxx
Subject: sulfur discussion paper
Date: Wed, 05 Mar 1997 17:18:58 +0000


Sulfur Emissions in New IPCC Scenarios

Arnulf Gruebler, IIASA


SUMMARY OF PROPOSED ACTIVITIES

1. Review and comments of present sulfur discussion paper
2. Revision by sulfur paper lead author
3. Preparation of comparison of regional sulfur scenarios (by lead
author with inputs from other members of writing team and experts)

Timing: August 1997.

4. Specification of minimum and desirable sulfur emission scenario
characteristics and specification (for modeling teams in open process)
5. Establishment of key relationships between sulfur emissions and
other salient scenario driving force variables (income,
technological change environmental, non-GHG policies) using the
simple metric of sulfur to carbon emission ratios.
6. Adoption of specific sulfur control scenarios in conformity with
overall scenario ``storylines''.
7. Distribution of ``template'' sulfur scenarios to selected modeling teams
for assessment of climate and acidification impacts of sulfur scenarios.

Timing: End of 1997.


DISCUSSION PAPER

1. Introduction

The purpose of this discussion paper is to review briefly
the assumptions on sulfur emissions in the IS92 IPCC scenarios,
advances in knowledge and modeling of future sulfur emission
scenarios since IS92, as well as to initiate a discussion on how
to incorporate future sulfur emissions trends into the new IPCC emissions
scenarios. The present draft will be revised based on feedback
received within the members of the IPCC writing team as well as
additional outside experts.


2. Sulfur emissions in IS92

The treatment of sulfur emissions in the IS92 scenarios was
comprehensive. In addition to the dominant energy sector emissions,
also sulfur emissions from industrial processes and land-use changes
(biomass burning) and (a constant flow) of natural sources were
included in the scenarios.

1990 base year values in IS92 were as follows in MtS
(Million tons, or Tg, elemental sulfur; to obtain
weight as SO2 multiply by 2.):

Energy Sector: 65 MtS
Other Industry: 8 MtS
Biomass burning: 2 MtS
Natural: 22 MtS
TOTAL: 98 MtS

These global base year values are well within the range given by
global sulfur emission inventories of 4 to 45 MtS natural sources
and 65 to 90 MtS anthropogenic sources in 1990 (IPCC, 1995:xxx xxxx xxxx).
A comparison of 1990 base year sulfur emission values from a number
of scenarios and integrated assessment models is enclosed as
attachment.

However, as observed in the evaluation of the IS92 scenarios (Alcamo et al.,
1995) regional sulfur emissions assumed in IS92 (e.g. for China) are
much more uncertain. There is for instance up to a factor two difference
between regionalized estimated of global inventories and aggregates of
national and regional emissions inventories. Thus, the good agreement of
base year values of IS92 at the global level masks important differences
and uncertainties at the regional level.

A first important task for the new IPCC scenarios is therefore to update the
regional sulfur emissions baseline values with the results of
latest regional sulfur emissions inventories. Such inventories are available
for Europe through EMEP and CORINAIR, North America (NAPAP), and more
recently also for Asia (e.g. the Worldbank sulfur project, Foell et al., 1995).

Improved modeling of regional sulfur emissions (and deposition, i.e.
impacts) patterns would also require a redefinition of the world
regions as used in the IS92 scenario series. For instance, Canada
is included in the region OECD-Europe, and the IS92 region "South
Asia" includes both the Indian subcontinent as well as Indonesia.
Their important differences in resource endowments lead to different
patterns of sulfur emissions. Their differing predominant weather
patterns and distinct ecosystems lead to differing acidic deposition
patterns and impacts. Both factors preclude their aggregation into
one single regional model. Active inputs from representatives of all
respective modeling communities (regional acidification impacts, regional
climate modelers, energy systems analysts) will be sought on this
issue and lessons learned within EMF activities (M. Schlesinger) on
appropriate sulfur regionalization (6 world regions) will be extremely
valuable.

Concerning future emissions of sulfur the IS92 scenarios project
global anthropogenic emissions of between 150 to 200 MtS by 2050 and
between 140 to 230 MtS by 2100 in the high growth cases, and of around 80-90
and 60 MtS in the two low scenarios (IS92c and IS92d) by 2050 and 2100
respectively. The IS92 scenario evaluation (Alcamo
et al., 1995:xxx xxxx xxxx) concluded that the IS92 scenario series only
partially reflect recent legislation to reduce sulfur emissions (e.g.
the amendments to the Clean Air Act in the US or the Second
European sulfur protocol). Hence, particularly regional sulfur
emissions in OECD countries projected in IS92 are much higher than
more recent scenarios taking account these legislative changes (as
also discussed by IPCC, 1995:xxx xxxx xxxx). For instance the recent
scenarios of the Commission of the European Communities (EC, 1996)
indicate that sulfur emissions by 2020 will be between 64 to 77 percent
below 1990 emissions levels, or between less than 2 to 3 MtS, compared to
8 in 1990. For comparison, the IS92 scenarios project for OECD
Europe (including Canada) sulfur emissions between 8.4 (IS92a and
IS92b) and 11.7 (all other scenarios) MtS by 2020, i.e. between 2 to
30 percent lower than in 1990 (12 MtS).

In addition, integrated assessment models are increasingly able to
model in greater detail driving forces of sulfur emissions as well
as acidification impacts (cf. discussion below). These model
simulations suggest that particularly in Asia acidification impacts
would require substantial sulfur emission control measures already
much earlier than 2050. The resulting global sulfur emissions
are substantially lower than suggested in the IS92 series: typically
in the range between 20 to 80 MtS by 2050 and between 20 to 120 MtS
by 2100. (A comparison of global sulfur emissions scenarios with and
without specific sulfur control assumptions in enclosed as
attachment.)


3. What's New since IS92 (scientific front)

The importance of aerosols including those from sulfur emissions
is by now widely recognized and considerable progress has been made
to quantify their effect on regional climate, both in large GCM
simulations as well as in more simplified integrated assessment models,
e.g. MAGICC's SCENGEN module (needs checking for details with Mike Hulme)
or Michael Schlesinger's work within the EMF (current status:
uncertain). The importance of sulfur emissions as input to climate models
is therefore larger than ever.

As a result of a major World Bank study on acid rain in Asia also
improved national and regional sulfur emissions inventories have
become available (Foell et al., 1995). Improved emissions
inventories outside North America, Europe (including the European
part of the former USSR), and Asia (excluding Oceania, for which
only sparse data seems to be available) have not been made available
since publication of IS92.
As a result, models and scenarios continue to rely on estimates, largely
based on approximate mass and sulfur balance approaches in the world regions
for the Middle East, Southern Africa, and Latin America (cf. discussion of
data availability below).

Similarly, acidification impact models are increasingly being
refined for regions outside OECD in particular for Asia.
Acidification impact studies for unabated sulfur
emissions of coal intensive ``business as usual'' scenarios indicate
exceedance of critical loads of up to a factor 10 already within the
next three to four decades (Amann et al., 1995) with enormous
impacts on natural ecosystems as well as important foodcrops (Fischer
et al., 1996).

Increasingly also energy sector and integrated assessment models
link regional acidification models with simplified climate models
enabling joint analysis of sulfur and climate policies and
impacts. Examples include the IMAGE model (Posch et al., 1996) and the
IIASA integrated assessment model (Rogner and Nakicenovic, 1996) that are
linked with the acidification model RAINS for Europe and Asia, the AIM
(Morita et al., 1994) model for Asia, or ???? for North America.
These models extend earlier energy sector models that dealt with a
comparative costs assessment of isolated sulfur and carbon reductions,
and joint mitigation respectively, such as the OECD GREEN model
(Complainville and Martins, 1994). The state of knowledge of joint
benefits of sulfur and carbon emission reductions was reviewed in
the 1995 IPCC WG III report (IPCC, 1996: xxx xxxx xxxx) and is expanding
rapidly.


4. Data requirements

The most obvious data requirements concern of course
comprehensiveness of sulfur emissions by major source category
(anthropogenic and natural, energy sector and other industrial sources).
Here the data model of the IS92 scenarios appears appropriate and would only
require a reassessment in view of most recent data concerning regional
emissions (particularly in China, where data uncertainties seem
largest).

A more difficult question concerns spatial disaggregation.
Independent from the question of which formal models are being used
to check for scenario consistency, the outmost spatial detail
currently in driving force models with global coverage available is
at the level of world regions (typically around 10, but going up to
around 20 world regions). Both climate as well as acidification
models require inputs at finer spatial resolution. It is unclear at
present what would constitute a ``minimum'' or ``desirable'' level
of spatial disaggregation for the variety of user communities of new
IPCC scenarios. Existing model links (like with the RAINS model)
could be used in some regions like Europe and Asia to generate
spatially highly disaggregated sulfur emission and deposition maps
as inputs for climate models and for impact assessment studies (e.g.
for agricultural crop yield models). In their most advanced
versions the model links even incorporate regionalized differential
growth trends and thus improve on the standard practice of
renormalizing base year spatial emission and deposition patterns
linearly with a particular sulfur emissions scenario.

For regions where similar links are unavailable, more simplified procedures
will need to be devised, keeping in mind the overall tight time frame of the
scenario exercise. Two data sets (are there more??) appear available for
regionalized sulfur emission patterns: the Oak Ridge
GAIA data set (spatial resolution: ????) and the Spiro et al. (1992)
data set (spatial resolution: one degree by one degree).

An open (but extremely critical) issue remaining to be resolved is
to identify mechanisms and responsible groups that could provide the
link between the spatial resolution of the new IPCC scenarios sulfur
emissions to whatever final geographical scales required by impact
assessment and climate models.


5. Scenarios and Sulfur Policies

There are two major sets of driving force variable that influence
future sulfur emissions. 1. Level and structure of energy supply and end
use, and 2. degree of sulfur control policies assumed. (Because of the
dominance of energy related sulfur emissions, they should receive
particular attention in the new scenarios. Industrial sources could
be included in the scenarios with much a simpler driving force
model, e.g. coupling to industrial output.)
Ceteris paribus, highest sulfur emissions occur in scenarios of high demand
growth, rapid resource depletion, limited technological change and absence
of sulfur control policies outside OECD countries. In terms of energy
supply structures such scenarios imply a massive use of coal, including
synfuel production. Typical examples would include the IS92e
and IS92f scenarios. Up to ca. 2050 sulfur emissions in such
scenarios roughly grow in line with fossil fuel use and resulting
carbon emissions, i.e. a roughly constant sulfur to carbon emissions
ratio. Post 2050, still in absence of sulfur control policies,
growth rates of sulfur emissions start to fall short of growth in
fossil fuel use due to the internal technology logic of synfuel
production: synfuel production requires prior coal conversion (e.g.
gasification) and removal of sulfur prior to further conversion,
e.g. to synliquids. Ceteris paribus, therefore sulfur emissions
relative to those of carbon decline.

Sulfur emissions are lower in scenarios with 1. lower demand, 2. more
ample resource availability (especially for natural gas), 3. higher
rates of technological change (especially for non-fossil energy
technologies), and 4. extent and timing of direct sulfur control policies
especially outside OECD countries (itself function of projected impacts like
acidification), and finally, 5. level of other environmental control
measures and valuation of environmental goods (e.g. sulfur emissions are
also lower in scenarios imposing limits on GHG emissions).

Next to environmental impacts and policies, there are also other key
relationships that need to be considered for the formulation of
future sulfur scenarios. For instance, the literature on
environmental Kuznets curves (cf. e.g. World Bank, 1992, or
IIASA-WEC, 1995) argues that with increasing affluence and valuation
of environmental goods, sulfur emissions decline. This hypothesis
is corroborated by both longitudinal and cross-sectional empirical
data. Thus, in the process of industrialization and economic development,
emissions rise initially, pass through a maximum (say at income levels
around 2000 $/capita) and decline thereafter with rising per capita incomes
and the resulting preference of cleaner end-use fuels, valuation of clean
environments, etc.

A scenario taxonomy along the dimensions of demand, resource
availability, and technological change in any case is necessary to
respond to the critique on the IS92 series that these important
driving forces were not varied appropriately to reflect both
uncertainty as well as new scientific knowledge and empirical
evidence. They form part of the overall scenario design process and
the scenario ``storylines'' and need not to be addressed
specifically in the work on sulfur emissions.

Separate ``sulfur stories'' could be developed in addition, based on various
relationships between sulfur emissions and levels of affluence,
industrial structure, etc. within the overall framework of the
scenario ``storylines''. Here sulfur emissions would be part of
other environmental policies (e.g. on water quality, urban traffic
related pollutants, etc.) that form integral part of particular
scenario ``storylines''.

A key variable remains the timing and extent of sulfur control
policies to be assumed for the new scenarios. First of all the
scenarios need to reflect changes in actual policies implemented.
As noted above, IS92 did not take full account of recent
environmental legislation in both North America and the second
European sulfur protocol. Secondly, the sulfur policies to be
assumed, need to reflect recent scientific findings, in particular
the very large local and regional impacts on agricultural crops and
ecosystems of unabated high sulfur emission scenarios, particularly
in Asia. Therefore, all scenarios should assume faster and
deeper reductions in sulfur emissions outside OECD countries than
were assumed for IS92 in light of this recent scientific evidence. The
exact timing and extent of such sulfur reduction measures could then
be scenario dependent. Also no specific reference to individual
policy measures would need to be made (to avoid normative policy
elements, or recommendations, in the scenarios), as reduction
profiles could be adopted from existing sulfur reduction scenarios
in the scientific literaursement by UE (Action COST) for the lecturer, but for this I hope to
>have an answer as soon as possible.
>
>Thank you for your answer
>
>Best regards
>
>I'm Bernardo Gozzini and I work with Marco Bindi in the organisation of this
>seminar because Marco in the next week will leave for USA for two months and
>he cannot follow it
>******************************************************************
>Bernardo Gozzini
>Ce.S.I.A.-Accademia dei Georgofili
>Piazzale delle Cascine, 18
>50144 FIRENZE ITALIA
>
>tel: 39 xxx xxxx xxxxxxx xxxx xxxx/ 354897
>fax 39 xxx xxxx xxxxxxx xxxx xxxx
>e-mail: gozzini@xxxxxxxxx.xxx
>******************************************************************
>
>

Original Filename: 884787012.txt | Return to the index page | Permalink | Later Emails

From: P R Shukla <shukla@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>
To: Nebojsa Nakicenovic <naki@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>
Subject: Re: Invitation to the SRES meeting in Berkeley
Date: Wed, 14 Jan 1998 09:10:xxx xxxx xxxx
Reply-to: shukla@xxxxxxxxx.xxx
Cc: "Joseph M. Alcamo" <alcamo@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, "Knut H. Alfsen" <knut.alfsen@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Dennis Anderson <dennis.anderson@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Zhou Dadi <becon@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, "Gerald R. Davis" <Ged.R.Davis@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Benjamin Dessus <benjamin.dessus@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Jae Edmonds <ja_edmonds@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, "(although he cancelled) Joergen Fenhann" <j.fenhann@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, "Stuart R. Gaffin" <stuart@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Henryk Gaj <Fewewar@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Ken Gregory <kennethgregory@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, "A. Gruebler" <gruebler@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Erik Haites <EHaites@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, William Hare <bhare@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Michael Hulme <m.hulme@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Michael Jefferson <jefferson@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Tae-Yong Jung <tyjung@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Tom Kram <kram@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Emilio Lebre La Rovere <emilio@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Mathew Luhanga <vc@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Douglas McKay <Doug.D.Mckay@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Julio Torres Martinez <dpid@[169.158.128.138]>, Laurie Michaelis <laurie.michaelis@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Shunsuke Mori <mori@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Tsuneyuki Morita <t-morita@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Richard Moss <rmoss@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, "Youssef H. Nassef" <nassef@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, William Pepper <wpepper@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, "Hugh M. Pitcher" <hm_pitcher@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Lynn Price <lkprice@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Hans-Holger Rogner <h.h.rogner@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Cynthia Rosenzweig <crosenzweig@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, "Jim F. Skea" <J.F.Skea@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Priyadarshi Shukla <shukla@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Leena Srivastava <leena@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Rob Swart <rob.swart@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, "H.J.M. de Vries" <Bert.de.Vries@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, "John P. Weyant" <weyant@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Ernst Worrell <e.worrell@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>

Naki,

Thanks for the invitation to the SRES meeting.

Given the funds situation at your disposal, I am opting out of attending
the meeting. I would however like to offer any assistance on issues
concerning developing / Asian countries. Specifically, I have data on
structural changes of GDP and energy for countries in Asia-Pacific. The
structural transitions in these countries offer interesting insights and
directions for scenarios. I have passed an analysis of 12 countries to
Tae. The countries include the important economies in Asia-Pacific,
namely China, India, Japan, Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand,
Pakistan, Bangladesh etc. I think the structural changes in developing
countries is a very vital aspect for specifying future emissions. Also,
well documented and specified information on this shall help the policy
exercises later which shall use our emissions scenarios as reference.

I think the modelling groups may also require some inputs (and insights)
for handling developing country specifications in the models. In the
past we have pointed out several lacunas - such as neglect of
traditional biomass, disequilibrium, informal economy, geopolitical
realities etc. These also influence technological assumptions and
constraints. In fact our scenarios are very well suited to handle some
of these aspects differently. The modellers may have to be advised to
handle these aspects suitably. This is vital since we aim to specify the
emissions regionally.

An another issue I wish to bring to your attention relates to discount
rates. I know your competence on this issue. However, the modelling
difficulties (and paradigm itself) often stop us from using different
discount rates. The persistence of high discount rates in developing
economies is an observed fact. This may not equalize globally during the
next half century (or more). Even if we may not want to have different
discount rates (since this upsets the underlying neoclassical paradigm),
we may just ask the modellers to ensure that the results are not
sensitive to this.

A more interesting issue concerning the discount rates for our scenarios
is that the different futures (scenarios) would have different
associated discount rates. The sustainable development type scenarios
(e.g. B1 scenario) may have lower discount rate than our A scenarios. If
we run all scenarios with same discount rate, this would be a
contradiction. I know there are no easy answers around this since we do
not want to confuse the users of scenarios later on with too many
different parameters. However it may be worth providing different
specifications for important parameters or caveats where we anticipate
contradictions.

Given the recent developments in East Asia, it may be worth to take a
relook at A1 scenario and consider whether the Tiger World would transit
to A1 or A2. This is just an aside.

Wishing you a very happy new year.

P.R. Shukla



**************************************************************
P.R. Shukla, Professor
Indian Institute of Management, Vastrapur, Ahmedabad 380015, India
Phone: xxx xxxx xxxx, Fax: xxx xxxx xxxx
Email: shukla@xxxxxxxxx.xxx, http://www.iimahd.ernet.in/~shukla
***************************************************************

Original Filename: 889554019.txt | Return to the index page | Permalink | Later Emails

From: Anne JOHNSON <johnson@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>
To: Joseph Alcamo <alcamo@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Knut Alfsen <knut.alfsen@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Dennis Anderson <dennis.anderson@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Zhou Dadi <becon@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Gerald Davis <Ged.R.Davis@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Benjamin Dessus <Benjamin.Dessus@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Bert de Vries <Bert.de.Vries@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Jae Edmonds <ja_edmonds@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Joerg Fenhann <j.fenhann@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Stuart Gaffin <stuart@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Henryk Gaj <Fewewar@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Kenneth Gregory <kennethgregory@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Arnulf Gruebler <gruebler@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Erik Haites <ehaites@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, William Hare <bhare@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Michael Hulme <m.hulme@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Michael Jefferson <jefferson@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Tae-Yong Jung <tyjung@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Thomas Kram <kram@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Emilio La Rovere <emilio@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Mathew Luhanga <vc@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Julio Torres Martinez <dpid@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Douglas McKay <Doug.D.Mckay@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Laurie Michaelis <laurie.michaelis@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Shunsuke Mori <mori@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Tsuneyuke Morita <t-morita@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Richard Moss <rmoss@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Nebojsa Nakicenovic <Naki@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Youssef Nassef <nassef@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, William Pepper <WPepper@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Hugh Pitcher <hm_pitcher@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Lynn Price <lkprice@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Rich Richels <rrichels@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Holger Rogner <rogner@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Cynthia Rosenzweig <crosenzweig@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Priyadarshi Shukla <shukla@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, James Skea <J.F.Skea@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Leena Srivastava <leena@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Robert Swart <rob.swart@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Robert Watson <rwatson@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, John Weyant <weyant@xxxxxxxxx.xxx.>, Ernst Worrell <e.worrell@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>
Subject: new IPCC-SRES Zero Order Draft
Date: Tue, 10 Mar 1998 13:20:19 +0100

Dear Colleagues:

I am sending you a copy of Ged Davis' IPCC-SRES Zero Order Draft on
storylines and scenarios. The text is appended below, but I am also
attaching versions in MS Word and in Rich Text formats so that you can
better view the graphics.

Please send any comments directly to Ged Davis at

Ged.R.Davis@xxxxxxxxx.xxx

Regards,

Anne Johnson

****************************************************************************
******
Zero Order Draft

IS99
Storylines and Scenarios


February, 1998

Ged Davis et al


For Comment Only
Draft Paper for the IPCC Special Report on Emissions Scenarios



*********************************
Contents

1. Introduction

2. Scenarios - overview

3. Golden Economic Age (A1)

4. Sustainable Development (B1)

5. Divided World (A2)

6. Regional Stewardship (B2)

7. Scenario comparisons

8. Conclusions

Appendix 1: Scenario quantification

1. Introduction

The IS99 scenarios have been constructed to explore future developments in
the global environment with special reference to the production of GHGs.
These scenarios are being developed in three phases:
- Phase 1: the Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES) team is
preparing a set of scenarios for wide public discussion, which is the
subject of this note,
- Phase 2: the scenarios will be placed on the World Wide Web, subject to
public scrutiny, and suggestions for relevant modification of the scenarios
will be sought,
- Phase 3: the scenarios will be finalised for peer review, incorporating
suggestions received during the public review, by April 1999.
Phase 1 centred on a facilitated open process for Lead Authors at workshops
in Paris, Vienna and Utrecht. The scenarios developed allow for a broad
range of GHG emissions and provide a basis for reflection on policy.

1.1 What are scenarios?
Scenarios are pertinent, plausible, alternative futures. Their pertinence,
in this case, is derived from the need for climate change modelers to have
a basis for assessing the implications of future possible paths for
Greenhouse Gas Emissions (GHGs). Their plausibility is tested by peer
review, in an open process, which includes their publication on the World
Wide Web.

There are clearly an infinite number of possible alternative futures to
explore. We have consciously applied the principle of Occam's Razor ,
seeking the minimum number of scenarios to provide an adequate basis for
climate modelling and challenge to policy makers. The alternative futures
constructed are not, and cannot be, value free since like any work they
self-evidently reflect the team's view of the possible. The scenarios
should not be construed as being desirable or undesirable in their own
right and have been built as descriptions of possible, rather than
preferred, developments. There can be no objective assessment of the
probability of the scenarios, although in the prevailing zeitgeist some
will appear to individuals to be more likely than others. Scenarios are
built to clarify ignorance rather than present knowledge -- the one thing
we can be sure of is that the future will be very different from any of
those we describe!

2. Scenarios - overview

2.1 Scenarios: key questions and dimensions
Developing scenarios for a period of one hundred years is a relatively new
field. Within that period we might expect two major technological
discontinuities, a major shift in societal values and a change in the
balance of geopolitical power. A particular difficulty is that people are
not trained to think in these time-spans, are educated in narrow
disciplines and our ability to model large-systems, at the global level, is
still in its infancy. Additionally, most databases do not go back much
further than 50 years and many less than that. How best to integrate
demography, politico-economic, societal and technological knowledge with
our understanding of ecological systems? Scenarios can be used as an
integration tool, allowing an equal role for intuition, analysis and
synthesis.

Terminology
Storylines, Scenarios and Scenario Families

Storyline: a narrative description of a scenario (or a family of
scenarios), highlighting the main scenario characteristics, relationships
between key driving forces and the dynamics of the scenarios.

Scenario: projections of a potential future, based on a clear logic and a
quantified storyline.

Scenario family: one or more scenarios which have the same demographic,
politico-societal, economic and technological storyline.

Scenario Classification

Our approach has been to develop a set of four "scenario families". The
storylines of each of these scenario families describes a demographic,
politico-economic, societal and technological future. Within each family
one or more scenarios explore global energy industry and other developments
and their implications for Greenhouse Gas Emissions and other pollutants.
These are a starting point for climate impact modelling.

The scenarios we have built explore two main questions for the 21st
century, neither of which we know the answer to:
- Can adequate governance -- institutions and agreements -- be put in place
to manage global problems?
- Will society's values focus more on enhancing material wealth or be more
broadly balanced, incorporating environmental health and social well-being.
The way we answer these questions leads to four families of scenarios:
- Golden Economic Age (A1): a century of expanded economic prosperity with
the emergence of global governance
- Sustainable Development (B1): in which global agreements and
institutions, underpinned by a value shift, encourages the integration of
ecological and economic goals
- Divided World (A2): difficulty in resolving global issues leads to a
world of autarkic regions
- Regional Stewardship (B2): in the face of weak global governance there is
a focus on managing regional/local ecological and equity

Within these scenario families we examine plausible energy industry and
other developments which will contribute to GHG emissions. Although the
storylines cannot have explicit climate change policy measures in them
there are examples of indirect mitigation measures in some of the scenarios.
The scenario quantifications of the main indicators related to growth of
population and economy, the characteristics of the energy system and the
associated greenhouse gas emissions all fall within the range of prior
studies .

3. Golden Economic Age (A1)

This scenario family entitled "Golden Economic Age", describes rapid and
successful economic development. The primary drivers for economic growth
and development "catch up" are the strong human desire for prosperity, high
human capital (education), innovation, technology diffusion, and free trade.
The logic of successful development assumes smooth growth with no major
political discontinuities or catastrophic events. The scenario family's
development model is based on the most successful historical examples of
economic growth, i.e., on the development path of the now affluent OECD
economies. Historical analogies of successful economic "catching up" can
be found in the Scandinavian countries, Austria, Japan, and South Korea.
"Intangible" assets (human capital, stable political climate) take
precedence over "tangible" assets (capital, resource, and technology
availability) in providing the conditions for a take-off into accelerated
rates of development. Once these conditions are met, free trade enables
each region to access knowledge, technology, and capital to best deploy its
respective comparative economic and human resource advantages.
Institutional frameworks are able to successfully sustain economic growth
and also to handle the inevitable volatility that rapid economic growth
entails.

The "intangible" prerequisites for accelerated rates of economic growth
also offer long-term development perspectives for regions that are poorly
endowed with resources or where current economic prospects are not
auspicious, such as Sub-Saharan Africa. There, for instance, fostered
regional trade and capital availability enhance the pull-effects of a
strong South African economy. In other regions, growth may be fuelled by
domestic know-how and high human capital valued at the international
market. An example of this is the thriving software industry of the Indian
subcontinent. In yet other regions, growth could be stimulated by the
expansion of regional economic partnerships and free trade arrangements
(e.g., extensions of NAFTA and the European Union).

The main difference with the historical OECD experience is a certain
acceleration in time and space, (i.e., "leapfrogging") made possible by
better access to knowledge and technology, a consequence of the high-tech
and free trade characteristics of development. Successful catching up
becomes pervasive; all parts of the "developing world" participate, though
with differences in timing. The final outcome is that practically all
parts of the world achieve high levels of affluence by the end of the 21st
century, even if disparities will not have disappeared entirely. The
current distinction between "developed" and "developing" countries will in
any case no longer be appropriate.
As in the past, high growth (a "growing cake") eases distributional
conflicts. Everyone reaps the benefits of rapid growth, rising incomes,
improved access to services, and rising standards of living. The economic
imperatives of markets, free trade, and technology diffusion (i.e.,
competition) that underlie the high growth rates provide for efficient
allocation of resources. Efficiency and high productivity are the positive
by-products of the highly competitive nature of the economy. They also
provide the economic resources for distributive and social measures
required for a stable social and political climate, vital for sustaining
high growth rates in human capital, productivity, innovation, and hence
economic growth.

The economic development focus explains its central metric: the degree of
economic development as reflected in per capita income levels (GDP at
market exchange rates as well as at purchasing power parity rates). The
principal driver is the desire for prosperity, all major driving forces are
closely linked to prosperity levels, with actual causality links going in
both directions. For example, demographic variables co-evolve with
prosperity: mortality declines (i.e. life expectancy increases) as a
function of higher incomes (better diets and affordable medical treatment).
In turn, changes in the social values underlying the fertility transition
also pave the way for greater access to education, modernisation of
economic structures, and market orientation. These are key for innovating
and diffusing the best practice technologies underlying the high
productivity, and hence economic growth, of the scenario.

3.1 Key Scenario Drivers and their Relationships

3.11 Population and Economic Development
High education, stable social relations, and incentives for innovation and
experimentation are the preconditions for productivity increases underlying
rapid economic development in this world-- as a result, social, economic,
and demographic development are highly correlated .
The link between demographic and economic variables in the scenario
corresponds to present empirical observations: the affluent live long and
have few children. High per capita incomes are thus associated with both
low mortality and low fertility. Together, this results in rather low
population growth, characterised in addition by a considerable "greying" of
the population.
This family of scenarios combines high life expectancy with low fertility,
where OECD rates are assumed to stabilize at current (below replacement)
levels, and developing countries follow a similar transition by the
mid-21st century. Fertility rates range between 1.3 to 1.7 children per
woman. Life expectancy can approach some 95 years, with a regional
variation between 80 and 95 years. Global population grows to some 9
billion by 2050, and declines to 7 billion by 2100, the result of continued
below replacement fertility in all regions.
Population ageing results in economic growth rates somewhat lower than
historical experience, especially in the OECD countries. Economic growth
rates slow over time in proportion to the reduction of the potentially
economic active population (age 15 to 65), which decline in some regions to
50 percent compared to the historical average of approximately 70 percent.

For "developing countries", economic growth is based on the most successful
cases of economic "catch up" found in history. The economic growth profile
of Japan after WW II served as a model to delineate the upper bounds of
possible GDP growth for all regions. Consistent with growth theory, GDP
expansion initially accelerates, passes through a peak, in which growth
rates around 10 percent per year can be sustained for several decades, and
then declines. Once the economic and industrial base is firmly established
and the economy matures, growth rates decline with increasing income
levels. This reflects saturation effects and a higher emphasis on quality
rather than quantity at high income levels.
The global economy in the "Golden Economic Age" expands at an average
annual rate of three percent per year to 2100. This is about the same rate
as the global average since 1850 and in this respect may simply be
considered "dynamics as usual". Non-Annex-I economies expand with an
average annual growth rate of four percent per year, twice the rate of
Annex-I economies. By approximately 2030 Non-Annex-I GDP surpasses that of
the Annex-I economies. Per capita income disparities are reduced, but
differences between regions are not entirely eliminated. Non-Annex-I per
capita income reaches the 1990 Annex-I level (14,000 $/capita) by around
2040. By 2100 per capita income would approach 100,000 $/capita in Annex-I
countries and 70,000 $/capita in Non-Annex-I countries.

3.12 Equity
Equity issues are not a major concern in the world, but is rather a
by-product of the high rates of economic development. Existing per capita
income gaps between regions close up in a similar way as between Western
Europe and Japan compared to the US in the 20th century. Disparities
continue to persist between regions, but more so within particular regions.
Nevertheless, the high economic growth rates require a certain degree of
income distribution. Extreme income disparities are found to be negative
influencing factors for economic growth. Additionally, fair income
distribution only assures the large consumer markets and the social
cohesion and stability required for the realisation of high economic growth.

3.13 Settlement patterns/communication
Communication technologies and styles are highly homogeneous and extremely
developed -- rather than a "global village" future, this is one of "global
cities." Existing trends towards urbanisation continue, as cities provide
the highest "network externalities" for the educational and R&D-intensive
economic development pattern underlying the scenario. Regional differences
in settlement patterns persist. They range from fragmented, compact, but
large (i.e., 20+ million inhabitants) cities that depopulate their
respective rural hinterlands in Latin America to urban "corridors"
connected by high capacity communication and transport networks (in Asia).
Regional transport networks include high speed trains and maglevs, which
ultimately fuse short- and long-distance transport means into single
interconnected infrastructures. In some parts of the world high-tech cars
take the place that high-tech trains occupy in other parts.
The large urban agglomerates and the high transport demands of a high
material growth economy generate vast congestion constraints. These are
solved by applying market-based instruments (prices) rather than
regulation. Economic instruments include access and parking fees,
auctioning off the limited number of new car and truck licenses in
megacities, much along the lines of the current stringent Singapore model.
Therefore, even at very high income levels, car ownership rates could be
comparatively low in parts of the world. In extremely densely populated
areas, cars remain a luxury rather than a means of mass transport (viz.
Hong Kong). In areas with lower population density, car densities are high
(+1 car per inhabitant). Car fuels could be either oil, synfuels,
electricity, or hydrogen. Intercontinental transport is provided by
energy- and GHG-intensive hypersonic aircraft fuelled by methane or
hydrogen. They are the physical transport equivalent of the high capacity
virtual communication links of a truly global economy.

3.14 Environmental Concerns/Ecological resilience
Ecological resilience is assumed to be high. In and of themselves,
ecological concerns receive a low priority. Instead, the valuation of
environmental amenities is strictly in economic terms, e.g., a function of
affluence. Non-congestion, clean water and air, and recreational
possibilities in nature all assume increasing importance with rising
affluence, although preferences for environmental amenities may differ
across regions and income levels. For instance, urban air quality and
human health are valued highly even at income levels lower than those
prevailing in England, where stringent air quality measures were introduced
after the "killer smog" of 1952. Reduced particulate and sulphur air
pollution become a matter of major consumer preference at levels of $2,000
- 3,000/capita income in Asia. Altogether, the concept of environmental
quality changes from "conservation" of nature to active "management" --and
marketing-- of natural and environmental amenities and services.

3.2 Scenarios
The core bifurcation (with respect to GHG emissions) of the scenario family
unfolds around alternative paths of technology development in the
agriculture and energy sectors. In the energy sector, the central question
is how to manage the transition away from the current reliance on
conventional oil and gas. In the agricultural sector, the key issue
concerns land productivity.
Alternative technology bifurcations lead to a number of scenarios embedded
and consistent within the overall theme of "prosperity via high
techologies". All scenarios provide the high quantities of clean and
convenient energy forms and diverse, high quality food demanded in an
affluent world. Because technological change is cumulative, it can go in
alternative, mutually exclusive directions, i.e., changes become "path
dependent". Alternative directions unfold around the interrelated cluster
of variables of resource availability and conversion technologies in both
energy and agriculture. For instance, new technologies may enable humanity
to tap either the vast quantities of fossil resources existing in the form
of coal, unconventional oil, and gas with technologies that are both highly
economic, efficient, and clean in terms of traditional pollutants, such as
particulates or sulphur. Alternatively, technological change could unfold
favouring non-fossil technologies and resources, such as nuclear and
renewables.
A similar bifurcation unfolds in the agricultural sector. In one
sub-scenario, only incremental improvements are achieved in farming
practices and land productivity. This is combined with a gradual global
diffusion of meat-based diets. Both of these trends are land- (and
deforestation-) intensive. Alternatively, global agriculture could move in
the direction of genetically engineered, high productivity crops and
"sea-farming," combined with a quality- and health-oriented diet based on
fish and vegetables, both of which are relatively less land intensive. As
a result, GHG emissions range widely even for otherwise similar scenario
characteristics.

3.21 Energy Resources/Technology
Resource availability and technology are tightly interrelated. The "Golden
Economic Age" of high productivity growth results from substantial
technological innovation. Both contribute to economic growth, expansion of
accessible resources, and improved efficiency in resource use. Factor
productivity improvements occur across the board for agricultural land,
materials, and energy. Improvement rates largely follow long-term
historical trends and are entirely technology- and income- driven. Energy
intensity (total commercial and traditional primary energy use per unit of
GDP) improves at an aggregate global rate of 1.5 percent per year.
Improvement rates vary across regions as a function of distance from the
productivity frontier and the turnover rates of capital stock. Ceteris
paribus, improvement rates are higher in regions with currently lower
efficiency and greater than average GDP growth. This assumes no particular
policy intervention or additional price regulation apart from the ones
consistent with a free market environment (i.e. price subsidies are
removed, and full costing principles are established).

Per capita final energy use gradually converges as income gaps close.
Final energy use per capita in non-Annex-I countries would reach
approximately 85 GJ (2 tons of oil equivalent) by 2050 and approximately
125 GJ (3 toe) by 2100, i.e., about the current average of OECD countries
outside North America. Despite improvements in productivity and
efficiency, the high income levels lead to resource use close to the upper
bounds of the scenarios available in the literature. For instance, global
final energy use would increase to approximately 1000 EJ by 2100.

The scenarios developed are a function of the different directions taken by
technological change. The key question is which primary resources may
become economically accessible in the future, and which technologies will
become available to convert these primary resources into the final goods
and services demanded by consumers. In the energy area,
resources/technologies are key variables in determining the timing and
nature of the transition away from currently dominant conventional oil and
gas.
Four pathways are possible:
1. Progress across all resources and technologies.
2. "Clean coal" technologies: environmentally friendly except for GHG
emissions and possible resource extraction impacts.
3. "Oil/Gas": smooth transition from conventional to unconventional oil and
gas, tapping the vast occurrences of unconventional fossil fuels, including
methane clathrates.
4. "Bio-Nuclear": rapid technological progress in non-fossil supply and
end-use technologies, e.g. renewables, such as solar and biomass
combustion, nuclear and hydrogen-fuelled end-use devices, such as fuel cells.

For the scenario quantification, a number of contrasting cases,
characterised by the main energy form used in the second half of the 21st
century, have been evaluated with the aid of formal energy models:
1. The dominance of Non-Fossil fuels -- the "Bio-Nuclear" scenario (A1R).
2. The dominance of unconventional gas, including hydrates, and oil (A1G)
3. The dominance of "Clean Coal" (A1C)

A brief scenario taxonomy is given below.

Scenario
Dominant
Oil/Gas Resource
Technology Improvements
Fuel Availability Coal Oil/Gas Non-fossil
A1R Non-fossil Medium (<50 ZJ ) Low Medium High
A1G Oil/Gas High (>75 ZJ) Low High Low
A1C Coal Low (<35 ZJ) High Low Low
*
Depending on the assumed availability of oil and gas, (low/medium/high) and
corresponding improvements in production and conversion technologies for
coal, oil/gas, and non-fossil technologies, different energy systems
structures unfold. For instance, in the dynamic technology cases, liquid
fuels from coal or unconventional oil/gas resources would become available
at less than $30 /barrel, with costs falling further by about one percent
per year with exploitation of learning curve effects. Non-fossil
electricity (photovoltaics, new nuclear) would become available at costs of
less than 10 mills/kWh ($.01/kWh) and continue to improve further as a
result of learning curve effects. The basic premise of the "dynamic
technology" scenarios is that energy services could be delivered at
long-run costs not higher than today, but with technologies having
radically different characteristics, including environmental. In the event
that such technology dynamics do not materialise, energy costs and prices
would be significantly higher than suggested above -- illustrative model
runs suggest energy demand would be up to 20 percent lower for a fossil
scenario without significant cost improvements .

3.22 Agriculture
In the agricultural sector, two contrasting scenarios of land productivity
could unfold, depending on the nature of advances in agricultural
technologies. However, CO2 emissions from land use changes could range
from 0.5 (low) to 1.5 (high) GtC by 2030 and from -1 to -2 (low) to zero
(high) GtC emissions by 2100. In the latter case tropical forests
essentially become depleted as a result of land-use conversions for
agriculture and biomass fuel plantations. In the former case, land
productivity gains are so substantial that ploughing of marginal
agricultural land is no longer economically feasible and is abandoned,
following recent trends in the OECD. The resulting expansion of forest
cover leads to a net sequestration of atmospheric CO2.

3.23 Scenario Quantification
An initial scenario quantification in terms of population, GDP, energy use,
and CO2 emissions for the three energy resource/technology sub-scenarios is
summarised in Appendix 1 . The global scenario for 2100 is also summarised
in the form of a snowflake diagram. All scenario quantifications are
tentative and subject to revisions.
[Figure: "Snowflake" for A1 scenarios]

3.24 CO2 Emissions
The diverging pathways of resource availability and technological change
characteristic of the three scenarios examined result in a wide range of
annual CO2 emissions: from 10 to 33 GtC by 2100. It is interesting to note
that the emissions of the two "fossil fuel" sub-scenarios, "clean coal" and
"oil and gas," are quite close to each other (33 CtC versus 29 GtC).
Continued reliance on oil and gas, coupled with demand growth, explain the
emission patterns for the oil/gas scenario. Coal is the only fossil
resource available in the "clean coal" scenario. Therefore, over time coal
is increasingly required for conversion into premium fuels such as
synliquids and syngas. This conversion "deepening" leads to a feedstock
premium for coal and increases the market potential of non-fossil fuels.
CO2 emissions are therefore not as high as in traditional coal-intensive
scenarios.
4. Sustainable Development (B1)

The central elements of this scenario family include high levels of
environmental and social consciousness, successful governance including
major social innovation, and reductions in income and social inequality.
Successful forms of governance allow many problems which are currently hard
or difficult to resolve to fall within the competency of government and
other organisations. Solutions reflect a wide stakeholder dialogue leading
to consent on international environmental and social agreements. This is
coupled with bottom-up solutions to problems, which reflect wide success in
getting broad-based support within communities.
The concerns over global sustainable development, expressed in a myriad of
environmental and social issues, results in the eventual successful
management of the interaction between human activities and the biosphere.
While no explicit climate policy is undertaken, other kinds of initiatives
lead to lower energy use, and clean energy systems, which significantly
reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Besides cleaning up air quality, there is
emphasis on improving the availability and quality of water.

4.1 Key Scenario Drivers and their Relationships

4.11 Technological Development
High levels of technological development focused on achieving sustainable
development leads to high levels of material and energy saving, innovations
in emissions control technology, as well as labour productivity. The
latter is essential to support the rapid growth in personal income, given
that a major increase in labour force participation is implicit in the
equity assumptions. Technologies tend to be implemented in an industrial
ecology mode, implying a much more highly integrated form of industrial
production than at present. Information technology achieves a global
spread, and is fully integrated into production technologies. Advances in
international institutions permit the rapid diffusion of new technologies
-- R&D approaches two percent of GDP.

4.12 Population and Economic Development
Population -- reaches only 9 billion by 2xxx xxxx xxxxdue to a faster than
expected completion of the demographic transition arising from a large
increase of women in the labour force, universal literacy, and concern for
the environmental impacts of high population levels. The potential impacts
of ageing populations which emerge from this low level of population growth
are offset by relatively high levels of immigration, which reduce the
negative impacts of ageing populations on savings and the ability of
societies to adapt and implement new and cleaner technologies.
This world has a faster than expected transition from traditional to modern
economic sectors throughout the developing world. In addition, widespread
education leads to high labour productivity, and high labour force
participation. Migration serves to sustain the size of the labour force in
developed countries, which helps to maintain their growth in per capita
income. Developing countries experience few institutional failures,
enabling them to grow at or near the historical upper bounds of experience
given their per capita incomes.
This yields a world of high levels of economic activity, with significant
and deliberate progress being made with respect to international and
national inequality of income. The current order of magnitude differences
in income between developing and developed countries are reduced to a
factor of two, with moderate growth continuing to occur in OECD countries.
Gross World Product (GWP) reaches $350 trillion by 2100 and average global
incomes $40,000 per capita. Economic development is balanced and, given
the high environmental consciousness and institutional effectiveness, this
leads to a better quality environment, with many of the aspects of rapid
growth being anticipated and dealt with effectively. Active management of
income distribution is undertaken through use of taxes and subsidies. The
composition of final demand will evolve to a mix reflecting lower use of
materials and energy, thus easing the impact of high income levels.

4.13 Equity
In this world there is a preparedness to address issues of social and
political equity. The increases in equity, reflect a shift in values
which, with widespread education, leads to greater opportunity for all.
New social inventions, such as the Grameen Bank's micro-credit schemes, are
a significant contributor to an increase in institutional effectiveness and
equity improvement.

4.14 Communications, Settlement Patterns and Environment
The social innovations and effective governance rest on high levels of
communication, both in a passive (i.e. TV) and active sense. Governance
systems reflect high levels of consent from those affected by decisions,
and this consent arises out of active participation in the governance process.
Settlement patterns arise from design, and tend to reflect a distributed,
compact, city design structure. This results in high amenity levels, and
the careful design and location of these cities results in a lessening of
the natural disasters which plague many cities today. Advanced hazard
warning systems and careful design limit the impact of such disasters.
Low emission technologies, and careful management of land use, preservation
of large tracts of land, and active intervention to counteract the impacts
of imprudent societal actions strengthen the resilience of the ecological
system.

4.2 Scenarios

4.21 Energy Resources/Technology
Energy efficiency innovations, and successful institutional innovations
disseminating their use, result in much lower levels of energy use relative
to historic patterns. The forward-looking nature of societal planning
results in relatively smooth transitions to alternative energy systems as
conventional oil and gas resources dwindle in availability. There is major
use of unconventional natural gas as fuel supply during the transition, but
the major push is towards renewable resources such as solar and wind. The
impact of environmental concerns is a significant factor in the planning
for new energy systems.
Two alternative energy systems, leading to two sub-scenarios, are
considered to provide this energy:
1. Widespread expansion of natural gas, with a growing role for renewable
energy (scenario B1N). Oil and coal are of lesser importance, especially
post-2050. This transition is faster in the developed than in the
developing countries.
2. A more rapid development of renewables, replacing coal and oil; the bulk
of the remaining energy coming from natural gas (scenario B1R).

4.22 Scenario Quantification
Per capita incomes in the developed world are close to ___ in 2100, while
average per capita income in the developing world grows from ___ % of the
developed world in 1990 to ____ % in 2100. Energy per unit of output
continues to fall at about historical rates in the developed countries,
resulting in total energy use of ____ EJ in 2100. Rapid spread of
technology from developed to developing countries enables an energy growth
of ___ percent less than GDP, resulting in total energy use of ___ EJ in
the developing part of the world
An initial quantification of the scenarios in terms of population, GDP,
energy use, and CO2 emissions for the two energy resource/technology
scenarios is summarised in Appendix 1. The global scenario for 2100 is
also summarised in the form of a snowflake diagram. All scenario
quantifications are tentative and subject to revisions.
[Figure: "Snowflake" for B1 scenarios]

4.23 CO2 Emissions
The range of carbon in CO2 emissions for the scenarios is 7.5 to 20 billion
tons in 2100, reflecting 3 and 2 percent per year reductions in carbon per
unit of GDP

5. Divided World (A2)

In a retreat from the globalising trends of the previous century, the world
"consolidates" into a series of roughly continental economic regions.
Regions pursue different economic strategies based on the resources and
options available to them. Trade within economic regions increases, while
trade between regions is controlled by tariff and non-tariff barriers to
support the region's economic strategy. High income regions restrict
immigration and impose selective controls on technology transfer to
maintain high incomes for their residents.
High income regions encourage higher levels of education to increase the
productivity of their labour force. They impose restrictions on immigrants,
except skilled immigrants, to keep per capita incomes high. They also try
to impose selective restrictions on technology transfer to maintain the
productivity of their labour force.
Low income regions are only able to increase per capita incomes slowly.
They do not have the resources to invest in educating the labour force or
in research and development. Investment from other regions is constrained.
Thus exports are primarily products manufactured with low cost labour and
some natural resource-intensive products. Population growth is high
relative to high income regions. Income inequality becomes more pronounced
within low income regions and increases between regions.

Regions use non-tariff barriers, such as differences in standards and
labelling requirements, to limit trade. Trade is also dampened by
differences in tastes in products. These factors favour the use of
resources found within each region. Regions that have abundant coal
resources but very limited oil resources, for example, encourage use of
"local" coal by heavy industries and electric utilities while allowing
restricting free imports of crude oil and petroleum products .

5.1 Key Scenario Drivers and their Relationships

5.11 Population and Economic Development
Fertility rates vary among regions. North America, Northwest Europe and
Asia experience falling fertility rates and populations. The Middle East,
Africa, and to some extent, Southern Europe and South America see rising
population although the rate of growth decreases. This leads to a shift in
the world population balance from the Indian sub-continent and South East
Asia to the Middle East and Africa by the end of the century. World
population reaches 16 billion by 2100.
Regional economies emphasise self-sufficiency with wide variations in
growth levels. Average global economic growth is relatively low at around
2.5%/year, leading to a GWP of $250 trillion by 2100. Trade across regions
consists primarily of raw materials and semi-finished goods in a relatively
low trust world where dependence on other regions is minimised.

5.12 Government and Geopolitics
National boundaries become less important within the regions as an
increasing share of policy is agreed at the regional level. This allows
considerable cultural diversity within regions. Governmental style is also
diverse across regions. In some, government and religion strengthen their
links, in others, secular democracy is maintained or consolidated.
Education is strengthened in most regions with a deepening understanding of
cultural history and religion. The growing strength of the economic
regions, and their competing economic interests, lead to reduced
international co-operation. Global environmental, economic and social
issues are subject to relatively weak governance. Conflicts between ethnic
and religious groups within economic regions become less violent as a
result of economic pressures on the parties. Where ethnic and religious
violence persists, the groups are excluded from the economic region. Thus
wars occur in the boundary zones between economic regions. Wars may also
occur near regional boundaries for control of scarce natural resources.

5.13 Technology Developments
While underlying science is conducted in all regions an information about
scientific developments are available world-wide, consumption and
production patterns and hence, technology and practices, are determined by
local circumstances.

Research activity increases in all regions; in high income regions due to
the need to increase productivity with limited regional resources and in
low income regions due to the growing size of the population. Restrictions
on transfer of some technologies to other regions is widespread.

High income regions invest heavily in education to enhance labour
productivity. Some high-income regions move towards broad-based education
for a knowledge-based society. Others move towards practical education
(lots of science and engineering) for an advanced industrial society. Low
income regions are not able to invest as heavily in education, but the
levels (and future rates of economic growth, vary significantly.

Technological change is rapid in some regions, slow in others, with
industry adjusting to local resource endowments, cultural characteristics
and education levels.

5.14 Communication and Settlement Patterns
Languages become more uniform within regions, but globally more diverse.
Speakers of the main world languages are fairly evenly split. Computerised
translation eliminates the language barrier to technology diffusion and
economic development.
Urban concentration continues except in Europe and North America, which
move towards larger numbers of smaller cities and towns. Urban shares of
population in other countries rise to current OECD levels by 2020. While
there is free movement within most regions, there is very little migration
among regions. Refugee problems are confined to edge areas, for example,
Baltics and Tibet.

5.15 Environmental Concerns
Environmental management follow pragmatic paths: with rising incomes,
people become increasingly concerned first about urban pollution, then
about regional pollution, finally about global problems. In this world,
global environmental problems are discussed extensively but the will to
tackle them is lacking. Propensity to worry about the environment is
regionally variable. Sulphur emissions are rapidly reduced in South and
South East Asia due to the impacts on agriculture but increase in Africa
with exploitation of coal and minerals there.

5.2 Scenarios
Divided World is explored through a single scenario.
5.21 Resource Availability
Regions try to use their resource endowment for their economic advantage.
Regions with abundant energy and mineral resources use those resources
domestically and to produce exports (surplus to expected long-term needs).
Regions poor in energy and mineral resources will minimise their dependence
on these resources. High-income, resource-poor regions will develop as
service-based, dematerialised economies, while low-income, resource-poor
regions are forced to limit their consumption of resources.

High-income regions without indigenous oil and gas undergo a near-complete
conversion to an energy economy based on nuclear or renewable based
electricity and synthetic gases and liquids by 2050. India and China adopt
these technologies at the largely exhausting domestic coal reserves by
2050. Renewable input, zero waste industry is pioneered in South East Asia
and adopted in Europe, minimising mineral and fossil fuel requirements by
2050. Oil and gas-rich regions (North Africa, the Middle East, Central
Asia, Russia) continue to use fossil fuels but towards 2050 the falling
cost of renewable technology (wind and biomass in Russia, photovoltaic in
the other regions) begins to make them competitive even in these regions

5.22 Scenario Quantification
An initial quantification of the scenario in terms of population, GDP,
energy use, and CO2 emissions is summarised in Appendix 1. The global
scenario for 2100 is also summarised in the form of a snowflake diagram.
All scenario quantifications are tentative and subject to revisions.
[Figure: "Snowflake" for A2 scenarios]

5.23 CO2 Emissions
The level of carbon in CO2 emissions for the scenario is 15 billion tons in
2100 as only oil and gas rich regions continue to use fossil fuels.

6. Regional Stewardship (B2)

"Regional Stewardship" is based on a natural evolution of the present
institutional policies and structures. As such it does not incorporate
major geopolitical power shifts or fundamental technological
discontinuities. There is relatively low trust, global agreements are
difficult to reach and the result is 'multiple islands' with inward looking
policies.
This is a world of good intentions, which are not capable of being
implemented. The late 20th century value shift towards environmental
stewardship continues, for example as envisioned in the Cairo and Rio
Programs of Action, with increasing recognition of the importance of human
welfare and inequity. These concerns cannot be tackled at a global level
and are resolved regionally or locally. Environmental solutions are
tempered by the desire for balance with economic goals in many areas - but
poor governance means that meeting the needs of the poor and future
generations is hampered by limited prosperity.
Families think seriously about the fact that their offspring may be dealing
with a more ecologically stressed world, moreover one with limited
financial resources for dealing with such problems. Education levels are
high so that the ability of families to internalise global concerns in
their family planning decisions is also high. The relative stabilisation
of world population growth after 2050 leads to general optimism about the
ability of society to solve problems such as food and water supply.

6.1 Key Scenario Drivers and their Relationships

6.11 Population
Both local governance and environmental concerns limit population growth.
The world largely supports efforts to reduce unwanted births both as a
social service but also because there is an implicit belief that even
increasing populations have severe environmental consequences. Education
and welfare programs for the young and illiterate are widely pursued.

Population stabilises at 10.5 billion people by 2100. Since economic
growth is relatively slow, fertility rates do not decline strongly. But,
the effect of fertility rate declines on lowering population size outweigh
those of mortality rate decreases increasing population size.

The stabilisation of global population (largely after 2050) leads to a new
atmosphere for social planning. It becomes considerably easier than at
present for education, health care and pension programs. Age cohort sizes
are much more stable through time than at present, although of course,
overall ageing continues.

6.12 Economic Development
GWP grows to around 240 trillion $ in 2100 with a North/South income ratio
of approximately 7/1 (presently 13/1). Concerns about the ecological costs
of consumerist lifestyles receive wide attention and attempts are made,
first in industrial countries, but later in developing countries, to seek
satisfaction through community activities rather than high consumption.
Overall people are eager to find alternatives to the high income world of
materialism.

6.13 Governance
Governance is weak globally but strong nationally and regionally.
Deliberate policies to limit trade for environmental and social reasons
hinder the transfer of technologies. However pollution trading concepts
catch on as a way of driving down the costs of pollution control.
International alliances occur based on particular national circumstances,
such as in the development of biomass technologies. This fragmentation
gives rise to pockets of environmental and social justice activists.
Environmental policies vary widely across regions, for example in
acceptable sulphur emission levels. NGO and public interest groups are
strong, influential and busy.

6.14 Equity
While strong redistribution policies are enacted within regions to reduce
income disparity, income differences between regions persist globally
throughout the century and even increases in absolute terms, although the
relative inequity decreases. The mechanism by which global equity
increases relates in part to population dynamics: as fertility rates
decline in developing countries, the decrease in youth dependency ratios
leads to an increase in savings rate and strengthened economic growth
during the first half of the century. In the developed regions, by
contrast, ageing becomes an increasing drag on economic growth in helping
to converge global incomes, concerns about the persistence of income
inequality world-wide are swamped by the local concerns and conscious
policies to limit international trade.

6.15 Settlement Patterns
A strong deurbanization trend occurs in this world because of increasing
concern about the marginalization of the very poor that accompanies massive
urbanisation. There are also concerns about managing large transient
populations that migrate seasonally to cities for short term employment,
for example in the construction industry.

Immigration is controlled but accepted, partly to compensate for very low
fertility rates in some regions and partly to help economic development
worldwide without the problems of uncontrolled globalisation.

6.16 Environmental Policy
Environmental improvement is strongly pursued although regional policies
vary widely such as with sulphur controls. Marked reductions in S, CH4,
deforestation, CFCs and N2O occur and water quality is addressed.
Ecological resilience is not seen as high. The environment is viewed as
quite fragile and requiring careful policy stewardship. Resource
extraction is viewed as intrinsically problematic and scepticism persists
regarding the ability of society to prevent environmental disasters like
the Valdez oil spill and Kuwaiti oil fires. Indeed the world is
increasingly sensitive about and intolerant of such events and much tension
exists concerning this aspect of development. Environment groups lobby
hard on these themes and paint a picture of rapidly depleting natural
resources.

6.2 Scenarios

6.21 Energy Resources/Technology
Because of the concern about ecological fragility, alternative and
renewable energy systems are viewed with much hope and are socially and
politically encouraged. Biomass technologies and policies are invigorated.
The labour and land intensive developing countries pursue biomass
production while the capital intensive developed regions develop the
required technologies. A degree of co-operation coalesces about such
mutually symbiotic activities.
Consumers accept a rather long return in evaluating energy-efficiency
investments. Mass transit systems are very successful and profitable.
Advances in transportation technology are rapid.

Hydroelectric power is a constrained bag. Dams are viewed with disdain
because there are soon no more wild rivers anywhere and the rights of
indigenous people have been egregiously violated. Although they are
relatively clean from the perspective of carbon emissions, their effects on
indigenous people (mercury poisoning of fish, etc.) becomes unacceptable.
Decommissioning dams is widespread to restore pristine ecological systems
downstream.

Reduction in carbon intensity is not viewed as a policy goal but it
declines for other reasons. It is a frugal world with limited resource
availability and so the paradigm grows that it is less costly to save
energy than it is to buy it and use it. This spurs the development of
technologies that use carbon more efficiently. In addition the
accompanying emissions of NOx and SOx and tropospheric ozone are
increasingly viewed as unacceptable.

6.23 Scenario Quantification
An initial scenario quantification in terms of population, GDP, energy use,
and CO2 emissions for the scenario is summarised in Appendix 1.
Energy intensity declines at a rate of 1.3%/year to a value of 0.12
toe/$1000 in 2100. This represents a total global energy usage in 2100 of
1250 EJ, of which 300 EJ is oil and gas; 100 EJ coal and 900 EJ is
non-carbon renewables, with nuclear's role limited.

The global scenario for 2100 is also summarised in the form of a snowflake
diagram. All scenario quantifications are tentative and subject to revisions.
[Figure: "Snowflake" for B2 scenario]

6.24 CO2 Emissions
By 2100 CO2 emissions 11.5 GtC/year, of which 5 GtC/year is emitted by the
North and 6.5 GtC/year by the South. Carbon intensity declines at a rate
of 0.8%/year to 2100, to a value of 0.3 tC/toe, some 50% of today's value.
7. Scenario Comparisons
[To be written]

8. Conclusions
[To be written]



Appendix 1: Scenario Quantification
[To be written]


Attachment Converted: "c:eudoraattachdavis.doc"

Attachment Converted: "c:eudoraattachdavis.rtf"

Anne JOHNSON
IIASA
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
A-2361 Laxenburg, Austria
E-Mail: johnson@xxxxxxxxx.xxx
Phone : xxx xxxx xxxx
Fax : xxx xxxx xxxx

Original Filename: 901894140.txt | Return to the index page | Permalink | Later Emails

From: mnoguer@xxxxxxxxx.xxx
To: scenarios@xxxxxxxxx.xxx
Subject: Scenarios - SRES description 2
Date: Fri, 31 Jul 1998 10:09 +0000 (GMT)

As promised here is the second part of the SRES description:

----------



SRES WRITING TEAM
ADDRESS LIST


Dr. Joseph M. Alcamo
Professor, Scientific Center for
Environmental Systems Research
University of Kassel, Germany

Dr. Knut H. Alfsen
Director, Center for International Climate and Environmental Protection (CICERO)
University of Oslo, Norway

Prof. Akhiro Amano
Dean, School of Policy Studies
Kwansei Gakuin University, Japan

Dr. Dennis Anderson
Professor, Oxford University
Oxford, UK

Dr. Zhou Dadi
Energy Research Institute
State Planning Commission
Chinese Academy of Sciences
Beijing, China

Dr. Gerald R. Davis
Group Planning
Shell International Petroleum
London, UK

Dr. Bert de Vries
National Institute for Public Health
and Environmental Hygiene (RIVM)
Bilthoven, the Netherlands

Dr. Jae Edmonds
Senior Research Scientist
Pacific Northwest National
Laboratory
Washington, D.C., U.S.A.

Mr. J/0rgen Fenhann
Energy Systems Group and
UNEP Collag. Ctr. on Energy
and Environment
Ris/0 National Laboratory
Roskilde, Denmark

Dr. Stuart R. Gaffin
Atmosphere Program
Environmental Defense Fund
New York, NY, U.S.A.

Dr. Henryk Gaj
Polish Foundation for Energy
Efficiency (FEWE)
Warsaw, Poland

Dr. Ken Gregory
Centre for Business and the Environment
Middlesex, UK

Dr. Arnulf Gruebler
Environmentally Compatible
Energy Strategies
International Institute for Applied
Systems Analysis
Laxenburg, Austria

Mr. William Hare
Greenpeace International
Amsterdam, the Netherlands

Dr. Erik Haites
Margaree Consultants, Inc.
Toronto, ONT, Canada

Dr. Tae-Yong Jung
Korea Energy Economics Institute
Euiwang-Si, Kyunggi-Do, Korea


Dr. Thomas Kram
Project Head of ETSAP
ECN Policy Studies
Netherlands Energy Research
Foundation
Petten, the Netherlands

Dr. Emilio Lebre La Rovere
COPPE/UFRJ
Universidade Federal do
Rio de Janeiro
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

Prof. Matthew Luhanga
University of Dar es Salaam
Dar es Salaam, United Republic
of Tanzania
Dr. Laurie Michaelis
Environment Directorate
OECD
Paris, France

Dr. Shunsuke Mori
Department of Industrial Administration
Faculty of Science and Engineering
Science University of Tokyo
Tokyo, Japan

Dr. Tsuneyuki Morita
Head of Global Warming Response Team
National Institute for Environmental
Studies
Tsukuba, Japan

Dr. Richard Moss
Head of Technical Support Unit
IPCC Working Group II
Washington, D.C., U.S.A.


Prof. Nebojsa Nakicenovic
Project Leader
Environmentally Compatible
Energy Strategies
International Institute for Applied
Systems Analysis
Laxenburg, Austria

Dr. William Pepper
ICF Kaiser
Fairfax, VA, U.S.A.

Mr. Hugh Martin Pitcher
Senior Scientist, Global Change Group
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
Washington, D.C., U.S.A.

Ms. Lynn Price
Energy Analysis Program
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory
Berkeley, CA, U.S.A.

Dr. Hans-Holger Rogner
Section Head, Planning and Economic
Studies Section
International Atomic Energy Agency
Vienna, Austria

Dr. Priyadarshi Shukla
Indian Institute of Technology
Ahmedabad, India

Mr. Alexei Sankovski
ICF Kaiser
Washington, D.C., U.S.A.

Dr. Robert Swart
Air Research Laboratory
Policy Analysis and Scenarios
RIVM
Bilthoven, the Netherlands

Prof. John P. Weyant
Director
Energy Modeling Forum
Stanford University
Stanford, CA, U.S.A.

Dr. Ernst Worrell
Energy Analysis Program
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory
Berkeley, CA, U.S.A.

/p/ecs/general/admin/ipcc-sr/corr/open process/naki-short.doc 06/26/98,
11:34 AM

Original Filename: 904080701.txt | Return to the index page | Permalink | Later Emails

From: Nebojsa NAKICENOVIC <naki@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>
To: Joseph Alcamo <alcamo@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Knut Alfsen <knut.alfsen@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Akhiro Amano <z95020@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Dennis Anderson <dennis.anderson@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Zhou Dadi <becon@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Gerald Davis <Ged.R.Davis@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Benjamin Dessus <Benjamin.Dessus@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Bert de Vries <Bert.de.Vries@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Jae Edmonds <ja_edmonds@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Joergen Fenhann <j.fenhann@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Guenther Fischer <fischer@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Stuart Gaffin <stuart@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Henryk Gaj <Fewewar@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Kenneth Gregory <kennethgregory@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Arnulf Gruebler <gruebler@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Erik Haites <ehaites@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, William Hare <bhare@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Michael Jefferson <jefferson@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Tae-Yong Jung <tyjung@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Tom Kram <kram@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Emilio La Rovere <emilio@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Rik Leemans <Rik.leemans@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Matthew Luhanga <vc@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Michael Hulme <m.hulme@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Douglas McKay <Doug.D.Mckay@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Julio Torres-Martinez <dpid@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Laurie Michaelis <laurie.michaelis@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Roberta Miller <roberta.miller@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Shunsuke Mori <mori@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Tsuneyuke Morita <t-morita@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Nebojsa Nakicenovic <Naki@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Youssef Nassef <Nassef@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, William Pepper <WPepper@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Hugh Pitcher <hm_pitcher@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Lynn Price <lkprice@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Rich Richels <rrichels@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Holger Rogner <H.H.Rogner@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Cynthia Rosenzweig <crosenzweig@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Alexei Sankovski <ASankovski@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Stephen Schneider <shs@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Priyadarshi Shukla <shukla@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, James Skea <J.F.Skea@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Steve Smith <ssmith@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Leena Srivastava <leena@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Susan Subak <S.Subak@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Robert Swart <rob.swart@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Sascha van Rooijen <vanrooijen@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, John Weyant <weyant@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Ernst Worrell <e.worrell@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Xing Xiaoshi <xxiaoshi@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>
Subject: Next SRES Meeting in Beijing, 7-9 October
Date: Tue, 25 Aug 1998 17:31:41 +0200
Cc: johnson@xxxxxxxxx.xxx, kuszko@xxxxxxxxx.xxx, dowds@xxxxxxxxx.xxx

Dear Colleagues,

Zhou Dadi has been kind enough to organize the next SRES Lead Authors
meeting in Beijing, China, to be held on 7-9 October, 1998. Dadi will
provide us with more detailed information on meeting logistics in the near
future, and I will send out a meeting agenda as we get closer to the
meeting date. Basically, there are four items that need to be discussed at
the meeting: 1) SRES progress to date; 2) the open process; 3) scenario
revisions and additional work; and 4) planning the final report.

Please mark you calendars for this date and RSVP to both Zhou Dadi
(becon@xxxxxxxxx.xxx) and Anne Johnson (johnson@xxxxxxxxx.xxx) as soon
as possible I will be out of the office xxx xxxx xxxxSeptember and will not be
able to receive messages during this time.

I look forward to seeing you in Beijing.

Naki

Original Filename: 904762907.txt | Return to the index page | Permalink | Later Emails

From: Nebojsa NAKICENOVIC <naki@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>
To: Joseph Alcamo <alcamo@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Akhiro Amano <z95020@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Zhou Dadi <becon@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Gerald Davis <Ged.R.Davis@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Bert de Vries <Bert.de.Vries@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Jae Edmonds <ja_edmonds@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Joergen Fenhann <j.fenhann@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Guenther Fischer <fischer@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Stuart Gaffin <stuart@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Henryk Gaj <Fewewar@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Kenneth Gregory <kennethgregory@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Arnulf Gruebler <gruebler@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, William Hare <bhare@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Michael Jefferson <jefferson@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Tae-Yong Jung <tyjung@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Tom Kram <kram@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Emilio La Rovere <emilio@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Rik Leemans <Rik.leemans@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Matthew Luhanga <vc@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Michael Hulme <m.hulme@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Douglas McKay <Doug.D.Mckay@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Julio Torres-Martinez <dpid@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Bert Metz <bert.metz@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Laurie Michaelis <laurie.michaelis@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Roberta Miller <roberta.miller@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, "John F.B. Mitchell" <jfbmitchell@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Shunsuke Mori <mori@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Tsuneyuke Morita <t-morita@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Nebojsa Nakicenovic <Naki@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Youssef Nassef <Nassef@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, William Pepper <WPepper@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Hugh Pitcher <hm_pitcher@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Lynn Price <lkprice@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Rich Richels <rrichels@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Keywan Riahi <Riahi@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Alexander Roehrl <Roehrl@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Holger Rogner <H.H.Rogner@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Cynthia Rosenzweig <crosenzweig@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Alexei Sankovski <ASankovski@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Stephen Schneider <shs@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Priyadarshi Shukla <shukla@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, "Michael Schlesinger <schlesin@xxxxxxxxx.xxx> Steve Smith" <ssmith@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Leena Srivastava <leena@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Susan Subak <S.Subak@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Sascha van Rooijen <vanrooijen@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, John Weyant <weyant@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Xing Xiaoshi <xxiaoshi@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, "Richard H. Moss" <rmoss@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, "John F.B. Mitchell" <jfbmitchell@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Ernst Worrell <e.worrell@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Dennis Anderson <dennis.anderson@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Erik Haites <ehaites@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, James Skea <J.F.Skea@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>
Subject: Next SRES Meeting in Beijing, 7-9 October
Date: Wed, 02 Sep 1998 15:01:47 +0200
Cc: Dave Dokken <ddokken@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Rob Swart <rob.swart@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, "D.J. Griggs" <djgriggs@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>


Dear Colleagues,

This is a follow up on the earlier announcement of the next SRES Meeting.
First, I would like to thank all those of you who have confirmed that you
will join us in Beijing. Unfortunately, some of our colleagues also had to
cancel due to other commitments. Attached you will find the venue of the
meeting and hotel that Dadi reserved for us at a special discounted price.
My proposal is to convene at 13:00 hours on 7 October and try to finish on
early afternoon on 9 October so that you have some free time left for
sight-seeing before we all depart.

I will soon send to all of you formal invitation letters on IIASA
letter-head just in the case you need it for travel approval (unless you
cancel your participation in the meantime). Dadi will send you a similar
invitation letter to use in order to obtain a visa for China.

Appended is my last e-mail concerning this meeting in case you did not
receive a copy. In the attachment to this e-mail you will find two
letters. One is from IPCC outlining the possible role of scenarios in IPCC
assessment (Microsoft Photo Editor file). It is important for our work as
it indicates possible uses of new IPCC emissions scenarios. One of the
agenda items at the meeting will indeed be to discuss which of our marker
scenarios we recommend be used in the interim period before our scenarios
are approved by IPCC in early 2000. The other letter is also from IPCC
announcing the SRES web-site (PowerPoint file). The web-site includes most
of the scenario variants we have developed to date. Please circulate this
second letter as widely as you can because we need as much feedback from
the wider community of possible users as we can obtain.

Please let us know as soon as possible whether you are planing to attend.

I hope to see you all in China.

Regards, Naki

Venue:
National Meteorological Administration (No. 46 Baishiqiao Road, Haidian
District, Beijing).

Accommodation:
Olympic Hotel (No. 48 Baishiqiao Road, Haidian District, Beijing,
Tel: xxx xxxx xxxx); discounted Price: US$65+15% service costs.

Meeting Announcement:

Dear Colleagues,

Zhou Dadi has been kind enough to organize the next SRES Lead Authors
meeting in Beijing, China, to be held on 7-9 October, 1998. Dadi will
provide us with more detailed information on meeting logistics in the near
future, and I will send out a meeting agenda as we get closer to the
meeting date. Basically, there are four items that need to be discussed at
the meeting: 1) SRES progress to date; 2) the open process; 3) scenario
revisions and additional work; and 4) planning the final report.

Please mark you calendars for this date and RSVP to both Zhou Dadi
(becon@xxxxxxxxx.xxx) and Anne Johnson (johnson@xxxxxxxxx.xxx) as soon
as possible I will be out of the office xxx xxxx xxxxSeptember and will not be
able to receive messages during this time.

I look forward to seeing you in Beijing.

Naki

Original Filename: 933254004.txt | Return to the index page | Permalink | Later Emails

From: Mike Hulme <m.hulme@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>
To: Jennifer F Crossley <J.Crossley@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>
Subject: Re: masking of WWF maps
Date: Thu Jul 29 09:13:xxx xxxx xxxx

Jenny,

Thanks for these.

After entering into debate with Barrie Pittock, I have decided to shift to using the 1 sigma level as a mask for all maps. This will not affect any of the temperature plots you have done until now, but means that the China and C.America precipitation maps will need re-drawing using 1 sigma. Please let me know when these are done.
Note also for Russia and that everything from now on for WWF (both T and P) should use 1 sigma as the mask.

Sorry about this and I realise this squeezes even more time away from the RCM.

Given what has happened and your role in producing these plots, you may interested in the exchanges I have had with Barrie Pittock - it illustrates nicely the nuances of presenting climate scenarios in different Fora. Read these three emails in reverse order.

Mike

___________________________________________


Dear Mike,

Thank you for your careful consideration of my "trenchant comments". I
am now much happier with what you are doing, and indeed grateful for
your hard work and enterprise is getting the new scenarios out so
quickly for both IPCC and WWF. Shifting to a one standard deviation is
certainly an improvement, along with some discussion of possible changes
in extremes. I fully appreciate that analysis of daily output is a
time-consuming future task, but meantime an appropriate caveat is
needed. Maybe an additional upfront paragraph discussion of the very
issues we have discussed re providing best estimates of changes, even if
their statistical detectability can only be established after a long
time period has elapsed, would be useful?

I should perhaps explain my delicate position in all this. As a retired
CSIRO person I have somewhat more independence than before, and perhaps
a reduced sense of vested interest in CSIRO, but I am still closely in
touch and supportive of what CAR is doing. Also, I have a son who is now
a leading staff member of WWF in Australia and who is naturally well
informed on climate change issues. Moreover, Michael Rae, who is their
local climate change staffer, is a member of the CSIRO sector advisory
committee (along with some industry people as well) and well known to
me. So I anticipated questions from WWF Australia, and from the media
later when the scenarios are released, regarding the scenarios. I did
not want to be in the position of feeling the need to seriously question
in public their presentation or interpretation. You have allayed my
fears on that score, so that is great.

Roger may still follow up with some more detailed comments he is
collating from people in CAR.

Best regards,

Barrie.

________________________________


Barrie,

Thanks for your trenchent comments re. the scenario maps.

Let's get the bit about extremes out of the way because in what WWF have asked us to do (or what Tim Carter and I have done for WGII) we cannot produce new detailed analyses for all the 15 regions we are doing of GCM-based changes in daily or sub-daily events. Clearly for (some, many?) impacts such changes will be important and we (do and will) make comments to this effect in various places. [By the way, we do show some analyses of changes in the probability of extreme *seasons*, if not extreme days].

Your main point of contention, however, is about the portrayal of changes in mean seasonal T and P (and we are talking about 30-year climate averages here).

My reason for introducing the idea of only showing changes in T and P that *exceed* some level of 'natural' variability was a pedagogic one, rather than a formal statistical one (I concede that using '95% confidence' terminology in the WWF leaflet is misleading and will drop this). And the pedagogic role of this type of visual display is to bring home to people that (some, much or all of) GCM simulated changes in mean seasonal precip. for some regions do *not* amount to anything very large in relation to what may happen in the future to precip. anyway - a classic example is the African Sahel where *none* of the GCMs get precip. changes anything like as large as have been seen this century.

The reasons for this may be 1) because the GHG signal is poorly defined, i.e., a scatter of GCM P changes both above and below zero, and/or 2) because even with a tighter bunching of GCM predictions in one direction these may still not be large relative to 'natural' variations in 30-year mean precip. My approach of taking a pseudo-ensemble of GCMs, standarising and scaling and then plotting the Median *in relation to* natural variations is I think one of the more elegant ways of showing this. Of course, we could define natural variability to be the 1 sigma rather than the 2 sigma level, or simply the interquartile range of control climates or even just the xxx xxxx xxxxpercentile range. What one chooses is a matter of judgement and probably for WWF I should use a less extreme threshold than 2 sigma.

The point behind all this is to emphasise that precip. changes are less well-defined than temp. changes *and* that we should be thinking of adaptation to *present* levels of precip. variability, rather than getting hung up on the problems of predicting future precip. levels. This pedagogic thinking is hard to communicate in a short WWF brochure.

Your concern about my message is well taken, however, and I intend to remove any reference to 95% confidence levels, to re-word the text to indicate that we are plotting precip. changes only 'where they are large relative to natural variability', and to reduce my threshold to the 1 sigma level of HadCM2 control variability (e.g. this has the effect of showing precip. changes for the majority of Australia even in the B1 scenario).

But I do not intend to abandon the concept. I think it important - even for Greenie groups - to present sober assessments of magnitudes of change. Thus making it clear that future changes in T are better defined that future changes in P, and also to point out that future emissions (and therefore climate change) may be as low as the B1 scenario (is B1 climate change negligible? I almost think so), whilst also being possibly as high as A2 is I think very important.

The alternative is to think that such a more subtle presentation is too sophisticated for WWF. But I think (hope) not.

Thanks again Barrie for forcing me to think through this again.

Mike

_________________________________________________________

At 17:52 28/07/99 +1000, you wrote:
>Hello Mike,
>
>I am giving a preliminary response to your suggestion that Peter Whetton
>comment on your scenario material in case there is some urgency. Peter
>did write an email last Friday night before going on a week's holiday,
>but unfortunately the email system failed and it probably did not go and
>has been lost. He asked Roger Jones to respond on behalf of the group
>but Roger is snowed under at present.
>
>Peter and I did discuss it on Friday. Our main concern (although there
>are other more detailed ones) is your use of the 95% confidence limits
>of natural climatic variability as some sort of threshold for change.
>This is a reasonable thing to do if you are addressing the question of
>whether climatic change will be detectable at a "scientific level" of
>confidence, but that is certainly not the question I would expect WWF to
>want answered, nor is it the one most relevant to giving policy advice.
>The relevant question is "What is the best estimate of climate change,
>given the assumption that increasing GH gases will cause change?". The
>contrast between these questions, the statistical criteria they require,
>and thus the answers, is what I was driving at in my comment on your
>paper in Nature. It is a very serious difference with serious
>consequences for how people will interpret your advice. The results as
>you present them suggest that many areas will have precipitation changes
>(particularly) which are small compared to natural variability, and
>therefore it does not matter. But if the change in mean is some
>appreciable fraction of natural variability, say, 50%, that is a very
>serious matter which ought to concern policy makers, because it will
>have cumulative impacts, especially in regard to large changes in the
>frequency and magnitude of extremes (floods and droughts). Surely you
>understand that! - refer to the standard diagrams of the impact on
>extremes of shifting a normal distribution by one standard deviation.
>
>What you are doing is using a strict Type I error criterion when others
>(WWF?) might think a Type II error criterion is more suitable (the
>Precautionary Principle), and reasonable people (like me of course!?)
>think a criterion in between which measures risk of serious impacts is
>what is needed for policymakers. The reference I gave in my comment in
>Nature may not be the best - but look at my argument in QJRMS, 109,
>pp.xxx xxxx xxxx(1983) for a clearer exposition on this point.
>
>The other related matter is that your scenarios for WWF, and for that
>matter for IPCC WG2, do not discuss the importance of changes in
>extremes, which are arguably the most important changes, however poorly
>understood they may be at present. This and the other caveats you are
>intending to include in the IPCC material, re scaling, sulfate aerosol
>effects, longer timescales, and change after stabilisation of
>concentrations, should be in the WWF material also, even if they
>complicate things a bit (I have not checked whether some of that is in
>your WWF stuff as yet).
>
>I would be very concerned if the material comes out under WWF auspices
>in a way that can be interpreted as saying that "even a
>greenie group like WWF" thinks large areas of the world will have
>negligible climate change. But that is where your 95% confidence limit
>leads.
>
>Sorry to be critical, but better now than later!
>
>Best regards,
>
>Barrie.
>
>Dr A. Barrie Pittock
>Post-Retirement Fellow*, Climate Impact Group
>CSIRO Atmospheric Research, PMB 1, Aspendale 3195, Australia
>Tel: xxx xxxx xxxx, Fax: xxx xxxx xxxx, email:
><barrie.pittock@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>
>WWW: http://www.dar.csiro.au/res/cm/impact.htm
>
>* As from 1 March 1999 I have become a CSIRO Post-Retirement Fellow.
>This means I do not have administrative responsibilities, and am
>working part-time, primarily on writing for the Intergovernmental Panel
>on Climate Change. Please refer any administrative matters or contract
>negotiations for the CIG to Dr. Peter Whetton, the new Group Leader, at
><peter.whetton@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, tel. xxx xxxx xxxx.
>
>"Far better an approximate answer to the right question which is often
>vague, than an exact answer to the wrong question which can always be
>made precise." J.W. Tukey as cited by R. Lewin, Science 221,xxx xxxx xxxx.
>
>

Original Filename: 969618170.txt | Return to the index page | Permalink | Later Emails

From: mhughes@xxxxxxxxx.xxx
To: tom crowley <tom@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>
Subject: Re: old stuff
Date: Fri, 22 Sep 2000 06:22:xxx xxxx xxxx
Cc: <k.briffa@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>

Dear Tom,
The difference between the Campito Mountain record and, for example, the one
from the Polar Urals that you mention, is that there is no meaningful
correlation between the Campito record and local temperature, whereas there is a
strong correlation in the Polar Urals case. I give references to the work
reporting this phenomenon at the end of this message, but I'm afraid I'm missing
the references to the technical comments that are being responded to in the last
two. If you examine my Fig 1 closely you will see that the Campito record and
Keith's reconstruction from wood density are extraordinarily similar until 1850.
After that they differ not only in the lack of long-term trend in Keith's
record, but in every other respect - the decadal-scale correlation breaks down.
I tried to imply in my e-mail, but will now say it directly, that although a
direct carbon dioxide effect is still the best candidate to explain this effect,
it is far from proven. In any case, the relevant point is that there is no
meaningful correlation with local temperature. Not all high-elevation tree-ring
records from the West that might reflect temperature show this upward trend. It
is only clear in the driest parts (western) of the region (the Great Basin),
above about 3150 meters elevation, in trees old enough (>~800 years) to have
lost most of their bark - 'stripbark' trees. As luck would have it, these are
precisely the trees that give the chance to build temperature records for most
of the Holocene. I am confident that, before AD1850, they do contain a record of
decadal-scale growth season temperature variability. I am equally confident
that, after that date, they are recording something else.
I'm split between Harvard Forest and UMASS these days, and my copy of your paper
is not with me today. I'd be interested to know what the name of the site for
the LaMarche central Colorado record was.
Cheers, Malcolm

Reference List

1. Graybill, Donald A., and Sherwood B. Idso. 1993. Detecting the
Aerial Fertilization Effects of Atmospheric CO2 Enrichment in Tree-Ring
Chronologies. Global Bioeochemical Cycles 7, no. 1: 81-95.
2. LaMarche , V. C., D. A. Graybill, H. C. Fritts, and M. R. Rose.
1984. Increasing Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide: Tree Ring Evidence for Growth
Enhancement in Natural Vegetation. Science 225: 1019-21.
3. ---1986. Carbon Dioxide Enhancement of Tree Growth At High
Elevations. Science 231: 859-60.
4. ---1986. Technical Comments: Carbon Dioxide Enhancement of Tree
Growth At High Elevations. Science 231: 860.




Quoting tom crowley <tom@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>:

> Dear Malcolm and Keith,
>
> as I discuss in my Ambio paper the "anomalous" late 19th century warming
> also occurs in a LaMarche tree ring record from central Colorado, the
> Urals
> record of Briffa, and the east China phenological temperature record of
> Zhu.
>
> Alpine glaciers also started to retreat in many regions around 1850,
> with
> 1/3 to 1/2 of their full retreat occurring before the warming that
> commenced about 1920.
>
> The Overpeck et al Arctic synthesis also discusses warming before 1920 -
> that record matches very closely the Mann et al reconstruction in other
> details back to 1600.
>
> Unpublished work by us on coral trends also suggests slight warming
> between
> about 1xxx xxxx xxxx.
>
> So, are you sure that some CO2 fertilization is responsible for this?
> May
> we not actually be seeing a warming?
>
> Tom
>
>
>
> Thomas J. Crowley
> Dept. of Oceanography
> Texas A&M University
> College Station, TX 77xxx xxxx xxxx
> xxx xxxx xxxx
> xxx xxxx xxxx(fax)
> xxx xxxx xxxx(alternate fax)
>
>
>

Original Filename: 1048799107.txt | Return to the index page | Permalink | Later Emails

From: Earth Government <earthgov@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>
Subject: Press release from Earth Government and April Newsletter
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 2003 16:05:xxx xxxx xxxx

Press release from Earth Government and April Newsletter
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

This Press release from Earth Government is found at
[1]http://members.shaw.ca/earthgov/HNewsPR05.htm

Formation of Earth Government for the good of all

March 27th, 2003


To all Peoples of the Earth,

Earth has long been waiting for a truly global governing body based on universal values,
human rights, global concepts and democracy. Earth Government might as well be created now,
there is no longer any reason to wait. We are the Earth Community, and we will form the
Earth Government. Earth management is a priority and is a duty by every responsible person.
A democratically elected Earth Government will now be formed, and we want you to reflect on
future effects of such an event on the history of humanity. Certainly one will expect
extraordinary changes: a reorganizing of human activities all over the planet;
participation by all societies on the planet in solving local and global problems; new
alliances forming; north meeting with south (eradication of poverty will be the price to
pay to get votes from the south) in order to gather more votes within the newly created
Earth Government to satisfy power struggles between European, Asian and Western countries;
adoption of democratic principles, human and Earth rights, global concepts, and universal
values by every human being; expansion of consciousness; gathering and coordinating of
forces to resolve social and political problems in a peaceful way (no more conflicts or
wars); gathering and coordinating of forces (technologies, scientific research, exploration
work, human resources, etc.) to resolve global problems such as global climate,
environment, availability of resources, poverty, employment, etc. Thousands more changes!

Let your heart and mind reflect on 'the good' of a democratically elected Earth Government.
Everyone is part of Earth Community by birth and therefore everyone has a right to vote.
Everyone should be given a chance to vote. Decisions will be made democratically.

Earth Government is proposing that:

a) different nations may require different political systems at different times
b) a democratic system is not a "must have it" to be a responsible member nation of the
Earth Government
c) all democracies are to be upgraded, or improved upon, to be a responsible member nation
of the Earth Government. The Scale of Human and Earth Rights and the Charter of the Earth
Government are the newly added requirements to all democratic systems of the world.

In today's Earth Government it is important for our survival to cooperate globally on
several aspects such as peace, security, pollution in the air, water and land, drug trade,
shelving the war industry, keeping the world healthy, enforcing global justice for all,
eradicating poverty worldwide, replacing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the
Scale of Human and Earth Rights, and entrenching the Charter of Earth Government as a way
of life for the good of all.

Earth needs urgently a world system of governance. The United Nations fail to satisfy the
needs of the people of the 21st Century. It has never improved upon the old ways and
thinking of the middle of the 20th Century. Its voting system no longer satisfy the 6.157
billion people on Earth. The challenges are different and require a world organization up
for dealing with the needs of all these people.

During the past several years, the Earth Government has been pleading the United Nations
leaders to make changes in the UN organizational structure and ways of doing things. There
has been an urgent need for fundamental changes in the United Nations organization. The
decision of the United States Government to invade the Middle East nations and Afghanistan
has shown to be a result of this incapacity for changes on the part of the United Nations.
A lack of leadership at the United Nations is a major threat to the security of the world.
The world wants a true democratic world organization. The UN is not!

The most fundamental requirement of a world organization is a democratic system of voting.
Democracy must be a priority. The right that the greatest number of people has by virtue of
its number (50% plus one) is a human right. It should be respected. The actual UN system of
voting is undemocratic, unfair and noone likes it. It does not work! Earth Government has
proposed a voting system based on democracy.

Of the 190 Member States of the United Nations, it takes only one of the five permanent
members to overthrow any decision or proposal during a meeting. This means 1/189 or 0.5% of
the membership is more powerful than the remaining 99.5%. If that is not a dictature, what
is it? It does not say much about democracy at the UN. More like a dictature of the five
permanent members. In the Preamble of the Charter of the United Nations, it says "WE THE
PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS " but in fact it should say "WE THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS".

The voting system for Earth Government is very simple and practical. One representative per
million people. If all countries in the world had decided now to participate with this
process we would have today 6,114 elected representatives to form Earth Government. They
would form the Legislative body of Earth Government. They could actually all stay home to
govern or from some place in their communities. Today communications are more than good
enough to allow voting and discussing issues, etc. through the Internet and video
conferencing. That would cut cost of governing down to a minimum, at least administrative
costs. The Executive body would also govern in this way to cut cost down to a minimum.
Ministers can administer their Ministries from where they live if they wish to. There will
be a place for the Headquarters. We will show that it costs very little to administer Earth
Government, and that we can achieve immense results. There is no limit to the good the
Earth Government can achieve in the world. Think! What can do a unified 6.114 billion
people determined to make things work to keep Earth healthy?

For the first time in human history, and the first time this millennium, humanity has
proposed a benchmark:

* formation of Earth Government
* formation of global ministries in all important aspects of our lives
* the Scale of Human and Earth Rights as a replacement to the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights
* an evolved Democracy based on the Scale of Human and Earth Rights and the Charter of
the Earth Government
* a central organization for Earth management, the restoration of the planet and Earth
governance: the Global Community Assessment Centre (GCAC)
* the Earth Court of Justice to deal with all aspects of the Governance and Mangement of
the Earth
* a new impetus given to the way of doing business and trade
* more new, diversified (geographical, economical, political, social, business,
religious) symbiotical relationships between nations, communities, businesses, for the
good and well-being of all
* the event and formation of the human family and the Soul of Humanity
* proposal to reform the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, the World Bank,
the IMF, NAFTA, FTAA, and to centralize them under Earth Government, and these
organizations will be asked to pay a global tax to be administered by Earth Government
* the Peace Movement of the Earth Government and shelving of the war industry from
humanity
* a global regulatory framework for capitals and corporations that emphasizes global
corporate ethics, corporate social responsibility, protection of human and Earth rights,
the environment, community and family aspects, safe working conditions, fair wages and
sustainable consumption aspects
* the ruling by the Earth Court of Justice of the abolishment of the debt of the poor or
developing nations as it is really a form of global tax to be paid annually by the rich
or industrialized nations to the developing nations
* establishing freshwater and clean air as primordial human rights

The political system of an individual country does not have to be a democracy. Political
rights of a country belong to that country alone. Democracy is not to be enforced by anyone
and to anyone or to any community. Every community can and should choose the political
system of their choice with the understanding of the importance of such a right on the
Scale of Human and Earth Rights. On the other hand, representatives to Earth Government
must be elected democratically in every part of the world. An individual country may have
any political system at home but the government of that country will have to ensure (and
allow verification by Earth Government) that representatives to Earth Government have been
elected democratically. This way, every person in the world can claim the birth right of
electing a democratic government to manage Earth: the rights to vote and elect
representatives to form the Earth Government.

In order to elect representatives to Earth Government it is proposed the following:

A. Each individual government in the world will administer the election of
representatives to Earth Government with an NGO and/or members of Earth Government be
allowed to verify all aspects of the process to the satisfaction of all parties
involved.
B. Representatives be elected every five years to form a new Earth Government.
C. It is proposed here that there will be one elected representative per 1,000,000
people. A population of 100 million people will elect 100 representatives. This process
will create a feeling of belonging and participating to the affairs of the Earth
Community and Earth Government.
D. A typical community of a million people does not have to be bounded by a geographical
or political border. It can be a million people living in many different locations all
over the world. The Global Community is thus more fluid and dynamic. We need to let go
the archaic ways of seeing a community as the street where I live and contained by a
border. Many conflicts and wars will be avoided by seeing ourselves as people with a
heart, a mind and a Soul, and as part of a community with the same.
E. Earth population is now 6.114 billion people. If all representatives had been elected
this year there would be 6,114 representatives to form Earth Government. They would be
the Legislative elected body of Earth Government. They would participate in some ways in
choosing the Executive and Judiciary bodies of Earth Government.

Humanity has now a Vision of the Earth in the years to come and a sense of direction.

May the DIVINE WILL come into our lives and show us the way.
May our higher purpose in life bring us closer to the Soul of Humanity and God.

Germain Dufour, President
Earth Community Organization (ECO) and Earth Government
___________________________________________________________________________________________

The Newsletter can be found at the following location:
April 2003 Newsletter
[2]http://members.shaw.ca/earthgov/NewsA.htm

There are no costs in reading our Newsletters
([3]http://members.shaw.ca/earthgov/EarthGovernment.htm).

The Table of Contents of the Newsletter is shown here.

Table of Contents

1.xxx xxxx xxxxPresident's Message
2.xxx xxxx xxxxLetter to the Prime Minister of Canada, Jean Chretien, concerning Peace in the
Middle East
3.xxx xxxx xxxxLetter to the American and British Peoples concerning the invasion of the Middle
East
4.xxx xxxx xxxxLetter to all Canadians concerning the total and global embargo on all US products,
all goods and services
5.xxx xxxx xxxxLetter to the Moslem and the Arab Peoples
6.xxx xxxx xxxxLetter to Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji of China, and to the Chinese People
7.xxx xxxx xxxxLetter to the United Nations

8.xxx xxxx xxxxArticles

Axxx xxxx xxxxHow women matter in decreasing world population
Bxxx xxxx xxxxThe energy we need
Cxxx xxxx xxxxMining the impacts
Dxxx xxxx xxxxSymbiotical relationship of religion and global life-support systems
Exxx xxxx xxxxCelebration of Life Day
Fxxx xxxx xxxxThe hidden agenda: China
Gxxx xxxx xxxxEarth Government now a priority
Hxxx xxxx xxxxThe splitting of America into separate independent states living at peace for the
good of all
Ixxx xxxx xxxxThe war industry: the modern evil at work in the Middle East
Jxxx xxxx xxxxEarth security
Kxxx xxxx xxxxEarth governance
Lxxx xxxx xxxxThe Earth Court of Justice holds the people of the U.S.A. and Britain as criminals
Mxxx xxxx xxxxFoundation for the new world order, Earth Government

Improved Democracy, Nonviolence, and Peace
Respect and Care for the Global Community of Life
Ecological Integrity
Social and Economic Justice
A new symbiotical relationship between that of spirituality and the
protection of the global life-support systems
Scale of Human and Earth Right
Earth Court of Justice
Charter of Earth Government

May the DIVINE WILL come into our lives and show us the way.
May our higher purpose in life bring us closer to the Soul of Humanity and God.

Germain Dufour, President
[4]Earth Community Organization (ECO) and [5]Earth Government

Website of the Earth Community Organization and of Earth Government
[6]http://www.telusplanet.net/public/gdufour/
[7]http://members.shaw.ca/earthgov
Email addresses
[8]gdufour@xxxxxxxxx.xxx
[9]gdufour@xxxxxxxxx.xxx
[10]earthgov@xxxxxxxxx.xxx

References

1. http://members.shaw.ca/earthgov/HNewsPR05.htm
2. http://members.shaw.ca/earthgov/NewsA.htm
3. http://members.shaw.ca/earthgov/EarthGovernment.htm
4. http://www.telusplanet.net/public/gdufour/
5. http://members.shaw.ca/earthgov
6. http://www.telusplanet.net/public/gdufour/
7. http://members.shaw.ca/earthgov
8. mailto:gdufour@xxxxxxxxx.xxx
9. mailto:gdufour@xxxxxxxxx.xxx
10. mailto:earthgov@xxxxxxxxx.xxx

Original Filename: 1056477985.txt | Return to the index page | Permalink | Later Emails

From: "Michael E. Mann" <mann@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>
To: Keith Briffa <k.briffa@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Phil Jones <p.jones@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, "Raymond S. Bradley" <rbradley@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>
Subject: Re: ice cores/China series (FYI)
Date: Tue, 24 Jun 2003 14:06:xxx xxxx xxxx
Cc: mann@xxxxxxxxx.xxx

Thanks Keith,
I just read your email after reading the others. We actually eliminate records with
negative correlations (this is mentioned breifly in the GRL article,), and we investigated
a variety of weighting schemes to assure the basic robustness of the composite--but I
certainly endorse your broader point here. Many of these records have some significant
uncertainties or possible sources of bias, and this isn't the place to get into that. The
uncertainties get at this, at some level, and other places (e.g. the Reviews of Geophysics
paper Phil and I are drafting) will provide an opportunity to discuss these kinds of issues
in more detail--we will certainly be seeking advice (either officially or unofficially)
from each of you once we have finalized the draft of that...
Now back to my honeymoon...
mike
At 02:38 PM 6/24/2003 +0100, Keith Briffa wrote:

To keep you informed , here is a reply to Tom Wigley re his request to "deal with Ray's
Comments" re the China series in EOS piece
Tom
Tim has just told me of your message expressing concern about the China series , and
your statement of the necessity to "deal with Ray's comment" and add in the "small
adjustment to the Figure Caption". .
We (I and Tim) decided to get this off as soon as possible to Ellen (AGU) , as we had
been asked to do (and as requested by Ellen). Hence it went off earlier today (and
before your message arrived). Mike was aware of Ray's comment and was happy to leave any
amendment to the text "until the proof stage" .
In my opinion it is not practical (or desirable) to try to "qualify " any one record in
this limited format. It was a majority decision to leave the Mann and Jones 2000-year
series in the Figure 1 (as it was to remove the Briffa and Osborn tree-ring based one) ,
and the details of the logic used to derive the Mann and Jones series is to be found in
the (cited) text of their paper. Signing on to this letter , in my mind. implies
agreement with the text and not individual endorsement of all curves by each author. I
too have expressed my concern to Phil (and Ray) over the logic that you leave all series
you want in but just weight them according to some (sometimes low) correlation (in this
case based on decadal values). I also believe some of the series that make up the
Chinese record are dubious or obscure , but the same is true of other records Mann and
Jones have used (e.g. how do you handle a series in New Zealand that has a -0.25
correlation?) . Further serious problems are still (see my and Tim's Science comment on
the Mann 1999 paper) lurking with the correction applied to the Western US tree-ring PC
amplitude series used (and shown in Figure 2). There are problems (and limitations )
with ALL series used. At this stage , singling out individual records for added (and
unavoidably cursory added description) is not practical. We were told to cut the text
and References significantly - and further cuts are implied by Ellen's messages to us.
If you wish to open this up to general discussion , it may be best to wait 'til the
proof stage and then we can all consider the balance of emphasis - but we had also
better guard against too "selective" a choice of data to present? If you want to get a
somewhat wider discussion of this point going in the meantime , feel free to forward
this to whoever you wish along with your disagreement , while we wait on the response
from AGU.
Best wishes
Keith
Professor Keith Briffa,
Climatic Research Unit
University of East Anglia
Norwich, NR4 7TJ, U.K.
Phone: xxx xxxx xxxx
Fax: xxx xxxx xxxx
[1]http://www.cru.uea.ac.uk/cru/people/briffa/

______________________________________________________________
Professor Michael E. Mann
Department of Environmental Sciences, Clark Hall
University of Virginia
Charlottesville, VA 22903
_______________________________________________________________________
e-mail: mann@xxxxxxxxx.xxx Phone: (4xxx xxxx xxxxFAX: (4xxx xxxx xxxx
[2]http://www.evsc.virginia.edu/faculty/people/mann.shtml

References

1. http://www.cru.uea.ac.uk/cru/people/briffa/
2. http://www.evsc.virginia.edu/faculty/people/mann.shtml

Original Filename: 1065636937.txt | Return to the index page | Permalink | Later Emails

From: "Michael E. Mann" <mann@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>
To: Tom Wigley <wigley@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>
Subject: Re: Fwd: EOS: Soon et al reply
Date: Wed, 08 Oct 2003 14:15:xxx xxxx xxxx
Cc: Caspar Ammann <ammann@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, rbradley@xxxxxxxxx.xxx, Keith Briffa <k.briffa@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, tcrowley@xxxxxxxxx.xxx, mhughes@xxxxxxxxx.xxx, omichael@xxxxxxxxx.xxx, t.osborn@xxxxxxxxx.xxx, jto@u.arizona.edu, Scott Rutherford <srutherford@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Kevin Trenberth <trenbert@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Tom Wigley <wigley@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, mann@xxxxxxxxx.xxx, p.jones@xxxxxxxxx.xxx

Thanks Tom,
In fact, I'm almost done with a brief (<750 word) response that addresses all of these
issues, and I'll be looking forward to comments on this. Hope to send it out later today,
mike
At 12:05 PM 10/8/2xxx xxxx xxxx, Tom Wigley wrote:

Folks,
I agree with Kevin that any response should be brief.
On the second page of their comment, SBL quote some of the caveat statements in their
earlier papers. The irony is that they do not heed their own caveats. If taken
literally, all these proxy data problems would mean that one can draw no conclusions
about the existence or otherwise of the MWE or LIA as global phenomena. This is what we
say (I hope -- at least I have said this in the paper cited belowxxx xxxx xxxxbut our over-bold
skeptics say that these anomalous intervals *did* exist. You can't have it both ways --
and basically what BS are doing is a confidence trick.
What is still needed here is an analysis of the BS method to show that it could be used
to prove anything they wanted.
I am still concerned about 'our' dependence on treerings. Are our results really
dependent on one region pre 1400 as SNL state? Is the problem of nonclimate obfuscating
factors in the 20th century enough to screw up calibrations on moderate to long
timescales? If not, we need to state and document this clearly. Does this problem apply
to both widths and densities? Are the borehole data largely garbage? I recall a paper of
Mike's on this issue that I refereed last year -- and there was something in GRL (I
think) very recently pointing out some serious potential problems.
Finally, did we really say what SBL claim we did in their p. 1 point (2)? Surely the
primary motive for all of this paleo work is that it DOES have a bearing on
human-induced climate effects?
Tom.
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++==
Michael E. Mann wrote:

Thanks Kevin,
I agree w/ your take on this. We need to come up with a short, but powerful rebuttal.
According to Judy Jacobs, we're only allowed 750 words, so we will need to be even more
sparing and precise in our words that in the original Eos piece. By the way, we have 3
weeks to submit (i.e., our response is due October 27).
We need to focus on the key new claims, while simply dismissing, by reference to earlier
writings, the recycled ones. The Kalnay et al paper seems to be the new darling of the
contrarians, and you're precise wording on this will be very helpful. Phil, Tim and
others should be able to put to rest, in one or two sentences, the myths about urban
heat bias on the CRU record. A few words from Malcolm and Keith on the biological tree
growth effects would help too. The comments on the various paleo figures are confusing
and inconsistent, but from what I can tell, just plain wrong. I'll draft some words on
that.
I'll just continue to assimilate info and suggestions from everyone over the next week
or so, and then try to put this in the form a rough draft rebuttal to send out.
Thanks for your quick reply. Looking forward to hearing back from others,
mike
At 09:16 AM 10/6/2xxx xxxx xxxx, Kevin Trenberth wrote:

Hi Mike et al
Firstly, you should know that comments by myself and the group at NCDC (Vose et al) on
the Kalnay and Cai Nature paper were accepted (after a rebuttal and review process), and
then fine tuned. But it is a slow process and Kalnay and Cai have yet to finalize their
rebuttal. I am attaching FYI the "final" version of my comment. NCDC deals with the
problems with the records.
My reaction to the reply is as follows:
The first page deals with comments on proxy records and their problems. I think we
should agree that there are issues with proxy records, they are not the same as
instrumental records (which have their own problems), but they are all we have.
However, some are better than others (e.g. borehole) and annual or better resolution is
highly desirable in particular to make sure that anomalies are synchronous. The records
are not really the issue here, it is there use (and abuse).
There are several charges about only US or Northern Europe that can be quickly dealt
with. However the main points are on p 2.
We know from the observational record that global or hemispheric means are typically
small residuals of large anomalies of opposite signs so that large warm spots occur
simultaneously with large cold regions (witness last winter).
This fact means that we need high temporal resolution (annual or better) AND an ability
to compute hemispheric averages based on a network. The Soon and Baliunas approach
fails dismally on both of these critical points.
BS point out that Fig 2 of Mann and Jones show some temperatures as high as those in the
20th C. (They are wrong, do they mean Fig 2 of
M03?) You can counter that by looking at China where this is far from true.
I would be inclined to respond with a fairly short minimalist but powerful rebuttal,
focussing mostly on the shortcomings of BS and not defending the M03 and other records.
It should point out (again) that their methodolgy is fundamentally flawed and their
conclusions are demonstrably wrong. For this, the shorter the better.
Regards
Kevin
Michael E. Mann wrote:

Dear Colleagues,
Sorry to have to bother you all with this-- I know how busy our schedules are, and this
comes at an unfortunately busy time for many of us I would guss. But I think we *do*
have to respond, and I'm hoping that the response can be, again, something we all sign
our names to.
I've asked Ellen for further guidance on the length limits of our response, and the due
date for our response. The criticisms are remarkably weak, and easy to reply to in my
view. S&B have thus unwittingly, in my view, provided us with a further opportunity to
expose the most egregious of the myths perpetuated by the contrarians (S&B have managed
to cram them all in there) in the format of a response to their comment.
THeir comment includes a statement about how the article is all based on Mann et al
[1999] which is pretty silly given what is stated in the article, and what is shown in
Figure 1. It would be appropriate to begin our response by pointing out this obvious
straw man.
Then there is some nonsense about the satellite record and urban heat islands that Phil,
Kevin, and Tom W might in particular want to speak to. And Malcolm and Keith might like
to speak to the comments on the supposed problems due to non-biological tree growth
effects (which even if they were correctly described, which they aren't, have little
relevance to several of the reconstructions shown, and all of the model simulation
results shown). There is one paragraph about Mann and Jones [2003] which is right from
the Idsos' "Co2 science" website, and Phil and I and Tim Osborn and others have already
spoken too. I will draft a short comment on that.
I'd like to solicit individual comments, sentences or paragraphs, etc. from each of you
on the various points raised, and begin to assimilate this into a "response". I'll let
you know as soon as I learn from Ellen how much space we have to work with.
Sorry for the annoyance. I look forward to any contributions you can each provide
towards a collective response.
Thanks,
mike

Date: Sun, 05 Oct 2003 08:23:xxx xxxx xxxx
To: Caspar Ammann <ammann@xxxxxxxxx.xxx> <[1]mailto:ammann@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, rbradley@xxxxxxxxx.xxx
<[2]mailto:rbradley@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Keith Briffa <k.briffa@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>
<[3]mailto:k.briffa@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Tom Crowley, "Malcolm Hughes" <mhughes@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>
<[4]mailto:mhughes@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, omichael@xxxxxxxxx.xxx
<[5]mailto:omichael@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Tim Osborn <t.osborn@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>
<[6]mailto:t.osborn@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Jonathan Overpeck <jto@u.arizona.edu>
<[7]mailto:jto@u.arizona.edu>, Scott Rutherford <srutherford@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>
<[8]mailto:srutherford@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Kevin Trenberth <trenbert@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>
<[9]mailto:trenbert@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Tom Wigley <wigley@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>
<[10]mailto:wigley@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>
From: "Michael E. Mann" <mann@xxxxxxxxx.xxx> <[11]mailto:mann@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>
Subject: Fwd: EOS: Soon et al reply
Comments?
Mike

Delivered-To: mem6u@xxxxxxxxx.xxx <[12]mailto:mem6u@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>
Date: Sat, 04 Oct 2003 12:33:xxx xxxx xxxx
From: Ellen Mosley-Thompson <thompson.4@xxxxxxxxx.xxx> <[13]mailto:thompson.4@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>
Subject: EOS: Soon et al reply
X-Sender: ethompso@xxxxxxxxx.xxx
<[14]mailto:ethompso@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>
To: "Michael E. Mann" <mann@xxxxxxxxx.xxx> <[15]mailto:mann@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>
Cc: lzirkel@xxxxxxxxx.xxx <[16]mailto:lzirkel@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, jjacobs@xxxxxxxxx.xxx
<[17]mailto:jjacobs@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>
X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 6.0.0.22
Dear Dr. Mann (and co-authors of the Forum piece that appeared in EOS),
Dr. Willie Soon and his co-authors have submitted a reply to your Forum piece that I
have accepted. Let me outline below the official AGU procedure for replies so that you
know the options available. I have sent these same instructions to Dr. Soon.
As you wrote the original piece you now have the opportunity to see their comment
(attached) on your Forum piece. You may decide whether or not to send a reply. If you
choose not to reply - their reply will be published alone.
Should you decide to reply then your response will be published along with their comment
on your paper. One little twist is that if you submit a reply, they are allowed to see
the reply, but they can't comment on it. They have two options: they can let both
their and your comments go forward and be published together or (after viewing your
reply) they also have the option of withdrawing their comment. In the latter case, then
neither their comment or your reply to the comment will be published. Yes this is a
little contorted, but these are the instructions that I received from Judy Jacobs at
AGU.
I have attached the pdf of their comment. Please let me know within the next week
whether you and your colleagues plan to prepare a reply. If so, then you would have
several weeks to do this.
I have copied Lee Zirkel and Judy Jacobs of AGU as this paper is out of the ordinary and
I want to be sure that I am handling all this correctly.
I look forward to hearing from you regarding your decision on a reply.
Best regards,
Ellen Mosley-Thompson
EOS, Editor
cc: Judy Jacobs and Lee Zirkel
attachment

______________________________________________________________
Professor Michael E. Mann
Department of Environmental Sciences, Clark Hall
University of Virginia
Charlottesville, VA 22903
_______________________________________________________________________
e-mail: mann@xxxxxxxxx.xxx <[18]mailto:mann@xxxxxxxxx.xxx > Phone: (4xxx xxxx xxxxFAX:
(4xxx xxxx xxxx
[19]http://www.evsc.virginia.edu/faculty/people/mann.shtml

______________________________________________________________
Professor Michael E. Mann
Department of Environmental Sciences, Clark Hall
University of Virginia
Charlottesville, VA 22903
_______________________________________________________________________
e-mail: mann@xxxxxxxxx.xxx <[20]mailto:mann@xxxxxxxxx.xxx > Phone: (4xxx xxxx xxxxFAX:
(4xxx xxxx xxxx
[21]http://www.evsc.virginia.edu/faculty/people/mann.shtml

-- ****************
Kevin E. Trenberth e-mail: trenbert@xxxxxxxxx.xxx
<[22]mailto:trenbert@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>
Climate Analysis Section, NCAR [23]www.cgd.ucar.edu/cas/
<[24]http://www.cgd.ucar.edu/cas/>
P. O. Box 3000, (3xxx xxxx xxxx
Boulder, CO 80xxx xxxx xxxx (3xxx xxxx xxxx(fax)
Street address: 1850 Table Mesa Drive, Boulder, CO 80303

______________________________________________________________
Professor Michael E. Mann
Department of Environmental Sciences, Clark Hall
University of Virginia
Charlottesville, VA 22903
_______________________________________________________________________
e-mail: mann@xxxxxxxxx.xxx Phone: (4xxx xxxx xxxxFAX: (4xxx xxxx xxxx
[25]http://www.evsc.virginia.edu/faculty/people/mann.shtml

______________________________________________________________
Professor Michael E. Mann
Department of Environmental Sciences, Clark Hall
University of Virginia
Charlottesville, VA 22903
_______________________________________________________________________
e-mail: mann@xxxxxxxxx.xxx Phone: (4xxx xxxx xxxxFAX: (4xxx xxxx xxxx
[26]http://www.evsc.virginia.edu/faculty/people/mann.shtml

References

1. mailto:ammann@xxxxxxxxx.xxx
2. mailto:rbradley@xxxxxxxxx.xxx
3. mailto:k.briffa@xxxxxxxxx.xxx
4. mailto:mhughes@xxxxxxxxx.xxx
5. mailto:omichael@xxxxxxxxx.xxx
6. mailto:t.osborn@xxxxxxxxx.xxx
7. mailto:jto@u.arizona.edu
8. mailto:srutherford@xxxxxxxxx.xxx
9. mailto:trenbert@xxxxxxxxx.xxx
10. mailto:wigley@xxxxxxxxx.xxx
11. mailto:mann@xxxxxxxxx.xxx
12. mailto:mem6u@xxxxxxxxx.xxx
13. mailto:thompson.4@xxxxxxxxx.xxx
14. mailto:ethompso@xxxxxxxxx.xxx
15. mailto:mann@xxxxxxxxx.xxx
16. mailto:lzirkel@xxxxxxxxx.xxx
17. mailto:jjacobs@xxxxxxxxx.xxx
18. mailto:mann@xxxxxxxxx.xxx
19. http://www.evsc.virginia.edu/faculty/people/mann.shtml
20. mailto:mann@xxxxxxxxx.xxx
21. http://www.evsc.virginia.edu/faculty/people/mann.shtml
22. mailto:trenbert@xxxxxxxxx.xxx
23. http://www.cgd.ucar.edu/cas/
24. http://www.cgd.ucar.edu/cas/
25. http://www.evsc.virginia.edu/faculty/people/mann.shtml
26. http://www.evsc.virginia.edu/faculty/people/mann.shtml

Original Filename: 1067542015.txt | Return to the index page | Permalink | Later Emails

From: "Michael E. Mann" <mann@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>
To: Keith Briffa <k.briffa@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, "raymond s. bradley" <rbradley@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Tim Osborn <t.osborn@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, p.jones@xxxxxxxxx.xxx
Subject: Re: One way out....
Date: Thu, 30 Oct 2003 14:26:xxx xxxx xxxx
Cc: mhughes@xxxxxxxxx.xxx

Hi Keith,
sorry--yes, I think the Nature idea would be great. Definitely give it a try!
thanks,
mike
At 06:53 PM 10/30/2003 +0000, Keith Briffa wrote:

Things obviously moving over there - this result looks good.Just thought I'd send this
first bit (up to dotted line) of edited version , to illustrate possible toning down?
Have to go now and feed daughter . Will wait til see your joint version first thing
tomorrow - rest assured, that am entirely with you on this and still appalled by the MM
stuff - but keeping your distance and calm stance is still urged.
all the best to all
any objections if I talk to Nature tomorrow?
Keith
At 01:31 PM 10/30/xxx xxxx xxxx, Michael E. Mann wrote:

Guys,
So the verification RE for the "censored" NH mean reconstruction? -6.64
The verification RE for the original MBH98 NH mean reconstruction: 0.42
I think the case is really strong now!
What if were to eliminate the discussion of all the other technical details (and just
say they exist), and state more nicely that these series were effectively censored by
their substitutions, and that by removing those series which they censored, I get a
similar result, with a dismal RE.
And most people would keep the RE of 0.42 over the RE of -6, right? So this would make
that point. I think we also need to say something about the process, etc. (the intro was
based on something that Malcolm/Ray had originally crafted).
Thoughts, comments? Thanks,
mike
I'm thinking of a note saying basically this, and attaching this figure.
Could everybody sign on to something like this?
Thanks for all your help,
mike
At 05:11 PM 10/30/2003 +0000, Keith Briffa wrote:

Ray et al
I agree with this idea in principle . Whatever scientific differences and fascination
with the nuances of techniques we may /may not share, this whole process represents the
most despicable example of slander and down right deliberate perversion of the
scientific process , and bias (unverified) work being used to influence public
perception and due political process. It is , however, essential that you (we) do not
get caught up in the frenzy that these people are trying to generate, and that will more
than likely lead to error on our part or some premature remarks that we might regret. I
do think the statement re Mike's results needs making , but only after it can be based
on repeated work and in full collaboration of us all. I am happy to push Tim to take the
lead and collaborate in this - and I feel we could get sanction very quickly from the
DEFRA if needed. BUT this must be done calmly , and in the meantime a restrained
statement but out saying we have full confidence in Mike's objectivity and independence
- which we can not say of the sceptics. In fact I am moved tomorrow to contact Nature
and urge them to do an editorial on this . The political machinations in Washington
should NOT dictate the agenda or scheduling of the work - but some cool statement can be
made saying we believe the "prats have really fucked up someway" - and that the
premature publication of their paper is reprehensible . Much of the detail in Mikes
response though is not sensible (sorry Mike) and is rising to their bate.
Keith
At 11:55 AM 10/30/xxx xxxx xxxx, raymond s. bradley wrote:

Tim, Phil, Keef:
I suggest a way out of this mess. Because of the complexity of the arguments involved,
to an uniformed observer it all might be viewed as just scientific nit-picking by "for"
and "against" global warming proponents. However, if an "independent group" such as you
guys at CRU could make a statement as to whether the M&M effort is truly an "audit", and
if they did it right, I think that would go a long way to defusing the issue.
It's clear from the figure that Reno Knuti sent yesterday that something pretty whacky
happened in their analysis prior to ~AD1600, and this led Mike to figure out the
problem. See:
[1]file:///c:/eudora/attach/nh_temp_rec.jpg
If you are willing, a quick and forceful statement from The Distinguished CRU Boys would
help quash further arguments, although here, at least, it is already quite out of
control.....yesterday in the US Senate the debate opened on the McCain-Lieberman bill to
control CO2 emissions from power plants. Sen Inhofe stood up & showed the M & M figure
and stated that Mann et al--& the IPCC assessment --was now disproven and so there was
no reason to control CO2 emissions.....I wonder how many times a "scientific" paper gets
reported on in the Senate 3 days after it is published....
Ray

--
Professor Keith Briffa,
Climatic Research Unit
University of East Anglia
Norwich, NR4 7TJ, U.K.
Phone: xxx xxxx xxxx
Fax: xxx xxxx xxxx
[2]http://www.cru.uea.ac.uk/cru/people/briffa/

______________________________________________________________
Professor Michael E. Mann
Department of Environmental Sciences, Clark Hall
University of Virginia
Charlottesville, VA 22903
_______________________________________________________________________
e-mail: mann@xxxxxxxxx.xxx Phone: (4xxx xxxx xxxxFAX: (4xxx xxxx xxxx
[3]http://www.evsc.virginia.edu/faculty/people/mann.shtml

--
Professor Keith Briffa,
Climatic Research Unit
University of East Anglia
Norwich, NR4 7TJ, U.K.
Phone: xxx xxxx xxxx
Fax: xxx xxxx xxxx
[4]http://www.cru.uea.ac.uk/cru/people/briffa/

______________________________________________________________
Professor Michael E. Mann
Department of Environmental Sciences, Clark Hall
University of Virginia
Charlottesville, VA 22903
_______________________________________________________________________
e-mail: mann@xxxxxxxxx.xxx Phone: (4xxx xxxx xxxxFAX: (4xxx xxxx xxxx
[5]http://www.evsc.virginia.edu/faculty/people/mann.shtml

References

1. file://c:eudoraattachnh_temp_rec.jpg/
2. http://www.cru.uea.ac.uk/cru/people/briffa/
3. http://www.evsc.virginia.edu/faculty/people/mann.shtml
4. http://www.cru.uea.ac.uk/cru/people/briffa/
5. http://www.evsc.virginia.edu/faculty/people/mann.shtml

Original Filename: 1074609944.txt | Return to the index page | Permalink | Later Emails

From: Keith Briffa <k.briffa@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>
To: "Malcolm Hughes" <mhughes@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, "Malcolm Hughes" <mhughes@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Tim Osborn <t.osborn@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>,"Michael E. Mann" <mann@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>
Subject: Re: J. Climate paper - in confidence
Date: Tue, 20 Jan 2004 09:45:44 +0000
Cc: Scott Rutherford <srutherford@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>

<x-flowed>
Malcolm seems to have done a good job sorting out these constituent sets ,
and I don't have anything to add other than agreeing that as a general
principal , where possible, original chronologies should be used in
preference to reconstructed temperature series ( the latter having been
already optimized using simple or multiple regression to fit the target
temperature series ). This applies not only to our western US
reconstructions (which it should be stressed are based on very flexible
curve fitting in the standardisation - and inevitably can show little
variance on time scales longer than a decade or so) but also to the
Tornetrask and Polar Urals reconstructions (each of which was based on ring
width and density data , but standardised to try to preserve centennial
variability - though the density series had by far the largest regression
coefficients). There is though a question regarding the PCs of the Siberian
network (presumably provided by Eugene?) . The correlation between density
and ring width can get high in central and eastern parts of the network ,
so even though these are different variables , it might not be strictly
true to think of them as truly independent (statistically) of the density
chronologies we use from the Schweingruber network ( there may also be a
standardisation issue here , as the density chronologies were standardised
with Hugershoff functions for our initial network work (as reported in the
Holocene Special Issue) whereas your PC amplitudes may be based on
"Corridor Standardisation" - which likely preserves less low frequency? ) .
These remarks are simply for clarification and discussion , and I too will
wait on your response draft , though I would throw in the pot the fact that
omitting the time dependent stuff would simplify the message at his stage.
cheers
Keith

At 01:42 PM 1/19/xxx xxxx xxxx, Malcolm Hughes wrote:
>Mike - there are the following density data in that set:
>xxx xxxx xxxxSchweingruber/Frttss series from the ITRDB (those that
>met the criteria described in the Mann et al 2000 EI paper)
>2) Northern Fennoscandia reconstruction (from Keith)
>3) Northern Urals reconstruction (from Keith)
>4) 1 density series for China (Hughes data) and one from India
>(also Hughes data) - neither included in Keith's data set, I think.
>5) To my great surprise I find that you used the Briffa gridded
>temperature reconstruction from W. N. America (mis-attributed
>to Fritts and Shao) - of course I should have picked up on this 6
>years ago when reading the proofs of the Nature sup mat. It was
>my understanding that we had decided not to use these
>reconstructions, as the data on which they were based were in the
>ITRDB, and had been subject to that screening process. So
>depending on whether you used the long or the shorter versions
>of these, there will have been a considerable number of density
>series included , some of them twice. It means that there is
>considerably more overlap between the two data sets, in North
>America, than I have been telling people. I stand corrected.
>Cheers, Malcolm
>.
>.Malcolm Hughes
>Professor of Dendrochronology
>Laboratory of Tree-Ring Research
>University of Arizona
>Tucson, AZ 85721
>xxx xxxx xxxx
>fax xxx xxxx xxxx

--
Professor Keith Briffa,
Climatic Research Unit
University of East Anglia
Norwich, NR4 7TJ, U.K.

Phone: xxx xxxx xxxx
Fax: xxx xxxx xxxx

http://www.cru.uea.ac.uk/cru/people/briffa/

</x-flowed>

Original Filename: 1074612429.txt | Return to the index page | Permalink | Later Emails

From: "Malcolm Hughes" <mhughes@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>
To: Keith Briffa <k.briffa@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, "Malcolm Hughes" <mhughes@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Tim Osborn <t.osborn@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, "Michael E. Mann" <mann@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>
Subject: Re: J. Climate paper - in confidence
Date: Tue, 20 Jan 2004 10:27:xxx xxxx xxxx
Cc: Scott Rutherford <srutherford@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, mann@xxxxxxxxx.xxx

Mike - you are right that we should probably leave the network
uncahnged for this mss. In fact, however, as Keith indicated, the
Vaganov data probably retained a fair amount of low frequency
because of the use of the corridor method (i.e. were not "heavily
standardized"). CHeers, Malcolm
On 20 Jan 2004 at 7:58, Michael E. Mann wrote:

> Thanks Keith,
>
> I agree w/ this--I think the Vaganov chronologies were pretty heavily
> standardized, and the other issues you raise are important. In the
> future, we would (and will) be a bit more circumspect about the use of
> some of these data.
>
> In the present case, however, I think we are forced to use the exact
> same network.
>
> Re, the omission of some results. I think we can probably keep them.
> Simply by cleaning up the text, removing redundancy, etc. I've
> shortened and tightened the manuscript considerably, and I think I've
> improved the logical flow a bit in the process. So my feeling is that
> we will not have to split this up, but I'll leave this to all of you
> to decide after you see the revised draft from Scott and me...
>
> Thanks,
>
> mike
>
> At 09:45 AM 1/20/2004 +0000, Keith Briffa wrote:
> Malcolm seems to have done a good job sorting out these
> constituent sets , and I don't have anything to add other than
> agreeing that as a general principal , where possible, original
> chronologies should be used in preference to reconstructed
> temperature series ( the latter having been already optimized
> using simple or multiple regression to fit the target temperature
> series ). This applies not only to our western US reconstructions
> (which it should be stressed are based on very flexible curve
> fitting in the standardisation - and inevitably can show little
> variance on time scales longer than a decade or so) but also to
> the Tornetrask and Polar Urals reconstructions (each of which was
> based on ring width and density data , but standardised to try to
> preserve centennial variability - though the density series had by
> far the largest regression coefficients). There is though a
> question regarding the PCs of the Siberian network (presumably
> provided by Eugene?) . The correlation between density and ring
> width can get high in central and eastern parts of the network ,
> so even though these are different variables , it might not be
> strictly true to think of them as truly independent
> (statistically) of the density chronologies we use from the
> Schweingruber network ( there may also be a standardisation issue
> here , as the density chronologies were standardised with
> Hugershoff functions for our initial network work (as reported in
> the Holocene Special Issue) whereas your PC amplitudes may be
> based on "Corridor Standardisation" - which likely preserves less
> low frequency? ) . These remarks are simply for clarification and
> discussion , and I too will wait on your response draft , though I
> would throw in the pot the fact that omitting the time dependent
> stuff would simplify the message at his stage. cheers Keith
>
> At 01:42 PM 1/19/xxx xxxx xxxx, Malcolm Hughes wrote:
> Mike - there are the following density data in that set:
> xxx xxxx xxxxSchweingruber/Frttss series from the ITRDB (those that
> met the criteria described in the Mann et al 2000 EI paper)
> 2) Northern Fennoscandia reconstruction (from Keith)
> 3) Northern Urals reconstruction (from Keith)
> 4) 1 density series for China (Hughes data) and one from India
> (also Hughes data) - neither included in Keith's data set, I
> think. 5) To my great surprise I find that you used the Briffa
> gridded temperature reconstruction from W. N. America
> (mis-attributed to Fritts and Shao) - of course I should have
> picked up on this 6 years ago when reading the proofs of the
> Nature sup mat. It was my understanding that we had decided not to
> use these reconstructions, as the data on which they were based
> were in the ITRDB, and had been subject to that screening process.
> So depending on whether you used the long or the shorter versions
> of these, there will have been a considerable number of density
> series included , some of them twice. It means that there is
> considerably more overlap between the two data sets, in North
> America, than I have been telling people. I stand corrected.
> Cheers, Malcolm . .Malcolm Hughes Professor of Dendrochronology
> Laboratory of Tree-Ring Research University of Arizona Tucson, AZ
> 85xxx xxxx xxxxfax xxx xxxx xxxx
>
> --
> Professor Keith Briffa,
> Climatic Research Unit
> University of East Anglia
> Norwich, NR4 7TJ, U.K.
>
> Phone: xxx xxxx xxxx
> Fax: xxx xxxx xxxx
>
> http://www.cru.uea.ac.uk/cru/people/briffa/
>
> ____________________________________________________________
> __
> Professor Michael E. Mann
> Department of Environmental Sciences, Clark Hall
> University of Virginia
> Charlottesville, VA 22903
> ______________________________________________________________________
> _ e-mail: mann@xxxxxxxxx.xxx Phone: (4xxx xxxx xxxxFAX: (4xxx xxxx xxxx
> http://www.evsc.virginia.edu/faculty/people/mann.shtml

Malcolm Hughes
Professor of Dendrochronology
Laboratory of Tree-Ring Research
University of Arizona
Tucson, AZ 85721
xxx xxxx xxxx
fax xxx xxxx xxxx

Original Filename: 1092167224.txt | Return to the index page | Permalink | Later Emails

From: Phil Jones <p.jones@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>
To: Gabi Hegerl <hegerl@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, "Michael E. Mann" <mann@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>
Subject: Re: Mann and Jones (2003)
Date: Tue Aug 10 15:47:xxx xxxx xxxx
Cc: Tom Crowley <tcrowley@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>

Gabi,
No second attempt - don't know what the first was? We'll be doing a new instrumental
data
set (surprisingly called HadCRUT3), but that's it at the moment.
Attached is a good review of corals - just out.
Cheers
Phil
At 10:36 10/08/2xxx xxxx xxxx, Gabi Hegerl wrote:

Hi Mike and Phil,
Thanks! Yes, factor 1.29 will get me closer to my best guess scaling (factor 1.6 to
same-size signals).
The scaling is a tough issue, and I think there are lots of possibilities to do it
depending on what one wants
to do. For comparing underlying forced signals, I think tls is best. To get a
conservative size paleo reconstruction
(like what part of instrumental do we reconstruct with paleo), the traditional scaling
is best.
I'll write up what Myles and I have been thinking and send it.
Phil, if there is a second attempt at that with the Hadley Centre, let me know, I don't
like racing anybody!
Gabi
Michael E. Mann wrote:

Dear Phil and Gabi,
I've attached a cleaned-up and commented version of the matlab code that I wrote for
doing the Mann and Jones (2003) composites. I did this knowing that Phil and I are
likely to have to respond to more crap criticisms from the idiots in the near future, so
best to clean up the code and provide to some of my close colleagues in case they want
to test it, etc. Please feel free to use this code for your own internal purposes, but
don't pass it along where it may get into the hands of the wrong people.
In the process of trying to clean it up, I realized I had something a bit odd, not
necessarily wrong, but it makes a small difference. It seems that I used the 'long' NH
instrumental series back to 1753 that we calculated in the following paper:
* Mann, M.E., Rutherford, S., Bradley, R.S., Hughes, M.K., Keimig, F.T., [1]Optimal
Surface Temperature Reconstructions using Terrestrial Borehole Data, Journal of
Geophysical Research, 108 (D7), 4203, doi: 10.1029/2002JD002532, 2003.

(based on the sparse available long instrumental records) to set the scale for the
decadal standard deviation of the proxy composite. Not sure why I used this, rather than
using the CRU NH record back to 1856 for this purpose. It looks like I had two similarly
named series floating around in the code, and used perhaps the less preferable one for
setting the scale.
Turns it, this has the net effect of decreasing the amplitude of the NH reconstruction
by a factor of 0.11/0.14 = 1.29.
This may explain part of what perplexed Gabi when she was comparing w/ the instrumental
series. I've attached the version of the reconstruction where the NH is scaled by the
CRU NH record instead, as well as the Matlab code which you're welcome to try to use
yourself and play around with. Basically, this increases the amplitude of the
reconstruction everywhere by the factor 1.29. Perhaps this is more in line w/ what Gabi
was estimating (Gabi?)
Anyway, doesn't make a major difference, but you might want to take this into account in
any further use of the Mann and Jones series...
Phil: is this worth a followup note to GRL, w/ a link to the Matlab code?
Mike
p.s. Gabi: when do you and Tom plan to publish your NH reconstruction that now goes back
about 1500 years or so? It would be nice to have more independent reconstructions
published in the near future! Maybe I missed this? Thanks...
______________________________________________________________
Professor Michael E. Mann
Department of Environmental Sciences, Clark Hall
University of Virginia
Charlottesville, VA 22903
_______________________________________________________________________
e-mail: [2]mann@xxxxxxxxx.xxx Phone: (4xxx xxxx xxxxFAX: (4xxx xxxx xxxx
[3]http://www.evsc.virginia.edu/faculty/people/mann.shtml


% COMPOSITENH"
%
% (cxxx xxxx xxxx, M.E. Mann
%
% THIS ROUTINE PERFORMS A RECONSTRUCTION OF NORTHERN HEMISPHERE
% MEAN ANNUAL TEMPERATURE BASED ON A WEIGHTED COMPOSITE OF LONG-TERM TEMPERATURE
% PROXY RECORDS SCALED AGAINST THE INSTRUMENTAL HEMISPHERIC MEAN TEMPERATURE
% SERIES, AS USED IN THE FOLLOWING TWO PUBLICATIONS:
%
%
% Jones, P.D., Mann, M.E., Climate Over Past Millennia, Reviews of Geophysics,
% 42, RG2002, doi:10.1029/2003RG000143, 2004
%
% Mann, M.E., Jones, P.D., Global Surface Temperatures over the Past two Millennia,
% Geophysical Research Letters,
% 30 (15), 1820, doi: 10.1029/2003GL017814, 2003
%
%
% 1. READ IN INSTRUMENTAL RECORD
%
% Read in CRU instrumental NH mean temeperature record (1xxx xxxx xxxx)
load nh.dat;
yearinstr=nh(:,1);
% calculate both warm-season and annual means
warmseason=(nh(:,5)+nh(:,6)+nh(:,7)+nh(:,8)+nh(:,9)+nh(:,10))/6;
annualmean=nh(:,14);
% use annual mean record in this analysis
nhmean=annualmean;
%
% 2. READ IN PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED PROXY-RECONSTRUCTIONS OF NH ANNUAL MEAN
% RECONSTRUCTIONS AND FORM APPROPRIATELY SCALED COMPOSITE
%
% Read in Mann et al (1998), Crowley and Lowery (2000), and Jones et al (1998)
% NH temperature reconstructions
load nhem-millennium.dat;
load crowleylowery.dat;
load joneshemisrecons.dat;
nhmbh=nhem_millennium(1:981,2);
nhjones=joneshemisrecons(1:981,2);
nhcl=crowleylowery(1:981,2);
yearmillen=nhem_millennium(1:981,1);
% since some reconstructions are only decadally resolved, smooth each on
% decadal timescales through use of a lowpass filter with cutoff at
% f=0.1 cycle/year. Based on use of the filtering routine described in:
%
% Mann, M.E., On Smoothing Potentially Non-Stationary Climate Time Series,
% Geophysical Research Letters, 31, L07214, doi: 10.1029/2004GL019569, 2004.
%
% using 'minimum norm' constraint at both boundaries for all time series
nhsmooth=lowpass(nhmean,0.10,0,0);
nhmbhsmooth=lowpass(nhmbh,0.10,0,0);
nhjonessmooth=lowpass(nhjones,0.10,0,0);
nhclsmooth=lowpass(nhcl,0.10,0,0);
% Mann et al (1998) already calibrated in terms of hemispheric annual mean temperature, but
% reference mean has to be adjusted to equal that of the instrumental series
% over the 1xxx xxxx xxxxoverlap period (which uses a 1xxx xxxx xxxxreference period)
admbh=mean(nhsmooth(1:125))-mean(nhmbhsmooth(857:981));
newmbh=nhmbhsmooth+admbh;
% need to adjust and scale Jones et al (1998) and Crowley and Lowery (2000)
% reconstructions to match mean and trend of smoothed instrumental series
% over 1xxx xxxx xxxx
t1=1856;
t2=1980;
x=(t1:t2)';
nhlong=nhmean(1:125);
smoothlong=lowpass(nhlong,0.10,0,0);
amean0=mean(smoothlong);
y=smoothlong;
[yc,t,trend0,detrend0,xm,ym] = lintrend(x, y);
%
y=nhclsmooth(txxx xxxx xxxx:txxx xxxx xxxx);
[yc,t,trendcl,detrendcl,xm,ym] = lintrend(x, y);
%
y=nhjonessmooth(txxx xxxx xxxx:txxx xxxx xxxx);
[yc,t,trendjones,detrendjones,xm,ym] = lintrend(x, y);
%
multjones=norm(trend0)/norm(trendjones);
adjustedjones=nhjonessmooth*multjones;
offsetjones=amean0-mean(adjustedjones(txxx xxxx xxxx:txxx xxxx xxxx));
newjones=adjustedjones+offsetjones;
newjones=newjones';
%
multcl=norm(trend0)/norm(trendcl);
adjustedcl=nhclsmooth*multcl;
offsetcl=amean0-mean(adjustedcl(txxx xxxx xxxx:txxx xxxx xxxx));
newcl=adjustedcl+offsetcl;
newcl=newcl';
%
nhlongcompose=0.3333*(newmbh+newjones'+newcl')';
%
% 3. READ IN AND PROCESS PROXY TEMPERATURE RECORDS
%
M=8;
load 'china-series1.dat'
load 'itrdb-long-fixed.dat'
load 'westgreen-o18.dat'
load 'torny.dat'
load 'chesapeake.dat'
load 'mongolia-darrigo.dat'
load 'dahl-jensen-gripbh1yrinterp.txt'
load 'dahl-jensen-dye3bh1yrinterp.txt'
% read in years
x1=china_series1(:,1);
x2=itrdb_long_fixed(:,1);
x3=westgreen_o18(:,1);
x4=torny(:,1);
x5=chesapeake(:,1);
x6=mongolia_darrigo(:,1);
x7=dahl_jensen_gripbh1yrinterp(:,1);
x8=dahl_jensen_dye3bh1yrinterp(:,1);
% read in proxy values
y1=china_series1(:,2);
y2=itrdb_long_fixed(:,2);
y3=westgreen_o18(:,2);
y4=torny(:,2);
y5=chesapeake(:,2);
y6=mongolia_darrigo(:,2);
y7=dahl_jensen_gripbh1yrinterp(:,2);
y8=dahl_jensen_dye3bh1yrinterp(:,2);
% Store decadal correlation of each proxy record with local available
% overlapping CRU gridpoint surface temperature record (see Mann and Jones, 2003)
corr(1)=0.22;
corr(2)=0.52;
corr(3)=0.75;
corr(4)=0.32;
corr(5)=0.31;
corr(6)=0.40;
corr(7)=0.53;
corr(8)=0.52;
% Estimate Area represented by each proxy record based on latitude of
% record and estimated number of temperature gridpoints represented by record
pi=3.14159;
factor=pi/180.0;
lat(1)=32.5;
dof(1)=4;
lat(2)=37.5;
dof(2)=2;
lat(3)=77;
dof(3)=0.667;
lat(4)=68;
dof(4)=3.5;
lat(5)=37.0;
dof(5)=1.0;
lat(6)=47;
dof(6)=1;
lat(7)=73;
dof(7)=0.667;
lat(8)=65;
dof(8)=0.667;
for j=1:M
area(j)=dof(j)*cos(lat(j)*factor);
end
% determine min and max available years over all proxy records
%
minarray=[min(x1) min(x2) min(x3) min(x4) min(x5) min(x6) min(x7) min(x8)];
maxarray=[max(x1) max(x2) max(x3) max(x4) max(x5) max(x6) max(x7) max(x8)];
tbegin=max(minarray);
tend1=min(maxarray);
tend=max(maxarray);
% initialize proxy data matrix
notnumber = -9999;
for j=1:M
for i=1:minarray(j)-1
time(i)=i;
mat(i,j)=notnumber;
end
for i=minarray(j):tend
time(i)=i;
end
for i=minarray(j):maxarray(j)
if (j==1) mat(i,j)=y1(i-minarray(j)+1);
end
if (j==2) mat(i,j)=y2(i-minarray(j)+1);
end
if (j==3) mat(i,j)=y3(i-minarray(j)+1);
end
if (j==4) mat(i,j)=y4(i-minarray(j)+1);
end
if (j==5) mat(i,j)=y5(i-minarray(j)+1);
end
if (j==6) mat(i,j)=y6(i-minarray(j)+1);
end
if (j==7) mat(i,j)=y7(i-minarray(j)+1);
end
if (j==8) mat(i,j)=y8(i-minarray(j)+1);
end
end
% added in Jones and Mann (2004), extend series ending between
% 1980 calibration period end and 2001 boundary by persistence of
% last available value through 2001
for i=maxarray(j)+1:tend
if (j==1) mat(i,j)=y1(maxarray(j)-minarray(j)+1);
end
if (j==2) mat(i,j)=y2(maxarray(j)-minarray(j)+1);
end
if (j==3) mat(i,j)=y3(maxarray(j)-minarray(j)+1);
end
if (j==4) mat(i,j)=y4(maxarray(j)-minarray(j)+1);
end
if (j==5) mat(i,j)=y5(maxarray(j)-minarray(j)+1);
end
if (j==6) mat(i,j)=y6(maxarray(j)-minarray(j)+1);
end
if (j==7) mat(i,j)=y7(maxarray(j)-minarray(j)+1);
end
if (j==8) mat(i,j)=y8(maxarray(j)-minarray(j)+1);
end
end
end
time=time';
data=[time mat];
% decadally lowpass of proxy series at f=0.1 cycle/year as described earlier
for j=1:M
unfiltered=mat(minarray(j):tend,j);
filt=lowpass(unfiltered,0.1,0,0);
for i=1:minarray(j)-1
filtered(i,j)=mat(i,j);
end
for i=minarray(j):tend
filtered(i,j)=filt(i-minarray(j)+1);
end
end
% standardize data
% first remove mean from each series
for j=1:M
icount=0;
amean(j)=0;
for i=1:tend
if (filtered(i,j)>notnumber)
icount=icount+1;
amean(j)=amean(j)+filtered(i,j);
end
end
amean(j)=amean(j)/icount;
end
% now divide through by standard deviation
for j=1:M
icount=0;
asum=0;
for i=1:tend
if (filtered(i,j)>notnumber)
asum=asum+(filtered(i,j)-amean(j))^2;
icount=icount+1;
end
end
sd(j)=sqrt(asum/icount);
for i=1:tend
standardized(i,j)=filtered(i,j);
if (mat(i,j)>notnumber)
standardized(i,j)=(filtered(i,j)-amean(j))/sd(j);
end
end
end
%
% 4. Calculate NH mean temperature reconstruction through weighted (and
% unweighted) composites of the decadally-smoothed proxy indicators
%
% impose weighting scheme for NH mean composite
for j=1:M
% weighting method 1: weight each proxy series by approximate area
% weighting method 2: weight each proxy series by correlation between
% predictor and local gridpoint series over available overlap period
% during calibration interval
% weighting method 3: weight each proxy series by correlation between
% predictor and NH mean series over calibration interval:
% weightlong(j)=lincor(nhlong,standardized(1856:1980,j));
% weighting method 4: combine 1 and 3
% weighting method 5: combine 1 amd 2 (this is the 'standard' weighting
% scheme chosen by Mann and Jones (2003)
% use standard weighting scheme
weight(j)=corr(j)*area(j);
end
% perform reconstructions based on:
% (1) the 6 proxy temperature records available over interval AD xxx xxxx xxxx
% (2) all 8 proxy temperature records available over interval AD xxx xxxx xxxx
istart0=200;
istart1=200;
istart2=553;
nseries1=0;
nseries2=0;
weightsum1=0;
weightsum2=0;
for j=1:M
if (istart1>=minarray(j))
nseries1=nseries1+1;
weightsum1=weightsum1+weight(j);
end
if (istart2>=minarray(j))
nseries2=nseries2+1;
weightsum2=weightsum2+weight(j);
end
end
% calculate composites through 1995 (too few series available after that date)
% As discussed above, persistence is used to extend any series ending
% between 1980 and 1995 as described by Jones and Mann (2004).
tend=1995;
for i=istart1:tend
unweighted1(i)=0;
unweighted2(i)=0;
weighted1(i)=0;
weighted2(i)=0;
for j=1:M
if (istart1>=minarray(j))
unweighted1(i)=unweighted1(i)+standardized(i,j);
weighted1(i)=weighted1(i)+weight(j)*standardized(i,j);
end
if (istart2>=minarray(j))
unweighted2(i)=unweighted2(i)+standardized(i,j);
weighted2(i)=weighted2(i)+weight(j)*standardized(i,j);
end
end
end
unweighted1=unweighted1/nseries1;
unweighted2=unweighted2/nseries2;
weighted1=weighted1/weightsum1;
weighted2=weighted2/weightsum2;
unweighted1(1:istart1-1)=0;
unweighted2(1:istart2-1)=0;
weighted1(1:istart1-1)=0;
weighted2(1:istart2-1)=0;
% scale composite to have same variance as decadally-smoothed instrumental
% NH series

% Mann and Jones (2003) and Jones and Mann (2004) used for this purpose
% the extended (1xxx xxxx xxxx) NH series used in:
% Mann, M.E., Rutherford, S., Bradley, R.S., Hughes, M.K., Keimig, F.T.,
% Optimal Surface Temperature Reconstructions using Terrestrial Borehole Data,
% Journal of Geophysical Research, 108 (D7), 4203, doi: 10.1029/2002JD002532, 2003.
% That series has a decadal standard deviation sd=0.1123
% If instead, the 1xxx xxxx xxxxCRU instrumental NH mean record is used, with
% a decadal standard deviation of sd=0.1446, the amplitude of the reconstruction
% increases by a factor 1.29 (this scaling yields slightly lower verification
% scores)
load nhem-long.dat
nhemlong=nhem_long(:,2);
longsmooth=lowpass(nhemlong,0.10,0,0);
sd0=std(longsmooth);
% use weighted (rather than unweighted) composite in this case
series1=weighted1;
% center composites on 1xxx xxxx xxxxcalibration period
y=series1(t1:t2)';
amean1=mean(series1(t1:t2));
compseries1=series1(t1:t2)-amean1;
mult1=sd0/std(compseries1);
% scale composite to standard deviation of instrumental series and re-center
% to have same (1xxx xxxx xxxx) zero reference period as CRU NH instrumental
% temperature record
adjusted1=series1*mult1;
offset1=amean0-mean(adjusted1(t1:t2));
compose1=adjusted1+offset1;
compose1=compose1';
series2=weighted2;
y=series2(t1:t2)';
amean2=mean(series2(t1:t2));
compseries2=series2(t1:t2)-amean2;
mult2=sd0/std(compseries2);
adjusted2=series2*mult2;
offset2=amean0-mean(adjusted2(t1:t2));
compose2=adjusted2+offset2;
compose2=compose2';
%
% 5. UNCERTAINTY ESTIMATION, AND STATISTICAL VERIFICATION
%
% estimate uncertainty in reconstruction
% nominal (white noise) unresolved calibration period variance
calibvar=lincor(smoothlong,compose1(t1:t2))^2;
uncalib=1-calibvar;
sdunc=sd0*sqrt(uncalib);
% note: this is the *nominal* white noise uncertainty in the reconstruction
% a spectral analysis of the calibration residuals [as discussed briefly in
% Mann and Jones, 2003] indicates that a peak at the multidecadal timescale
% that exceeds the white noise average residual variance by a factor of
% approximately 6. A conservative estimate of the standard error in the
% reconstruction thus inflates the nominal white noise estimate "sdunc" by a
% factor of sqrt(6)
sdlow = sdunc*sqrt(6)
% calculate long-term verification statistics for reconstruction
% use composite of Mann et al (1998)/Crowley and Lowery (2000)/Jones et al (1998)
% and AD 1xxx xxxx xxxxinterval
overlapcomp=nhlongcompose(1:981);
% work with longer reconstruction (back to AD 200)
overlaprecon=compose1(1000:1980)';
%overlaprecon=compose2(1000:1980)';
%calculate verification R^2
series11=overlaprecon(601:856);
series22=overlapcomp(601:856);
verifrsq=lincor(series11,series22)^2
% calculate verification RE
var1=0.0;
var2=0.0;
var3=0.0;
var4=0.0;
var5=0.0;
am0=0.0;
% insure convention of zero mean over calibration interval
for i=857:981
am0=am0+overlapcomp(i);
end
am0=am0/125;
for i=601:856
var1=var1+(overlapcomp(i)-am0)^2;
var2=var2+(overlapcomp(i)-overlaprecon(i))^2;
end
verifRE=1-var2/var1










--
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Gabriele Hegerl
Division of Earth and Ocean Sciences,
Nicholas School for the Environment and Earth Sciences,
Box 90227
Duke University, Durham NC 27708
Ph: xxx xxxx xxxx, fax xxx xxxx xxxx
email: [4]hegerl@xxxxxxxxx.xxx, [5]http://www.env.duke.edu/faculty/bios/hegerl.html

Prof. Phil Jones
Climatic Research Unit Telephone +44 xxx xxxx xxxx
School of Environmental Sciences Fax +44 xxx xxxx xxxx
University of East Anglia
Norwich Email p.jones@xxxxxxxxx.xxx
NR4 7TJ
UK
----------------------------------------------------------------------------

References

1. ftp://holocene.evsc.virginia.edu/pub/mann/borehole-jgr03.pdf
2. mailto:mann@xxxxxxxxx.xxx
3. http://www.evsc.virginia.edu/faculty/people/mann.shtml
4. mailto:hegerl@xxxxxxxxx.xxx
5. http://www.env.duke.edu/faculty/bios/hegerl.html

Original Filename: 1097540855.txt | Return to the index page | Permalink | Later Emails

From: Eystein Jansen <eystein.jansen@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>
To: Keith Briffa <k.briffa@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, wg1-ar4-ch06@xxxxxxxxx.xxx
Subject: Re: [Wg1-ar4-ch06] IPCC last 2000 years data
Date: Mon, 11 Oct 2004 20:27:35 +0200

<x-flowed>
Hi Keith,
I can take a stab at the THC bit (not strong
evidence so far for linkages to
multidecadal/century scale changes, but cannot be
ruled out) the marine evidence from the North
Atlantic (14C chronological control), and some
aspects of tropical/high latitude linkages.
Eystein




At 17:00 +0xxx xxxx xxxx, Keith Briffa wrote:
>Friends and authors ( especially Ricardo, Olga,
>Fortunat, David, Ramesh, Zhang, Dan, Eystein and
>Valerie)
>Now back from travels (until Wednesday when off to Austria for a few days)
>I thought it best to suggest a break down for
>the writing of the data section for the last
>2000 years of the IPCC palaeoclimate chapter.
>Please see the outline produced at the meeting.
>We have 4 IPCC pages . I will write a short
>intro linking to the instrumental data with
>links to Chapters 3-5. I will coach this in a
>general introduction to this section that
>addresses the points listed in the initial notes
>( namely how we use the various high , and few
>low, resolution data to construct regional and
>large-scale temperature variability , and where
>possible, gain insight into hydrologic
>variability. I will say we use models to get
>insight into methodology and to explore regional
>coverage and seasonality issues and we use
>control and forced model runs to look at
>sensitivity and detection issues , but also use
>date to test model variability and sensitivity .
>I can first go at the NH (SH) Spaghetti diagram
>discussion and hopefully you will pick up the
>regional aspects of the temperature and
>precipitation (moisture) variability .
>Rather than me say - I would like you to come
>back with the major areas you will cover , but
>these may best be done in terms of
>climatologically meaningful regions - ie
>relating to the ENSO, NAM, PDO , AAO, monsoon
>areas - then we could fill in the remaining
>regions if significant non overlap in areas is
>apparent (Eurasia, non-monsoon china etc) . We
>do not want a list of every paper ever written ,
>but a selection of (the better) work that you
>feel has regional relevance (and some length
>presumably). THe other alternative is just to
>divide up the world to our own regions and then
>discuss the climate indices separately. This
>would likely be easier to do . Let me know what
>you think. Either way , we also should have a
>specific discussion of forcings at high
>resolution , and Fortunat, Valerie could cover
>solar and volcanic , perhaps Eystein discussing
>what evidence there is for THC change . The
>knotty issue of THC versus NAO and the link to
>model theories/models could go here - or
>perhaps later in the section 6.4.3.2 ? Davis
>what say you about this? The same is true of
>ENSO links to terrestrial precipitation patterns
>and temperature?
>I don't like the idea of dealing wit quasi
>periodicities separately , but rather wit the
>regional discussions eg North American drought.
>The question of LIA , MWP will come up in the
>large scale average discussion but you can also
>address it in the regional discussions , but in
>a critical and quantitative way. I would like to
>see the evidence for extremmes/abrupt change
>from the regional syntheses and then see if we
>have enough to define and discuss the issue
>separately. Olga could you pick up on the
>glacial variations (perhaps with links to models
>also?)
>
>So come back to me asap to let me know
>impressions and regional/variable focus you all
>wish to pick up. Ricardo will obviously do North
>South linkages as per the PEP1 transect , but
>what about along PEP2 and 3/ WE may have to pick
>this up in the light of the regional data. Can
>you also let me know if/who you might be asking
>to help with writing . Peck , I would still
>rather have Mike Mann in , so what is the story
>here - can I ask him? Suggestions for summary
>Figures still welcome - I would like to have a
>High lat , mid lat , low lat transect type
>figure for temperature , possibly along each PEP
>transect - with longest instrumental data . A
>forcing diagram is also a must - but could
>combine Holocene and "blow up " last 2000 years.
>
>Best wishes
>Keith
>
>--
>Professor Keith Briffa,
>Climatic Research Unit
>University of East Anglia
>Norwich, NR4 7TJ, U.K.
>
>Phone: xxx xxxx xxxx
>Fax: xxx xxxx xxxx
>
>http://www.cru.uea.ac.uk/cru/people/briffa/
>_______________________________________________
>Wg1-ar4-ch06 mailing list
>Wg1-ar4-ch06@xxxxxxxxx.xxx
>http://www.joss.ucar.edu/mailman/listinfo/wg1-ar4-ch06


--
______________________________________________________________
Eystein Jansen
Professor/Director
Bjerknes Centre for Climate Research and
Dep. of Earth Science, Univ. of Bergen
All

Original Filename: 1101999700.txt | Return to the index page | Permalink | Later Emails

From: Phil Jones <p.jones@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>
To: Tom Wigley <wigley@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>
Subject: Re: New version of Chapter 4
Date: Thu Dec 2 10:01:xxx xxxx xxxx
Cc: "Folland, Chris" <chris.folland@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Thomas R Karl <Thomas.R.Karl@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Ben Santer <santer1@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>

Dear Toms, Chris and Ben,
If large-scale is important (as said by Tom W), I can't see how microclimatic
issues that Roger goes on about can be that important. Maybe when you all
meet at the delightful Chicago Airport Hilton, you can remind him of spatial
degrees of freedom.
Is the NOAA Tsurf used the new Smith and Reynolds (2005) spatially infilled
surface dataset? If this is the case maybe Ben could do a plot of NOAA minus
HadCRUT2v?
I have a plot that David Parker produced of Smith and Reynolds (2005) over land
and Jones and Moberg (2003) land (as smoothed global averages) from 1880.
Prior to about 1960 the SR dataset is always about 0.15 warmer than JM. This looks
likely due to infilling with xxx xxxx xxxxaverages (i.e zeroes) over the Antarctic and some
continental interiors of S. America, Africa, western China and Australia (where there
are no obs pre early 1950s, 1956 for the Antarctic). SR should be OK for 1979-99
and be very similar to HadCRUT2v.
Cheers
Phil
At 23:31 01/12/2004, Roger Pielke wrote:

Tom-
One issue to sort out with respect to "VTT" remains whether there are
unrecognized biases in the surface data. This issue is very much relevant
if, as seems the case from Phil Jones's e-mail, the "raw data" that has
been used has such large overlap among the different surface analyses.
If this is the case, there are not three independent assessments of
surface temperature trends. Moreover, unlike the MSU data, there are
inhomogeneities associated with the diverse locations of each surface
monitoring site (which have microclimate changes over time).
This issue is also very much a tropical issue as this is where large
land use/land cover change has occurred in the satellite era (photographs
rather than written documentation would really help in this assessment,
as we have proposed).
Roger
--
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Roger A. Pielke, Sr., Professor and State Climatologist
1371 Campus Delivery, Department Atmospheric Science,
Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO 80xxx xxxx xxxx,
Phone: xxx xxxx xxxx/Fax: xxx xxxx xxxx, Email: pielke@xxxxxxxxx.xxx
VISIT OUR WEBSITES AT: [1]http://blue.atmos.colostate.edu/
and [2]http://climate.atmos.colostate.edu
On Wed, 1 Dec 2004, Tom Wigley wrote:
> Date: Wed, 01 Dec 2004 16:15:xxx xxxx xxxx
> From: Tom Wigley <wigley@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>
> To: "Folland, Chris" <chris.folland@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>
> Cc: Thomas R Karl <Thomas.R.Karl@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>,
> Roger Pielke <pielke@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>,
> Phil Jones <p.jones@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, carl mears <mears@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>,
> CCSPTempTrendAuthors.NCDC@xxxxxxxxx.xxx
> Subject: Re: New version of Chapter 4
>
> Chris et al.,
>
> I do not see this as high priority. We are supposed to be looking at
> *VTT*. Uncerts/diffs in individual data sets are relevant, of course, but
> what is currently missing is a map (maps) of sfc vs trop trend diffs.
> We are meant to be addressing a problem that we have made
> clear at the global and tropix scale -- but just *where* are the problem
> areas? (I think Carl showed us such a map previously -- we need this,
> or similar, or more, in the report since it really is the crux of the
> problem.)
>
> Ideally we need sfc minus MSU LoTrop (A), sfc minus MidTrop
> (UAH (B) and RSS(C)) to at least look at, and decide which is/are best to
> show. I imagine this will have some bearing on Roger Pielke's concerns
> re LULC. If the biggest differences are over the oceans (and from memory
> this is the case, worst in the SH), then sorting this out would arguably
> be more important than sorting out LULC effects. It would be hard to
> argue (albeit not impossible) that teleconnections from LULC in (e.g.)
> North America, or even the Amazon Basin, are responsible for trend diffs
> over the South Pacific
>
> In Ch. 1 there is a correlation map -- this is pretty useless in my
> view, altho
> it would be interesting to compare the correl map with an equiv trend
> diff map.
>
> Ch. 3 has maps of the trends at sfc, mid trop, lo strat -- so we are close
> to trend diff map. But even those who might be brilliant enough to produce
> the trend diff map in their heads will be thwarted, becoz the mid trop map
> in Ch. 3 uses the average of UAH and RSS. Good grief! This really is
> carrying political correctness too far. Please, please John L et al.,
> replace
> the mid trop panel in 3.6.2.3 by separate panels for RSS and UAH.
>
> The next in my list of related wishes is a map of the RSS minus UAH trend
> diffs (D). Eyeballing A, B, C and D together could be interesting.
>
> I would put these things right at the top of my wish list for Chicago.
>
> Tom.
> ========================
>
> Folland, Chris wrote:
>
> >Tom
> >
> >Can you get Russ Vose to look at the issues of data overlap and local
> >and regional similarity. My original suggestion was to compare trends
> >over 1xxx xxxx xxxxand 1xxx xxxx xxxxat each grid point in the two data sets and
> >also over larger (regional) areas. This would go to the heart of any
> >differences in the context of this report, is easy to do, and can be
> >plotted on a pair of maps with a third "difference in trend" map for
> >each period. Where differences are large, a more detailed look at the
> >data can be done. It might even show up errors! Even the first analysis
> >on its own should give enough information to sharpen up well the current
> >speculative text and can be done perhaps in parallel with NRC review.
> >
> >Chris
> >
> >Professor Chris Folland
> >
> >Head of Climate Variability Research
> >
> >Global climate data sets are available from [3]http://www.hadobs.org
> >
> >Met Office, Hadley Centre, Fitzroy Rd, Exeter, Devon EX1 3PB United
> >Kingdom
> >Email: chris.folland@xxxxxxxxx.xxx
> >Tel: +44 (0)1xxx xxxx xxxx
> >Fax: (in UKxxx xxxx xxxx
> > (International) +44 (0)xxx xxxx xxxx)<[4]http://www.metoffice.gov.uk> >
> >Also: Hon. Professor of School of Environmental Sciences, University of
> >East Anglia
> >
> >
> >
> >-----Original Message-----
> >From: Thomas R Karl [[5]mailto:Thomas.R.Karl@xxxxxxxxx.xxx]
> >Sent: 01 December 2004 18:23
> >To: Roger Pielke
> >Cc: Phil Jones; Folland Chris; carl mears;
> >CCSPTempTrendAuthors.NCDC@xxxxxxxxx.xxx
> >Subject: Re: New version of Chapter 4
> >
> >
> >Phil,
> >
> >I think we need to be careful -- the method of combining the data can
> >matter very much. It is just that despite our different methodologies
> >the results are similar on large scales. I know we could use other
> >methods and the differences are more significant, e.g, first
> >differences, homogenization of ships, etc.
> >
> >Tom
> >
> >Roger Pielke wrote:
> >
> >
> >
> >>Hi Phil
> >>
> >>Thanks for the quick feedback. This helps a lot!
> >>
> >>With Best Regards
> >>
> >>Roger
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
>

Prof. Phil Jones
Climatic Research Unit Telephone +44 xxx xxxx xxxx
School of Environmental Sciences Fax +44 xxx xxxx xxxx
University of East Anglia
Norwich Email p.jones@xxxxxxxxx.xxx
NR4 7TJ
UK
----------------------------------------------------------------------------

References

1. http://blue.atmos.colostate.edu/
2. http://climate.atmos.colostate.edu/
3. http://www.hadobs.org/
4. http://www.metoffice.gov.uk/
5. mailto:Thomas.R.Karl@xxxxxxxxx.xxx

Original Filename: 1109021312.txt | Return to the index page | Permalink | Later Emails

From: Phil Jones <p.jones@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>
To: mann@xxxxxxxxx.xxx
Subject: Fwd: CCNet: PRESSURE GROWING ON CONTROVERSIAL RESEARCHER TO DISCLOSE SECRET DATA
Date: Mon Feb 21 16:28:xxx xxxx xxxx
Cc: "raymond s. bradley" <rbradley@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, "Malcolm Hughes" <mhughes@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>


Mike, Ray and Malcolm,
The skeptics seem to be building up a head of steam here ! Maybe we can use
this to our advantage to get the series updated !
Odd idea to update the proxies with satellite estimates of the lower troposphere
rather than surface data !. Odder still that they don't realise that Moberg et al used the
Jones and Moberg updated series !
Francis Zwiers is till onside. He said that PC1s produce hockey sticks. He stressed
that the late 20th century is the warmest of the millennium, but Regaldo didn't bother
with that. Also ignored Francis' comment about all the other series looking similar
to MBH.
The IPCC comes in for a lot of stick.
Leave it to you to delete as appropriate !
Cheers
Phil
PS I'm getting hassled by a couple of people to release the CRU station temperature data.
Don't any of you three tell anybody that the UK has a Freedom of Information Act !

X-Sender: f023@xxxxxxxxx.xxx
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Date: Mon, 21 Feb 2005 15:40:05 +0000
To: p.jones@xxxxxxxxx.xxx
From: Keith Briffa <k.briffa@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>
Subject: Fwd: CCNet: PRESSURE GROWING ON CONTROVERSIAL RESEARCHER TO
DISCLOSE SECRET DATA

Subject: CCNet: PRESSURE GROWING ON CONTROVERSIAL RESEARCHER TO DISCLOSE SECRET DATA
Date: Mon, 21 Feb 2005 15:02:xxx xxxx xxxx
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PRESSURE GROWING ON CONTROVERSIAL RESEARCHER TO DISCLOSE SECRET DATA
--------------------------------------------------------------------
This should have produced a healthy scientific debate. Instead, Mr. Mann tried
to shut down debate by refusing to disclose the mathematical algorithm by which
he arrived at his conclusions. All the same, Mr. Mann was forced to publish a
retraction of some of his initial data, and doubts about his statistical methods
have since grown.
--The Wall Street Journal, 18 February 2005
But maybe we are in that much trouble. The WSJ highlights what Regaldo and McIntyre
says is Mann's resistance or outright refusal to provide to inquiring minds his
data, all details of his statistical analysis, and his code. So this is what I
say to Dr. Mann and others expressing deep concern over peer review: give up your
data, methods and code freely and with a smile on your face.
--Kevin Vranes, Science Policy, 18 February 2005
Mann's work doesn't meet that definition [of science], and those who use Mann's
curve in their arguments are not making a scientific argument. One of Pournelle's
Laws states "You can prove anything if you can make up your data." I will now add
another Pournelle's Law: "You can prove anything if you can keep your algorithms
secret."
--Jerry Pournelle, 18 February 2005
The time has come to question the IPCC's status as the near-monopoly source of
information and advice for its member governments. It is probably futile to propose
reform of the present IPCC process. Like most bureaucracies, it has too much momentum
and its institutional interests are too strong for anyone realistically to suppose
that it can assimilate more diverse points of view, even if more scientists and
economists were keen to join up. The rectitude and credibility of the IPCC could be
best improved not through reform, but through competition.
--Steven F. Hayward, The American Enterprise Institute, 15 February 2005
(1) HOCKEY STICK ON ICE
The Wall Street Journal, 18 February 2005
(2) SCIENCE AND OPEN ALGORITHMS: "YOU CAN PROVE ANYTHING WITH SECRET DATA AND
ALGORITHMS"
Jerry Pournell, 18 February 2005
(3) OPEN SEASON ON HOCKEY AND PEER REVIEW
Science Policy, 18 February 2005
(4) CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE: TIME FOR TEAM "B"?
The American Enterprise Institute, 15 February 2005
(5) BRING THE PROXIES UP TO DATE!
Climate Audit, 20 February 2005
(6) CARELESS SCIENCE COSTS LIVES
The Guardian, 18 February 2005
(7) RE: MORE TROUBLE FOR CLIMATE MODELS
Helen Krueger <hkrueger@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>
(8) HOW TO HANDLE ASTEROID 2004 MN4
Jens Kieffer-Olsen <dstdba@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>
(9) AND FINALLY: EUROPE FURTHER FALLING BEHIND IN TECHNOLOGY AND RESEARCH
EU Observer, 10 February 2005
==================
(1) HOCKEY STICK ON ICE
The Wall Street Journal, 18 February 2005
[1]http://online.wsj.com/article_email/0,,SB110869271828758608-IdjeoNmlah4n5yta4GHaqyIm4
,00.html
On Wednesday National Hockey League Commissioner Gary Bettman canceled the season, and
we guess that's a loss. But this week also brought news of something else that's been
put on ice. We're talking about the "hockey stick."
Just so we're clear, this hockey stick isn't a sports implement; it's a scientific
graph. Back in the late 1990s, American geoscientist Michael Mann published a chart that
purported to show average surface temperatures in the Northern Hemisphere over the past
1,000 years. The chart showed relatively minor fluctuations in temperature over the
first 900 years, then a sharp and continuous rise over the past century, giving it a
hockey-stick shape.
Mr. Mann's chart was both a scientific and political sensation. It contradicted a body
of scientific work suggesting a warm period early in the second millennium, followed by
a "Little Ice Age" starting in the 14th century. It also provided some visually
arresting scientific support for the contention that fossil-fuel emissions were the
cause of higher temperatures. Little wonder, then, that Mr. Mann's hockey stick appears
five times in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's landmark 2001 report on
global warming, which paved the way to this week's global ratification -- sans the U.S.,
Australia and China -- of the Kyoto Protocol.
Yet there were doubts about Mr. Mann's methods and analysis from the start. In 1998,
Willie Soon and Sallie Baliunas of the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics
published a paper in the journal Climate Research, arguing that there really had been a
Medieval warm period. The result: Messrs. Soon and Baliunas were treated as heretics and
six editors at Climate Research were made to resign.
Still, questions persisted. In 2003, Stephen McIntyre, a Toronto minerals consultant and
amateur mathematician, and Ross McKitrick, an economist at Canada's University of
Guelph, jointly published a critique of the hockey stick analysis. Their conclusion: Mr.
Mann's work was riddled with "collation errors, unjustifiable truncations of
extrapolation of source data, obsolete data, geographical location errors, incorrect
calculations of principal components, and other quality control defects." Once these
were corrected, the Medieval warm period showed up again in the data.
This should have produced a healthy scientific debate. Instead, as the Journal's Antonio
Regalado reported Monday, Mr. Mann tried to shut down debate by refusing to disclose the
mathematical algorithm by which he arrived at his conclusions. All the same, Mr. Mann
was forced to publish a retraction of some of his initial data, and doubts about his
statistical methods have since grown. Statistician Francis Zwiers of Environment Canada
(a government agency) notes that Mr. Mann's method "preferentially produces hockey
sticks when there are none in the data." Other reputable scientists such as Berkeley's
Richard Muller and Hans von Storch of Germany's GKSS Center essentially agree.
We realize this may all seem like so much academic nonsense. Yet if there really was a
Medieval warm period (we draw no conclusions), it would cast some doubt on the
contention that our SUVs and air conditioners, rather than natural causes, are to blame
for apparent global warming.
There is also the not-so-small matter of the politicization of science: If climate
scientists feel their careers might be put at risk by questioning some orthodoxy, the
inevitable result will be bad science. It says something that it took two non-climate
scientists to bring Mr. Mann's errors to light.
But the important point is this: The world is being lobbied to place a huge economic bet
-- as much as $150 billion a year -- on the notion that man-made global warming is real.
Businesses are gearing up, at considerable cost, to deal with a new regulatory
environment; complex carbon-trading schemes are in the making. Shouldn't everyone look
very carefully, and honestly, at the science before we jump off this particular cliff?
Copyright 2005, The Wall Street Journal
=============
(2) SCIENCE AND OPEN ALGORITHMS: "YOU CAN PROVE ANYTHING WITH SECRET DATA AND
ALGORITHMS"
Jerry Pournell, 18 February 2005
[2]http://www.jerrypournelle.com/view/view349.html#hockeystick
Science and Open Algorithms: You can prove anything with secret data and algorithms.
There is a long piece on the global "hockey stick" in today's Wall Street Journal that
explains something I didn't understand: Mann, who generated the "hockey stick" curve
purporting to show that the last century was unique in all recorded history with its
sharp climb in temperature, has released neither the algorithm that generated his curve
nor the data on which it was based.
I had refrained from commenting on the "hockey stick" because I couldn't understand how
it was derived. I've done statistical analysis and prediction from uncertainty much of
my life. My first job in aerospace was as part of the Human Factors and Reliability
Group at Boeing, where we were expected to deal with such matters as predicting
component failures, and deriving maintenance schedules (replace it before it fails, but
not so long before it fails that the costs including the cost of the maintenance crew
and the costs of taking the airplane out of service are prohibitive) and other such
matters. I used to live with Incomplete Gamma Functions and other complex integrals; and
I could not for the life of me understand how Mann derived his famous curve. Now I know:
he hasn't told anyone. He says that telling people how he generated it would be
tantamount to giving in to his critics.
More on this after my walk, but the one thing we may conclude for sure is that this is
not science. His curve has been distributed as part of the Canadian government's
literature on why Canada supports Kyoto, and is said to have been influential in causing
the "Kyoto Consensus" so it is certainly effective propaganda; but IT IS NOT SCIENCE.
Science deals with repeatability and openness. When I took Philosophy of Science from
Gustav Bergmann at the University of Iowa a very long time ago, our seminar came to a
one-sentence "practical definition" of science: Science is what you can put in a letter
to a colleague and he'll get the same results you did. Now I don't claim that as
original for it wasn't even me who came up with it in the seminar; but I do claim
Bergmann liked that formulation, and it certainly appealed to me, and I haven't seen a
better one-sentence practical definition of science. Mann's work doesn't meet that
definition, and those who use Mann's curve in their arguments are not making a
scientific argument.
One of Pournelle's Laws states "You can prove anything if you can make up your data." I
will now add another Pournelle's Law: "You can prove anything if you can keep your
algorithms secret."
=============
(3) OPEN SEASON ON HOCKEY AND PEER REVIEW
Science Policy, 18 February 2005
[3]http://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/prometheus/archives/climate_change/000355open_seaso
n_on_hocke.html
By Kevin Vranes
The recent 2/14 WSJ article ("Global Warring..." by Antonio Regaldo) addresses the
debate that most readers of this site are well familiar with: the Mann et al. hockey
stick. The WSJ is still asking - and trying to answer - the basic questions: hockey
stick or no hockey stick? But the background premise of the article, stated explicitly
and implicitly throughout, is that it was the hockey stick that led to Kyoto and other
climate policy. Is it?
I think it's fair to say that to all of us in the field of climatology, the notion that
Kyoto is based on the Mann curve is utter nonsense. If a climatologist, or a policy
advisor charged with knowing the science well enough to make astute recommendations to
his/her boss, relied solely on the Mann curve to prove definitively the existence of
anthropogenic warming, then we're in deeper trouble than anybody realizes. (This is
essentially what Stephan Ramstorf writes in a 1/27 RealClimate post.) And although it's
easy to believe that national and international policy can hinge on single graphs, I
hope we give policy makers more credit than that.
But maybe we are in that much trouble. The WSJ highlights what Regaldo and McIntyre says
is Mann's resistance or outright refusal to provide to inquiring minds his data, all
details of his statistical analysis, and his code. The WSJ's anecdotal treatment of the
subject goes toward confirming what I've been hearing for years in climatology circles
about not just Mann, but others collecting original climate data.
As concerns Mann himself, this is especially curious in light of the recent RealClimate
posts (link and link) in which Mann and Gavin Schmidt warn us about peer review and the
limits therein. Their point is essentially that peer review is limited and can be much
less than thorough. One assumes that they are talking about their own work as well as
McIntyre's, although they never state this. Mann and Schmidt go to great lengths in
their post to single out Geophysical Research Letters. Their post then seems a bit
ironic, as GRL is the journal in which the original Mann curve was published (1999, vol
26., issue 6, p. 759), an article which is now receiving much attention as being flawed
and under-reviewed. (For that matter, why does Table 1 in Mann et al. (1999) list many
chronologies in the Southern Hemisphere while the rest of the paper promotes a Northern
Hemisphere reconstruction? Legit or not, it's a confusing aspect of the paper that
should never have made it past peer review.)
Of their take on peer review, I couldn't agree more. In my experience, peer review is
often cursory at best. So this is what I say to Dr. Mann and others expressing deep
concern over peer review: give up your data, methods and code freely and with a smile on
your face. That is real peer review. A 12 year-old hacker prodigy in her grandparents'
basement should have as much opportunity to check your work as a "semi-retired Toronto
minerals consultant." Those without three letters after their name can be every bit as
intellectually qualified, and will likely have the time for careful review that typical
academic reviewers find lacking.
Specious analysis of your work will be borne out by your colleagues, and will enter the
debate with every other original work. Your job is not to prevent your critics from
checking your work and potentially distorting it; your job is to continue to publish
insightful, detailed analyses of the data and let the community decide. You can be part
of the debate without seeming to hinder access to it.
===============
(4) CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE: TIME FOR TEAM "B"?
The American Enterprise Institute, 15 February 2005
[4]http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.21974/pub_detail.asp
By Steven F. Hayward
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is currently working on its fourth
assessment report. Despite the IPCC's noble intent to generate a scientific consensus, a
number of factors have compromised the research and drafting process, assuring that its
next assessment report will be just as controversial as previous reports in 1995 and
2001. Efforts to reform this large bureaucratic effort are unlikely to succeed. Perhaps
the time has come to consider competition as the means of checking the IPCC's monopoly
and generating more reliable climate science.
As the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) moves toward the release of its
fourth assessment report (fourth AR) in 2007, the case of Chris Landsea offers in
microcosm an example of why the IPCC's findings are going to have credibility problems.
Last month Landsea, a climate change scientist with the U.S. National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), resigned as a participant in the producing the
report. Landsea had been a chapter author and reviewer for the IPCC's second assessment
report in 1995 and the third in 2001, and he is a leading expert on hurricanes and
related extreme weather phenomena. He had signed on with the IPCC to update the state of
current knowledge on Atlantic hurricanes for the fourth report. In an open letter,
Landsea wrote that he could no longer in good conscience participate in a process that
is "being motivated by pre-conceived agendas" and is "scientifically unsound."[1]
Landsea's resignation was prompted by an all too familiar occurrence: The lead author of
the fourth AR's chapter on climate observations, Kevin Trenberth, participated in a
press conference that warned of increasing hurricane activity as a result of global
warming.[2] It is common to hear that man-made global warming represents the "consensus"
of science, yet the use of hurricanes and cyclones as a marker of global warming
represents a clear-cut case of the consensus being roundly ignored. Both the second and
third IPCC assessments concluded that there was no global warming signal found in the
hurricane record. Moreover, most climate models predict future warming will have only a
small effect--if any--on hurricane strength. "It is beyond me," Landsea wrote, "why my
colleagues would utilize the media to push an unsupported agenda that recent hurricane
activity has been due to global warming."[3] Landsea's critique goes beyond a fit of
pique at the abuse of his area of expertise. The IPCC, he believes, has become
thoroughly politicized, and is unresponsive to criticism. "When I have raised my
concerns to the IPCC leadership," Landsea wrote, "their response was simply to dismiss
my concerns."[4]
Landsea's frustration is not an isolated experience. MIT physicist Richard Lindzen,
another past IPCC author who is not participating in the fourth report, has written: "My
experiences over the past 16 years have led me to the discouraging conclusion that we
are dealing with the almost insoluble interaction of an iron triangle with an iron rice
bowl." (Lindzen's "iron triangle" consists of activists misusing science to get the
attention of the news media and politicians; the "iron rice bowl" is the parallel
phenomenon where scientists exploit the activists' alarm to increase research funding
and attention for the issue.[5]) And Dr. John Zillman, one of Australia's leading
climate scientists, is another ex-IPCC participant who believes the IPCC has become
"cast more in the model of supporting than informing policy development."[6]
And when the IPCC is not ignoring its responsible critics like Landsea and Lindzen, it
is demonizing them. Not long ago the IPCC's chairman, Dr. Rajendra Pachauri, compared
eco-skeptic Bjorn Lomborg to Hitler. "What is the difference between Lomborg's view of
humanity and Hitler's?" Pachauri asked in a Danish newspaper. "If you were to accept
Lomborg's way of thinking, then maybe what Hitler did was the right thing."[7] Lomborg's
sin was merely to follow the consensus practice of economists in applying a discount to
present costs for future benefits, and comparing the range of outcomes with other world
problems alongside climate change. It is hard to judge what is worse: Pachauri's
appalling judgment in resorting to reductio ad Hitlerum, or his abysmal ignorance of
basic economics. In either case, it is hard to have much confidence in the policy advice
the IPCC might have. [...]
Time for "Team B"?
The time has come to question the IPCC's status as the near-monopoly source of
information and advice for its member governments. It is probably futile to propose
reform of the present IPCC process. Like most bureaucracies, it has too much momentum
and its institutional interests are too strong for anyone realistically to suppose that
it can assimilate more diverse points of view, even if more scientists and economists
were keen to join up. The rectitude and credibility of the IPCC could be best improved
not through reform, but through competition....
FULL PAPER at [5]http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.21974/pub_detail.asp
===========
(5) BRING THE PROXIES UP TO DATE!
Climate Audit, 20 February 2005
[6]http://www.climateaudit.org/index.php?p=89#more-89
Steve McIntyre
I will make here a very simple suggestion: if IPCC or others want to use "multiproxy"
reconstructions of world temperature for policy purposes, stop using data ending in 1980
and bring the proxies up-to-date. Let's see how they perform in the warm 1990s - which
should be an ideal period to show the merit of the proxies. I do not believe that any
responsible policy-maker can base policy, even in part, on the continued use of obsolete
data ending in 1980, when the costs of bringing the data up-to-date is inconsequential
compared to Kyoto costs.
I would appreciate comments on this note as I think that I will pursue the matter with
policymakers.
For example, in Mann's famous hockey stick graph, as presented to policymakers and to
the public, the graph used Mann's reconstruction from proxies up to 1980 and
instrumental temperatures (here, as in other similar studies, using Jones' more lurid
CRU surface history rather than the more moderate increases shown by satellite
measurements). Usually (but not always), a different color is used for the instrumental
portion, but, from a promotional point of view, the juxtaposition of the two series
achieves the desired promotional effect. (In mining promotions, where there is
considerable community experience with promotional graphics and statistics, securities
commission prohibit the adding together of proven ore reserves and inferred ore reserves
- a policy which deserves a little reflection in the context of IPCC studies).
Last week, a brand new multiproxy study by European scientists [Moberg et al., 2005] was
published in Nature. On the very day of publication, I received an email from a
prominent scientist telling me that Mann's hockeystick was yesterday's news, that the
"community" had now "moved on" and so should I. That the "community" had had no
opportunity to verify Moberg's results, however meritorious they may finally appear,
seemed to matter not at all.
If you look at the proxy portion of the new Moberg graphic, you see nothing that would
be problematic for opponents of the hockey stick: it shows a striking Medieval Warm
Period (MWP), a cold Little Ice Age and 20th century warming not quite reaching MWP
levels by 1979, when the proxy portion of the study ends. (I'm in the process of
examining the individual proxies and the Moberg reconstruction is not without its own
imperfections.) In the presentation to the public - see the figure in the Nature article
itself, once again, there is the infamous splice between reconstruction by proxy (up to
1980) and the instrumental record thereafter (once again Jones' CRU record, rather than
the satellite record).
One of the first question that occurs to any civilian becoming familiar with these
studies (and it was one of my first questions) is: what happens to the proxies after
1980? Given the presumed warmth of the 1990s, and especially 1998 (the "warmest year in
the millennium"), you'd think that the proxy values would be off the chart. In effect,
the last 25 years have provided an ideal opportunity to validate the usefulness of
proxies and, especially the opportunity to test the confidence intervals of these
studies, put forward with such assurance by the multiproxy proponents. What happens to
the proxies used in MBH99 or Moberg et al [2005] or Crowley and Lowery [2000] in the
1990s and, especially, 1998?
This question about proxies after 1980 was posed by a civilian to Mann in December at
realclimate. Mann replied:
Most reconstructions only extend through about 1980 because the vast majority of
tree-ring, coral, and ice core records currently available in the public domain do not
extend into the most recent decades. While paleoclimatologists are attempting to update
many important proxy records to the present, this is a costly, and labor-intensive
activity, often requiring expensive field campaigns that involve traveling with heavy
equipment to difficult-to-reach locations (such as high-elevation or remote polar
sites). For historical reasons, many of the important records were obtained in the 1970s
and 1980s and have yet to be updated. [my bold]
Pause and think about this response. Think about the costs of Kyoto and then think again
about this answer. Think about the billions spent on climate research and then try to
explain to me why we need to rely on "important records" obtained in the 1970s. Far more
money has been spent on climate research in the last decade than in the 1970s. Why are
we still relying on obsolete proxy data?
As someone with actual experience in the mineral exploration business, which also
involves "expensive field campaigns that involve traveling with heavy equipment to
difficult-to-reach locations", I can assure readers that Mann's response cannot be
justified and is an embarrassment to the paleoclimate community. The more that I think
about it, the more outrageous is both the comment itself and the fact that no one seems
to have picked up on it.
It is even more outrageous when you look in detail at what is actually involved in
collecting the proxy data used in the medieval period in the key multiproxy studies. The
number of proxies used in MBH99 is from fewer than 40 sites (28 tree ring sites being
U.S. tree ring sites represented in 3 principal component series).
As to the time needed to update some of these tree ring sites, here is an excerpt from
Lamarche et al. [1984] on the collection of key tree ring cores from Sheep Mountain and
Campito Mountain, which are the most important indicators in the MBH reconstruction:
"D.A.G. [Graybill] and M.R.R. [Rose] collected tree ring samples at 3325 m on Mount
Jefferson, Toquima Range, Nevada and 11 August 1981. D.A.G. and M.R.R. collected samples
from 13 trees at Campito Mountain (3400 m) and from 15 trees at Sheep Mountain (3500 m)
on 31 October 1983."
Now to get to Campito Mountain and Sheep Mountain, they had to get to Bishop,
California, which is hardly "remote" even by Paris Hilton standards, and then proceed by
road to within a few hundred meters of the site, perhaps proceeding for some portion of
the journey on unpaved roads.
The picture below illustrates the taking of a tree ring core. While the equipment may
seem "heavy" to someone used only to desk work using computers, people in the mineral
exploration business would not regard this drill as being especially "heavy" and I
believe that people capable of operating such heavy equipment can be found, even in
out-of-the way places like Bishop, California. I apologize for the tone here, but it is
impossible for me not to be facetious.
There is only one relatively remote site in the entire MBH99 roster - the Quelccaya
glacier in Peru. Here, fortunately, the work is already done (although, needless to say,
it is not published.) This information was updated in 2003 by Lonnie Thompson and should
be adequate to update these series. With sufficient pressure from the U.S. National
Science Foundation, the data should be available expeditiously. (Given that Thompson has
not archived data from Dunde drilled in 1987, the need for pressure should not be
under-estimated.)
I realize that the rings need to be measured and that the field work is only a portion
of the effort involved. But updating 28 tree ring sites in the United States is not a
monumental enterprise nor would updating any of the other sites.
I've looked through lists of the proxies used in Jones et al. [1998], MBH99, Crowley and
Lowery [2000], Mann and Jones [2003], Moberg et al [2005] and see no obstacles to
bringing all these proxies up to date. The only sites that might take a little extra
time would be updating the Himalayan ice cores. Even here, it's possible that taking
very short cores or even pits would prove adequate for an update and this might prove
easier than one might be think. Be that as it may, any delays in updating the most
complicated location should not deter updating all the other locations.
As far as I'm concerned, this should be the first order of business for multiproxy
studies.
Whose responsibility is this? While the costs are trivial in the scheme of Kyoto, they
would still be a significant line item in the budget of a university department. I think
that the responsibility here lies with the U.S. National Science Foundation and its
equivalents in Canada and Europe. The responsibilities for collecting the proxy updates
could be divided up in a couple of emails and budgets established.
One other important aspect: right now the funding agencies fund academics to do the work
and are completely ineffective in ensuring prompt reporting. At best, academic practice
will tie up reporting of results until the publication of articles in an academic
journals, creating a delay right at the start. Even then, in cases like Thompson or
Jacoby, to whom I've referred elsewhere, the data may never be archived or only after
decades in the hands of the originator.
So here I would propose something more like what happens in a mineral exploration
program. When a company has drill results, it has to publish them through a press
release. It can't wait for academic reports or for its geologists to spin the results.
There's lots of time to spin afterwards. Good or bad - the results have to be made
public. The company has a little discretion so that it can release drill holes in
bunches and not every single drill hole, but the discretion can't build up too much
during an important program. Here I would insist that the proxy results be archived as
soon as they are produced - the academic reports and spin can come later. Since all
these sites have already been published, people are used to the proxies and the updates
will to a considerable extend speak for themselves.
What would I expect from such studies? Drill programs are usually a surprise and maybe
there's one here. My hunch is that the classic proxies will not show anywhere near as
"loud" a signal in the 1990s as is needed to make statements comparing the 1990s to the
Medieval Warm Period with any confidence at all. I've not surveyed proxies in the 1990s
(nor to my knowledge has anyone else), but I've started to look and many do not show the
expected "loud" signal e.g. some of the proxies posted up on this site such as Alaskan
tree rings, TTHH ring widths, and theories are starting to develop. But the discussions
so far do not explicit point out the effect of signal failure on the multiproxy
reconstruction project.
But this is only a hunch and the evidence could be otherwise. The point is this: there's
no need to speculate any further. It's time to bring the classic proxies up to date.
=============
(6) CARELESS SCIENCE COSTS LIVES
The Guardian, 18 February 2005
[7]http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,3604,1417224,00.html
Dick Taverne
In science, as in much of life, it is believed that you get what you pay for. According
to opinion polls, people do not trust scientists who work for industry because they only
care about profits, or government scientists because they suspect them of trying to
cover up the truth. Scientists who work for environmental NGOs are more highly regarded.
Because they are trying to save the planet, people are ready to believe that what they
say must be true. A House of Lords report, Science and Society, published in 2000,
agreed that motives matter. It argued that science and scientists are not value-free,
and therefore that scientists would command more trust "if they openly declare the
values that underpin their work".
It all sounds very plausible, but mostly it is wrong. Scientists with the best of
motives can produce bad science, just as scientists whose motives may be considered
suspect can produce good science. An obvious example of the first was Rachel Carson,
who, if not the patron saint, was at least the founding mother of modern
environmentalism. Her book The Silent Spring was an inspiring account of the damage
caused to our natural environment by the reckless spraying of pesticides, especially
DDT.
However, Carson also claimed that DDT caused cancer and liver damage, claims for which
there is no evidence but which led to an effective worldwide ban on the use of DDT that
is proving disastrous. Her motives were pure; the science was wrong. DDT is the most
effective agent ever invented for preventing insect-borne disease, which, according to
the US National Academy of Sciences and the WHO, prevented over 50 million human deaths
from malaria in about two decades. Although there is no evidence that DDT harms human
health, some NGOs still demand a worldwide ban for that reason. Careless science cost
lives.
Contrast the benefits that have resulted from the profit motive, a motive that is held
to be suspect by the public. Multinationals, chief villains in the demonology of
contemporary anti-capitalists, have developed antibiotics, vaccines that have eradicated
many diseases like smallpox and polio, genetically modified insulin for diabetics, and
plants such as GM insect-resistant cotton that have reduced the need for pesticides and
so increased the income and improved the health of millions of small cotton farmers. The
fact is that self-interest can benefit the public as effectively as philanthropy.
Motives are not irrelevant, and unselfish motives are rightly admired more than selfish
ones. There are numerous examples of misconduct by big companies, and we should examine
their claims critically and provide effective regulation to control abuses of power and
ensure the safety of their products. Equally, we should not uncritically accept the
claims of those who act from idealistic motives. NGOs inspired by the noble cause of
protecting our environment often become careless about evidence and exaggerate risks to
attract attention (and funds). Although every leading scientific academy has concluded
that GM crops are at least as safe as conventional foods, this does not stop Greenpeace
reiterating claims about the dangers of "Frankenfoods". Stephen Schneider, a
climatologist, publicly justified distortion of evidence: "Because we are not just
scientists but human beings as well ... we need to ... capture the public imagination
... So we have to offer up scary scenarios, make simplified dramatic statements, and
make little mention of any doubts we have."
But in the end motives are irrelevant to the validity of science. It does not matter if
a scientist wants to help mankind, get a new grant, win a Nobel prize or increase the
profits of her company. It does not matter whether a researcher works for Monsanto or
for Greenpeace. Results are no more to be trusted if the researcher declares his values
and confesses that he beats his wife, believes in God, or is an Arsenal supporter. What
matters is that the work has been peer-reviewed, that the findings are reproducible and
that they last. If they do, they are good science. If not, not. Science itself is
value-free. There are objective truths in science. We can now regard it as a fact that
the Earth goes rounds the sun and that Darwinism explains the evolution of species.
A look at the history of science makes it evident how irrelevant the values of
scientists are. Newton's passion for alchemy did not invalidate his discovery of the
laws of gravitation. To quote Professor Fox of Rutger's University: "How was it relevant
to Mendel's findings about peas that he was a white, European monk? They would have been
just as valid if Mendel had been a Spanish-speaking, lesbian atheist."

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From: Jonathan Overpeck <jto@u.arizona.edu>
To: Keith Briffa <k.briffa@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>
Subject: IPCC - your section
Date: Mon, 23 May 2005 22:46:xxx xxxx xxxx
Cc: Eystein Jansen <eystein.jansen@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>

<x-flowed>
Hi Keith - thanks again for the help in Beijing. We hope you found a
fabulous clay pot or at least some good views of China.

We know it's going to be extra hard on you to get everything done on
time, but we're hoping you can more-or-less stick to the schedule we
just sent around. Your section is going to be the big one, and we
need to make sure we have as much review and polishing as possible.
If we don't we (especially you) will pay heavily at FOD review time.
Lots of work now saves even more work later. Or so the real veterans
tell us.

Lastly, we wanted you to know that we can probably win another page
or two (total, including figs and refs) if you end up needing it.
Susan didn't promise this, but she gave us the feeling that we could
get it if we ask - but probably only for your section, and maybe an
extra page for general refs (although we're not going to mention this
to the others, since we're not sure we can get it). Note that some of
the methodological parts of your sections should go into supplemental
material - this has to be written just as carefully, but it gives you
another space buffer. All this means you can do a good job on
figures, rather than the bare minimum. We're hoping you guys can
generate something compelling enough for the TS and SPM - something
that will replace the hockey-stick with something even more
compelling.

Anyhow, thanks in advance for what is most likely not going to be
your number 1 summer to remember. That said, what we produce should
provide real satisfaction.

Best, Peck and Eystein
--
Jonathan T. Overpeck
Director, Institute for the Study of Planet Earth
Professor, Department of Geosciences
Professor, Department of Atmospheric Sciences

Mail and Fedex Address:

Institute for the Study of Planet Earth
715 N. Park Ave. 2nd Floor
University of Arizona
Tucson, AZ 85721
direct tel: xxx xxxx xxxx
fax: xxx xxxx xxxx
http://www.geo.arizona.edu/
http://www.ispe.arizona.edu/
</x-flowed>

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From: Jonathan Overpeck <jto@u.arizona.edu>
To: Keith Briffa <k.briffa@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>
Subject: Re: First draft of FOD
Date: Fri, 24 Jun 2005 11:52:xxx xxxx xxxx
Cc: Eystein Jansen <eystein.jansen@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, t.osborn@xxxxxxxxx.xxx, "Ricardo Villalba" <ricardo@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>

<x-flowed>
Hi gang - I still have to weigh in on the great
figs/text that Keith and Tim have created, but
here's some feedback in the meantime.

I agree that a mean recon isn't the thing to do.
Let me think more before I weigh in more on the
fig. Working to get other LAs to get their stuff
in.

As for the Southern Hem temperature change fig
(and caption and a little text), I agree that you
(Ricardo in the lead) should do it as you've
proposed. We need a clear S. Hem statement, and
although it should stress that the data are too
few to create a reliable S Hem recon, we should
show the data that are available. Thus, PLEASE
proceed Ricardo on this tack. Also, can we
include the borehole recon series from S. Africa
and Australia (e.g., Pollack and Huang, 98)? I'm
sure Henry Pollack would provide fast - cc Huang
too, since he might be even faster. Keith and
Tim, does that make sense?

Please note that I think we can find room for the
above, regardless, if it is compelling enough.

As for ENSO, we will need to address for sure -
based mainly on the more direct coral data rather
than teleconnected (e.g., tree-ring)
relationships. The latter don't seem to be
definitive enough at this time - as I think we
discussed in China. The same holds true for
NAO/AO/PDO etc., and I think that we (Keith and
Tim) will need to have this in their section - in
a appropriately short manner. I'll provide more
feedback on this soon, so don't sweat it for now.

Main thing is to go ahead on the S Hem temp
fig/caption/short text., independent of ENSO etc
discussions.

Thanks, Peck



>Eystein and Peck
>very quick initial response - as have not seen
>Tim today. The Figure legends with very detailed
>explanations is at the end of the text I sent
>you already. The forcings ARE the ones that went
>into the models , appropriately colour coded for
>direct comparison - it was partly the difficulty
>of getting all of these prescribed or diagnosed
>forcings sorted out for each model that took Tim
>so long.The uncertainty levels are a compromise
>that chose came up with - see description in
>caption , but we are considering other things .
>Will get back to re the colours. Producing a
>mean reconstruction is not in my opinion a
>sensible thing to do so we will have to talk
>about this. The question of space is crucial
>regarding the Figure and reworking needed on
>Regional stuff Ricardo and I need to know how
>the space is panning out , and you opinions on
>the reative importance of a SH regional Figure
>versus an ENSO Figure.- and what about Monsoon
>Peck? By the way, please clarify the space re
>the Medieval Warm Period Box. Does this have to
>come down , thought it was short enough?
>Keith
>
> At 09:03 24/06/2005, Eystein Jansen wrote:
>>Hi Keith and Tim,
>>Lots of thanks for your hard work.
>>I have gone through the FOD draft and the
>>figures. Will send comments on text later today.
>>Here some comments on the figures.
>>I did not see the figure captions so it is not
>>entirely transparent to me what went into the
>>figures, hopefully all is material that is or
>>will be published before the end of 2005. But
>>anyhow, I think these figures are very good and
>>in my view give the different reconstructions,
>>the combined uncertainty as well as
>>reconstructions and simulations brought
>>together. I assume you have the Moberg et al
>>reconstruction included, but not the Oerlemans,
>>which will be treated in Ch. 4 (needs a x-ref).
>>Concerning the way of displaying the
>>uncertainties, it is not transparent to me how
>>the white and grey areas are produced. Would it
>>be viable to make a single curve of the mean of
>>the reconstructions to accompany the
>>simulations? The white area underlying the
>>simulations seem a bit weak, in the sence that
>>a superficial reader might wonder if it
>>displays something without content, perhaps a
>>different shade or colour would be better.
>>Conserning the simulations, it needs to be
>>clarified that the simulations did not
>>necessarily use the forcings displayed above,
>>hence it may be misleading to place the
>>forcings and simulations into the same figure.
>>Concerning the forcings, I am a bit surprised
>>that the amplitude of these are so close to
>>each other. Although I haven

Original Filename: 1121883804.txt | Return to the index page | Permalink | Later Emails

From: Jonathan Overpeck <jto@u.arizona.edu>
To: Tom Crowley <tcrowley@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>
Subject: Re: CLA feedback on Tom and the MWP
Date: Wed, 20 Jul 2005 14:23:xxx xxxx xxxx
Cc: Keith Briffa <k.briffa@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Eystein Jansen <eystein.jansen@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>

<x-flowed>
Tom - thanks. Good points regarding regional labeling. Defn stick to
Tibetan Plateau!

best, peck

>Keith, if you can find more I see no problem - it seems that a lot
>of the data you used was via Cook and colleagues - I was unable to
>locate a full length record from Quebec in that time series, but
>maybe you are relying on something else - if so can I have it!?
>
>other suggestions: provide a more general label to sites - eg,
>mangazeyek (sp)/yamal could be listed as polar urals - taimyr
>central Siberia.
>
>China shoudl be relabeled as east Asia as it does include some
>information from Japan and the Tibetan Plateau (L. Thompson) and we
>don't want to get into some political to-do by calling Tibet
>"Chinese".
>
>that's all I can think of for present, good sailing, tom
>
>Keith Briffa wrote:
>
>>Hi all
>>think this is resolved now (virtually) -
>>
>>We use series that total to Tom/Gabi composite , and we can cite
>>this as an example of the scatter of regional records "in a typical
>>reconstruction". This avoids very difficult issue of what is the
>>best way to aggregate certain data sets - we are simply
>>illustrating the point with one published (by then) data set.
>>The issue of the composite is then not an issue either , because it
>>is not a new (unpublished) composite that we were concerned about -
>>though I still believe it is a distraction to put the composite in.
>>It would be best to use data from 800 or 850 at least , and go to
>>1500 (?) and presumably normalise over the whole period of data
>>shown. OK? Even though you guys all wish to go with the reduced
>>period (ie not up the present) , but my own instinct is that this
>>might later come back to haunt us - but will take your lead.
>>I agree the look of the Figure should match the others.
>>So, if Tom will send the data sets (his regional curves) , Tim will
>>plot and send back asap for scrutiny. Thanks Tom and thanks for
>>your help with this - further comments on latest version of 6.5
>>(last 2000 years) still welcome , though will be incorporating a
>>few changes in response to David and Fortunat input , and SH bit
>>(from Ricardo and Ed) still to go in and regional section to be
>>revised (after input from Peck et al.)
>>cheers
>>Keith
>>.
>>
>>
>> At 21:42 19/07/2005, Jonathan Overpeck wrote:
>>
>>>Hi Keith and Tim: Just got off the phone with Eystein, and
>>>hopefully he will sleep ok knowing that we have a plan for the MWP
>>>fig and Tom...
>>>
>>>Please ask questions if we don't cover all the key points, but
>>>here's what we think:
>>>
>>>1) the MWP fig should span the MWP only, and should emphasize
>>>variation in regional amplitude (we agree that we must be clear
>>>that this fig is not a reconstruction) - that is, it is best to
>>>use time series representing regions, assuming that the regional
>>>series do represent a region ok with one or more input series. We
>>>want to avoid a regional bias if we can - this is what got us into
>>>all the MWP misunderstanding in the first place, perhaps (e.g.,
>>>nice MWP in Europe/Atlantic region - must be global)
>>>
>>>2) If you guys could agree on the series and the interval, that'd
>>>be great. We agree it would be good to start before 1000 and end
>>>before the Renaissance (15th century?). If you want more feedback
>>>on these issues, we're happy to provide, but it seems logical that
>>>you pick series and intervals so that each series covers the
>>>entire interval selected.
>>>
>>>3) Don't use the Chesapeak record - it is likely biased by salinity
>>>
>>>4) We'd like Keith and Tim to draft the final figure so that it
>>>matches the look and style of the other two figs they have made.
>>>Hope this is doable. Tom, does Keith have all the data? Thanks for
>>>sending if not.
>>>
>>>5) We agree that Tom should NOT be a CA given that he was
>>>officially one of the ZOD reviewers. Of course, this doesn't
>>>represent a real conflict, but we need to avoid even the
>>>appearance of conflict. We greatly appreciate all the feedback
>>>that Tom is providing! Is this plan ok w/ you Tom? We think you're
>>>cool with it, but just want to check one more time.
>>>
>>>That... it is. Please let us know if there are any more questions.
>>>Keith - feel free to try and get Eystein on his cell doing your
>>>work hours if you want quick feedback. Or we can do this by email
>>>- he's not in a very email friendly place right now, but the
>>>fishing appears to be ok.
>>>
>>>Again, thanks to you both for all the discussion and thought that
>>>has gone into this figure.
>>>
>>>Best, peck
>>>--
>>>Jonathan T. Overpeck
>>>Director, Institute for the Study of Planet Earth
>>>Professor, Department of Geosciences
>>>Professor, Department of Atmospheric Sciences
>>>
>>>Mail and Fedex Address:
>>>
>>>Institute for the Study of Planet Earth
>>>715 N. Park Ave. 2nd Floor
>>>University of Arizona
>>>Tucson, AZ 85721
>>>direct tel: xxx xxxx xxxx
>>>fax: xxx xxxx xxxx
>>>http://www.geo.arizona.edu/
>>>http://www.ispe.arizona.edu/
>>
>>
>>--
>>Professor Keith Briffa,
>>Climatic Research Unit
>>University of East Anglia
>>Norwich, NR4 7TJ, U.K.
>>
>>Phone: xxx xxxx xxxx
>>Fax: xxx xxxx xxxx
>>
>>http://www.cru.uea.ac.uk/cru/people/briffa/


--
Jonathan T. Overpeck
Director, Institute for the Study of Planet Earth
Professor, Department of Geosciences
Professor, Department of Atmospheric Sciences

Mail and Fedex Address:

Institute for the Study of Planet Earth
715 N. Park Ave. 2nd Floor
University of Arizona
Tucson, AZ 85721
direct tel: xxx xxxx xxxx
fax: xxx xxxx xxxx
http://www.geo.arizona.edu/
http://www.ispe.arizona.edu/
</x-flowed>

Original Filename: 1121950401.txt | Return to the index page | Permalink | Later Emails

From: Keith Briffa <k.briffa@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>
To: Tim Osborn <t.osborn@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>
Subject: Fwd: Re: CLA feedback on Tom and the MWP
Date: Thu Jul 21 08:53:xxx xxxx xxxx

Date: Wed, 20 Jul 2005 09:53:xxx xxxx xxxx
From: Tom Crowley <tcrowley@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>
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Gecko/20030624 Netscape/7.1
X-Accept-Language: en-us, en
To: Keith Briffa <k.briffa@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>
CC: Jonathan Overpeck <jto@u.arizona.edu>,
Eystein Jansen <eystein.jansen@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, t.osborn@xxxxxxxxx.xxx
Subject: Re: CLA feedback on Tom and the MWP
X-UEA-Spam-Score: 0.0
X-UEA-Spam-Level: /
X-UEA-Spam-Flag: NO
Keith, if you can find more I see no problem - it seems that a lot of the data you used
was via Cook and colleagues - I was unable to locate a full length record from Quebec in
that time series, but maybe you are relying on something else - if so can I have it!?
other suggestions: provide a more general label to sites - eg, mangazeyek (sp)/yamal
could be listed as polar urals - taimyr central Siberia.
China shoudl be relabeled as east Asia as it does include some information from Japan
and the Tibetan Plateau (L. Thompson) and we don't want to get into some political to-do
by calling Tibet "Chinese".
that's all I can think of for present, good sailing, tom
Keith Briffa wrote:

Hi all
think this is resolved now (virtually) -
We use series that total to Tom/Gabi composite , and we can cite this as an example of
the scatter of regional records "in a typical reconstruction". This avoids very
difficult issue of what is the best way to aggregate certain data sets - we are simply
illustrating the point with one published (by then) data set.
The issue of the composite is then not an issue either , because it is not a new
(unpublished) composite that we were concerned about - though I still believe it is a
distraction to put the composite in. It would be best to use data from 800 or 850 at
least , and go to 1500 (?) and presumably normalise over the whole period of data shown.
OK? Even though you guys all wish to go with the reduced period (ie not up the present)
, but my own instinct is that this might later come back to haunt us - but will take
your lead.
I agree the look of the Figure should match the others.
So, if Tom will send the data sets (his regional curves) , Tim will plot and send back
asap for scrutiny. Thanks Tom and thanks for your help with this - further comments on
latest version of 6.5 (last 2000 years) still welcome , though will be incorporating a
few changes in response to David and Fortunat input , and SH bit (from Ricardo and Ed)
still to go in and regional section to be revised (after input from Peck et al.)
cheers
Keith
.
At 21:42 19/07/2005, Jonathan Overpeck wrote:

Hi Keith and Tim: Just got off the phone with Eystein, and hopefully he will sleep ok
knowing that we have a plan for the MWP fig and Tom...
Please ask questions if we don't cover all the key points, but here's what we think:
1) the MWP fig should span the MWP only, and should emphasize variation in regional
amplitude (we agree that we must be clear that this fig is not a reconstruction) - that
is, it is best to use time series representing regions, assuming that the regional
series do represent a region ok with one or more input series. We want to avoid a
regional bias if we can - this is what got us into all the MWP misunderstanding in the
first place, perhaps (e.g., nice MWP in Europe/Atlantic region - must be global)
2) If you guys could agree on the series and the interval, that'd be great. We agree it
would be good to start before 1000 and end before the Renaissance (15th century?). If
you want more feedback on these issues, we're happy to provide, but it seems logical
that you pick series and intervals so that each series covers the entire interval
selected.
3) Don't use the Chesapeak record - it is likely biased by salinity
4) We'd like Keith and Tim to draft the final figure so that it matches the look and
style of the other two figs they have made. Hope this is doable. Tom, does Keith have
all the data? Thanks for sending if not.
5) We agree that Tom should NOT be a CA given that he was officially one of the ZOD
reviewers. Of course, this doesn't represent a real conflict, but we need to avoid even
the appearance of conflict. We greatly appreciate all the feedback that Tom is
providing! Is this plan ok w/ you Tom? We think you're cool with it, but just want to
check one more time.
That... it is. Please let us know if there are any more questions. Keith - feel free to
try and get Eystein on his cell doing your work hours if you want quick feedback. Or we
can do this by email - he's not in a very email friendly place right now, but the
fishing appears to be ok.
Again, thanks to you both for all the discussion and thought that has gone into this
figure.
Best, peck
--
Jonathan T. Overpeck
Director, Institute for the Study of Planet Earth
Professor, Department of Geosciences
Professor, Department of Atmospheric Sciences
Mail and Fedex Address:
Institute for the Study of Planet Earth
715 N. Park Ave. 2nd Floor
University of Arizona
Tucson, AZ 85721
direct tel: xxx xxxx xxxx
fax: xxx xxxx xxxx
[1]http://www.geo.arizona.edu/
[2]http://www.ispe.arizona.edu/

--
Professor Keith Briffa,
Climatic Research Unit
University of East Anglia
Norwich, NR4 7TJ, U.K.
Phone: xxx xxxx xxxx
Fax: xxx xxxx xxxx
[3]http://www.cru.uea.ac.uk/cru/people/briffa/

--
Professor Keith Briffa,
Climatic Research Unit
University of East Anglia
Norwich, NR4 7TJ, U.K.

Phone: xxx xxxx xxxx
Fax: xxx xxxx xxxx
[4]http://www.cru.uea.ac.uk/cru/people/briffa/

References

1. http://www.geo.arizona.edu/
2. http://www.ispe.arizona.edu/
3. http://www.cru.uea.ac.uk/cru/people/briffa/
4. http://www.cru.uea.ac.uk/cru/people/briffa/

Original Filename: 1121964854.txt | Return to the index page | Permalink | Later Emails

From: Tom Crowley <tcrowley@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>
To: Tim Osborn <t.osborn@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>
Subject: Re: MWP figure
Date: Thu, 21 Jul 2005 12:54:xxx xxxx xxxx
Cc: Keith Briffa <k.briffa@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>, Jonathan Overpeck <jto@u.arizona.edu>, Eystein Jansen <eystein.jansen@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>

<x-flowed>
Tim, we are getting close but there are a few items to discuss:

1) seven of the eight time series are from the Hegerl et al paper, now
out for review in Nature
2) the eighth time series is from Brian Luckmans recent extension of the
Alberta record to the 10th century - we used his original time series in
the H et al paper because the comparisons between model and observations
had been going on for a while, in fact before the new Luckman paper came
out, and we did not want to switch horses in midstream by changing the
composite - as you know the Luckman paper is either accepted or
published in CD, so there is no problem changing that
3) although technically the time series are not the same they are very
close, if you want me to do some comparisons I can, but I could not get
to it until probably tuesday of next week - I don't particularly see any
problem in makng such an addition
4) we cannot extend the time series back to 800 without dropping out
something - the reason we start at 945 is that is the first year when
all the records are available - if we go back to 800 we do so at the
cost of dropping 2 or possibly even 3 records. as our Dark Ages
reconstruction starting at 560 indicates (att.), the biggest warming
between xxx xxxx xxxxis in the late 10the century (xxx xxxx xxxx), we did not
think we missing out on anything by starting at 945 rather than 800.

I await your feedback on this increasingly intricate issue, tom

Tim Osborn wrote:

> Hi Tom,
>
> In Keith's email below, when he says "we use series that total to
> Tom/Gabi composite", he doesn't mean that *our* mock up of the figure
> uses these series, but that if the series shown in *your* draft figure
> are the same as those used in the Hegerl/Crowley recon that is
> currently submitted ("...a twice validated climate record...") then we
> will go with *your* figure. It is fine then to include the "composite
> series" and the instrumental data and a temperature scale. Our
> previous concerns about these latter points were that it might be seen
> as another new NH temperature reconstruction. But if in fact the
> composite and its expression as a temperature are not a new NH T
> recon, but are in fact identical to the published (submitted, at
> least) Hegerl/Crowley NH T recon (which is already included in the
> main intercomparison figure) then there's no problem.
>
> Does your figure equate to the new Hegerl/Crowley NH T recon? If so,
> we should go with your MWP figure, though the CLAs want me to draw it
> in the same style as the others and also cut the time period down to a
> few centuries spanning the MWP. Keith suggests beginning in 800 or 850.
>
> Would it be possible therefore to send the data series you used for
> your figure, but beginning in 800/850, so I can plot the figure in the
> required form?
>
> Cheers
>
> Tim
>
> At 14:53 20/07/2005, Tom Crowley wrote:
>
>> Keith, if you can find more I see no problem - it seems that a lot of
>> the data you used was via Cook and colleagues - I was unable to
>> locate a full length record from Quebec in that time series, but
>> maybe you are relying on something else - if so can I have it!?
>>
>> other suggestions: provide a more general label to sites - eg,
>> mangazeyek (sp)/yamal could be listed as polar urals - taimyr
>> central Siberia.
>>
>> China shoudl be relabeled as east Asia as it does include some
>> information from Japan and the Tibetan Plateau (L. Thompson) and we
>> don't want to get into some political to-do by calling Tibet "Chinese".
>>
>> that's all I can think of for present, good sailing, tom
>>
>> Keith Briffa wrote:
>>
>>> Hi all
>>> think this is resolved now (virtually) -
>>>
>>> We use series that total to Tom/Gabi composite , and we can cite
>>> this as an example of the scatter of regional records "in a typical
>>> reconstruction". This avoids very difficult issue of what is the
>>> best way to aggregate certain data sets - we are simply illustrating
>>> the point with one published (by then) data set.
>>> The issue of the composite is then not an issue either , because it
>>> is not a new (unpublished) composite that we were concerned about -
>>> though I still believe it is a distraction to put the composite in.
>>> It would be best to use data from 800 or 850 at least , and go to
>>> 1500 (?) and presumably normalise over the whole period of data
>>> shown. OK? Even though you guys all wish to go with the reduced
>>> period (ie not up the present) , but my own instinct is that this
>>> might later come back to haunt us - but will take your lead.
>>> I agree the look of the Figure should match the others.
>>> So, if Tom will send the data sets (his regional curves) , Tim will
>>> plot and send back asap for scrutiny. Thanks Tom and thanks for
>>> your help with this - further comments on latest version of 6.5
>>> (last 2000 years) still welcome , though will be incorporating a few
>>> changes in response to David and Fortunat input , and SH bit (from
>>> Ricardo and Ed) still to go in and regional section to be revised
>>> (after input from Peck et al.)
>>> cheers
>>> Keith
>>> .
>>>
>>>
>>> At 21:42 19/07/2005, Jonathan Overpeck wrote:
>>>
>>>> Hi Keith and Tim: Just got off the phone with Eystein, and
>>>> hopefully he will sleep ok knowing that we have a plan for the MWP
>>>> fig and Tom...
>>>>
>>>> Please ask questions if we don't cover all the key points, but
>>>> here's what we think:
>>>>
>>>> 1) the MWP fig should span the MWP only, and should emphasize
>>>> variation in regional amplitude (we agree that we must be clear
>>>> that this fig is not a reconstruction) - that is, it is best to use
>>>> time series representing regions, assuming that the regional series
>>>> do represent a region ok with one or more input series. We want to
>>>> avoid a regional bias if we can - this is what got us into all the
>>>> MWP misunderstanding in the first place, perhaps (e.g., nice MWP in
>>>> Europe/Atlantic region - must be global)
>>>>
>>>> 2) If you guys could agree on the series and the interval, that'd
>>>> be great. We agree it would be good to start before 1000 and end
>>>> before the Renaissance (15th century?). If you want more feedback
>>>> on these issues, we're happy to provide, but it seems logical that
>>>> you pick series and intervals so that each series covers the entire
>>>> interval selected.
>>>>
>>>> 3) Don't use the Chesapeak record - it is likely biased by salinity
>>>>
>>>> 4) We'd like Keith and Tim to draft the final figure so that it
>>>> matches the look and style of the other two figs they have made.
>>>> Hope this is doable. Tom, does Keith have all the data? Thanks for
>>>> sending if not.
>>>>
>>>> 5) We agree that Tom should NOT be a CA given that he was
>>>> officially one of the ZOD reviewers. Of course, this doesn't
>>>> represent a real conflict, but we need to avoid even the appearance
>>>> of conflict. We greatly appreciate all the feedback that Tom is
>>>> providing! Is this plan ok w/ you Tom? We think you're cool with
>>>> it, but just want to check one more time.
>>>>
>>>> That... it is. Please let us know if there are any more questions.
>>>> Keith - feel free to try and get Eystein on his cell doing your
>>>> work hours if you want quick feedback. Or we can do this by email -
>>>> he's not in a very email friendly place right now, but the fishing
>>>> appears to be ok.
>>>>
>>>> Again, thanks to you both for all the discussion and thought that
>>>> has gone into this figure.
>>>>
>>>> Best, peck
>>>> --
>>>> Jonathan T. Overpeck
>>>> Director, Institute for the Study of Planet Earth
>>>> Professor, Department of Geosciences
>>>> Professor, Department of Atmospheric Sciences
>>>>
>>>> Mail and Fedex Address:
>>>>
>>>> Institute for the Study of Planet Earth
>>>> 715 N. Park Ave. 2nd Floor
>>>> University of Arizona
>>>> Tucson, AZ 85721
>>>> direct tel: xxx xxxx xxxx
>>>> fax: xxx xxxx xxxx
>>>> http://www.geo.arizona.edu/
>>>> http://www.ispe.arizona.edu/
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> --
>>> Professor Keith Briffa,
>>> Climatic Research Unit
>>> University of East Anglia
>>> Norwich, NR4 7TJ, U.K.
>>>
>>> Phone: xxx xxxx xxxx
>>> Fax: xxx xxxx xxxx
>>>
>>> http://www.cru.uea.ac.uk/cru/people/briffa/
>>
>>
>
> Dr Timothy J Osborn
> Climatic Research Unit
> School of Environmental Sciences, University of East Anglia
> Norwich NR4 7TJ, UK
>
> e-mail: t.osborn@xxxxxxxxx.xxx
> phone: xxx xxxx xxxx
> fax: xxx xxxx xxxx
> web: http://www.cru.uea.ac.uk/~timo/
> sunclock: http://www.cru.uea.ac.uk/~timo/sunclock.htm
>

</x-flowed>

Attachment Converted: "c:eudoraattachCH.DA.jpg"

Original Filename: 1121976478.txt | Return to the index page | Permalink | Later Emails

From: Tim Osborn <t.osborn@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>
To: Tom Crowley <tcrowley@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>,Keith Briffa <k.briffa@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>
Subject: MWP figure
Date: Thu, 21 Jul 2005 16:07:58 +0100
Cc: Jonathan Overpeck <jto@u.arizona.edu>, Eystein Jansen <eystein.jansen@xxxxxxxxx.xxx>

<x-flowed>
Hi Tom,

In Keith's email below, when he says "we use series that total to Tom/Gabi
composite", he doesn't mean that *our* mock up of the figure uses these
series, but that if the series shown in *your* draft figure are the same as
those used in the Hegerl/Crowley recon that is currently submitted ("...a
twice validated climate record...") then we will go with *your* figure. It
is fine then to include the "composite series" and the instrumental data
and a temperature scale. Our previous concerns about these latter points
were that it might be seen as another new NH temperature
reconstruction. But if in fact the composite and its expression as a
temperature are not a new NH T recon, but are in fact identical to the
published (submitted, at least) Hegerl/Crowley NH T recon (which is already
included in the main intercomparison figure) then there's no problem.

Does your figure equate to the new Hegerl/Crowley NH T recon? If so, we
should go with your MWP figure, though the CLAs want me to draw it in the
same style as the others and also cut the time period down to a few
centuries spanning the MWP. Keith suggests beginning in 800 or 850.

Would it be possible therefore to send the data series you used for your
figure, but beginning in 800/850, so I can plot the figure in the required
form?

Cheers

Tim

At 14:53 20/07/2005, Tom Crowley wrote:
>Keith, if you can find more I see no problem - it seems that a lot of the
>data you used was via Cook and colleagues - I was unable to locate a full
>length record from Quebec in that time series, but maybe you are relying
>on something else - if so can I have it!?
>
>other suggestions: provide a more general label to sites - eg, mangazeyek
>(sp)/yamal could be listed as polar urals - taimyr central Siberia.
>
>China shoudl be relabeled as east Asia as it does include some information
>from Japan and the Tibetan Plateau (L. Thompson) and we don't want to get
>into some political to-do by calling Tibet "Chinese".
>
>that's all I can think of for present, good sailing, tom
>
>Keith Briffa wrote:
>
>>Hi all
>>think this is resolved now (virtually) -
>>
>>We use series that total to Tom/Gabi composite , and we can cite this as
>>an example of the scatter of regional records "in a typical
>>reconstruction". This avoids very difficult issue of what is the best way
>>to aggregate certain data sets - we are simply illustrating the point
>>with one published (by then) data set.
>>The issue of the composite is then not an issue either , because it is
>>not a new (unpublished) composite that we were concerned about - though I
>>still believe it is a distraction to put the composite in. It would be
>>best to use data from 800 or 850 at least , and go to 1500 (?) and
>>presumably normalise over the whole period of data shown. OK? Even though
>>you guys all wish to go with the reduced period (ie not up the present) ,
>>but my own instinct is that this might later come back to haunt us - but
>>will take your lead.
>>I agree the look of the Figure should match the others.
>>So, if Tom will send the data sets (his regional curves) , Tim will plot
>>and send back asap for scrutiny. Thanks Tom and thanks for your help
>>with this - further comments on latest version of 6.5 (last 2000 years)
>>still welcome , though will be incorporating a few changes in response to
>>David and Fortunat input , and SH bit (from Ricardo and Ed) still to go
>>in and regional section to be revised (after input from Peck et al.)
>>cheers
>>Keith
>>.
>>
>>
>> At 21:42 19/07/2005, Jonathan Overpeck wrote:
>>
>>>Hi Keith and Tim: Just got off the phone with Eystein, and hopefully he
>>>will sleep ok knowing that we have a plan for the MWP fig and Tom...
>>>
>>>Please ask questions if we don't cover all the key points, but here's
>>>what we think:
>>>
>>>1) the MWP fig should span the MWP only, and should emphasize variation
>>>in regional amplitude (we agree that we must be clear that this fig is
>>>not a reconstruction) - that is, it is best to use time series
>>>representing regions, assuming that the regional series do represent a
>>>region ok with one or more input series. We want to avoid a regional
>>>bias if we can - this is what got us into all the MWP misunderstanding
>>>in the first place, perhaps (e.g., nice MWP in Europe/Atlantic region -
>>>must be global)
>>>
>>>2) If you guys could agree on the series and the interval, that'd be
>>>great. We agree it would be good to start before 1000 and end before the
>>>Renaissance (15th century?). If you want more feedback on these issues,
>>>we're happy to provide, but it seems logical that you pick series and
>>>intervals so that each series covers the entire interval selected.
>>>
>>>3) Don't use the Chesapeak record - it is likely biased by salinity
>>>
>>>4) We'd like Keith and Tim to draft the final figure so that it matches
>>>the look and style of the other two figs they have made. Hope this is
>>>doable. Tom, does Keith have all the data? Thanks for sending if not.
>>>
>>>5) We agree that Tom should NOT be a CA given that he was officially one
>>>of the ZOD reviewers. Of course, this doesn't represent a real conflict,
>>>but we need to avoid even the appearance of conflict. We greatly
>>>appreciate all the feedback that Tom is providing! Is this plan ok w/
>>>you Tom? We think you're cool with it, but just want to check one more time.
>>>
>>>That... it is. Please let us know if there are any more questions. Keith
>>>- feel free to try and get Eystein on his cell doing your work hours if
>>>you want quick feedback. Or we can do this by email - he's not in a very
>>>email friendly place right now, but the fishing appears to be ok.
>>>
>>>Again, thanks to you both for all the discussion and thought that has
>>>gone into this figure.
>>>
>>>Best, peck
>>>--
>>>Jonathan T. Overpeck
>>>Director, Institute for the Study of Planet Earth
>>>Professor, Department of Geosciences
>>>Professor, Department of Atmospheric Sciences
>>>
>>>Mail and Fedex Address:
>>>
>>>Institute for the Study of Planet Earth
>>>715 N. Park Ave. 2nd Floor
>>>University of Arizona
>>>Tucson, AZ 85721
>>>direct tel: xxx xxxx xxxx
>>>fax: xxx xxxx xxxx
>>>http://www.geo.arizona.edu/
>>>http://www.ispe.arizona.edu/
>>
>>
>>--
>>Professor Keith Briffa,
>>Climatic Research Unit
>>University of East Anglia
>>Norwich, NR4 7TJ, U.K.
>>
>>Phone: xxx xxxx xxxx
>>Fax: xxx xxxx xxxx
>>
>>http://www.cru.uea.ac.uk/cru/people/briffa/
>

Dr Timothy J Osborn
Climatic Research Unit
School of Environmental Sciences, University of East Anglia
Norwich NR4 7TJ, UK

e-mail: t.osborn@xxxxxxxxx.xxx
phone: xxx xxxx xxxx
fax: xxx xxxx xxxx
web: http://www.cru.uea.ac.uk/~timo/
sunclock: http://www.cru.uea.ac.uk/~timo/sunclock.htm

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